THE 


CRISIS  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 


BY 


GEO.  S.  BOUTWELL 


BOSTON 

DANA  ESTES  &  COMPANY 
1900 


COPYRIGHT,  1900, 
DANA  ESTEH  AND  COMPANY. 


CONTENTS 


I     INTRODUCTORY  NOTE     i 

II     THE  VENEZUELAN  QUESTION  AND  THE  MONROE 

DOCTRINE 5 

III  INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION       .....  29 

IV  HAWAIIAN  ANNEXATION 41 

V     WAR,  AND  A  CHANGE  OF  OUR  PUBLIC  POLICY  .         .  53 

VI     PROBLEMS  RAISED  BY  THE  WAR 65 

VII     ISOLATION  AND  IMPERIALISM 89 

VIII     PEACE  OR  WAR 105 

IX     IMPERIALISTS  OR  REPUBLICANS 121 

X     SELF-GOVERNMENT  OR  TYRANNY 137 

XI     IMPERIALISM  AND  ANTI-IMPERIALISM    .         .        .         .15? 

XII     UN-REPUBLICAN  POLICY  OF  PRESIDENT  MCKINLEY    .  177 

XIII  ADDRESS  TO  THE  PEOPLE 181 

XIV  LETTER  TO  A  MEETING  OF  LABORING  MEN         .        .187 
XV     THE  WAR  OF  DESPOTISM  IN  THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS,  191 

XVI     LETTERS  TO  THE  CHICAGO  CONFERENCE,  ADDRESSED  TO 

EDWIN    BURNETT  SMITH  AND  ERVING  WINSLOW,  211 

INDEX 213 


269091 


INTRODUCTORY   NOTE. 


The  publication  of  these  papers  is  due  to  the 
generosity  of  my  friend,  Mr.  Dana  Estes. 

He  has  assumed,  voluntarily,  the  cost  of  the 
publication,  and  in  case  of  a  profit  from  the  sale  of 
the  book,  that  profit  will  be  passed  to  the  Anti- 
Imperialist  League  as  a  contribution  to  its  means 

of  influence. 

GEO.  S.  BOUTWELL. 

BOSTON,  November  i,  1899. 


THE  VENEZUELAN   QUESTION 

AND 

THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


THE   VENEZUELAN   QUESTION   AND  THE 
MONROE   DOCTRINE. 


IT  is  my  purpose  in  this  article  to  set  forth  the  views  that 
I  entertain  of  the  positions  taken  by  the  Executive  Depart 
ment  of  our  Government  touching  the  controversy  that,  for 
many  years,  has  existed  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela 
as  to  the  boundaries  of  the  latter  country  on  the  line  of  the 
colony  of  British  Guiana. 

Next,  it  is  my  purpose  to  consider  the  circumstances  in 
which  the  Monroe  doctrine  had  its  rise,  its  scope  as  it  was 
understood  originally,  and  then  to  examine  the  proposals  now 
made  for  the  enlargement  of  its  scope  to  national  and  inter 
national  relations  not  contemplated  by  its  authors. 

I  may  then  indulge  myself  in  some  observations  on  the 
aspect  of  affairs  as  they  appear  to  be  connected  with  the 
Venezuelan  controversy. 

If,  in  the  opinion  of  anyone,  an  American  citizen,  though 
a  private  citizen  only,  may  need  an  apology  or  an  excuse  for 
presenting  his  views  to  the  public,  he  may  find,  not  an 
apology,  nor  an  excuse  merely,  but  full  justification  in  the 
fact  that  that  controversy  has  become  a  menace  of  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

If  we  include  the  colonies  of  Great  Britain,  that  menace 
assails  directly  not  less  than  one-twelfth  part  of  the  civilized 
inhabitants  of  the  globe ;  and  if  that  menace  should  become 
an  event,  the  business  relations  of  men  and  the  political 
relations  of  states  would  be  disturbed  seriously  over  the  whole 
western  world. 

Do  I  assume  anything  beyond  what  is  justified  by  the 
record  when  I  say  that  the  positions  taken  by  the  Executive 
Department  are  a  menace  of  war?  What  are  those  positions? 
From  the  record  they  appear  to  be  these,  viz. : 

NOTE. — From  the  Boston  Herald  of  Feb.  2,  1896.  5 


First.  Great  Britain,  having  refused  to  submit  to  arbitra 
tion  the  question  of  boundary  between  Venezuela  and  British 
Guiana,  the  President,  with  the  assent  of  Congress,  has 
appointed  a  commission  of  five  persons,  who  are  charged 
with  the  duty  of  ascertaining  the  true  boundary  line  between 
Venezuela  and  British  Guiana,  and  reporting  thereon. 

Second.  "  When  such  report  is  made  and  accepted  it 
will,"  in  the  opinion  of  the  President,  "  be  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  resist,  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a 
wilful  aggression  upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appropria 
tion  by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands,  or  the  exercise  of  govern 
mental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which,  after  investigation, 
we  have  determined  of  right  belongs  to  Venezuela."  Such 
is  the  President's  opinion,  and  these  are  the  President's  words 
in  his  message  of  Dec.  17,  1895. 

As  I  am  dealing  with  the  positions  of  the  executive  branch 
of  the  Government,  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  qualify  my 
argument  by  the  statement  that  the  President  is  not  clothed 
with  power  to  enforce  his  opinions ;  but  it  is  also  true  that 
the  official  opinions  of  a  President  are  entitled  to  great  con 
sideration,  and  that  such  consideration  is  accorded  to  them 
at  home  and  abroad. 

As  an  illustration,  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  Monroe  doctrine, 
which  is  involved,  or  is  supposed  to  be  involved,  in  this  con 
troversy,  had  its  origin,  as  a  public  declaration,  in  President 
Monroe's  message  of  1823.  The  authority  of  that  declaration, 
which  continues  to  this  day,  has  its  chief  support  in  the  fact 
that  it  was  the  official  utterance  of  a  President,  although  its 
scope  was  not  defined  by  President  Monroe,  nor  has  its 
binding  obligation  upon  the  country  been  recognized  dis 
tinctly  by  any  act  of  Congress. 

Indeed,  of  many  resolutions  that  have  been  introduced  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  not  one  has  received  the  con 
current  affirmative  action  of  the  two  houses. 

It  is  not,  however,  to  be  inferred  from  this  non-action  that 
the  country  is  not  quite  unanimous  in  favor  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  but  upon  some  theory  of  its  scope,  which,  as  yet, 
has  not  been  defined. 


The  gravity  of  the  situation  has  been  made  more  serious  by 
the  circumstance  that  Congress  indorsed  so  much  of  the  Presi 
dent's  plan  as  was  involved  in  the  creation  of  a  commission ; 
and  by  the  additional  circumstance  that  his  policy  has  been 
indorsed  in  substance,  if  not  in  exact  form,  by  influential 
presses  and  by  leading  statesmen  of  the  majority  party  of  the 
country,  that,  upon  all  questions  of  domestic  policy,  is 
opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  President. 

Beyond  this,  and  more  serious,  possibly,  than  all  this,  the 
war  spirit  has  been  aroused,  especially  among  the  youth  of 
the  country,  who  know  not  what  war  is,  and  contributions  to 
the  rising  war  spirit  are  made  in  the  Senate  by  propositions 
to  increase  our  naval  armaments  to  an  equality  with  the  arma 
ments  of  England. 

Simultaneously  with  these  propositions  in  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  there  comes  the  rumor  that  the  mind  of 
England  is  being  directed  to  the  subject  of  the  enlargement 
of  her  navy,  by  an  addition  that,  of  itself,  will  exceed  the 
total  naval  armament  of  the  United  States.  Are  these  prep 
arations  preparations  for  peace  or  are  they  for  war?  With 
the  material  of  war  accumulated,  and  the  war  spirit  aroused 
in  a  hundred  million  people,  who  can  be  responsible  for  the 
peace  of  the  world  ? 

We  are  assured,  however,  by  those  who  demand  an  imme 
diate  increase  of  naval  force,  that  there  will  be  no  war.  If 
not,  then  why  the  force?  Is  England  to  be  deterred  from 
war  by  the  magnitude  of  our  means  for  prosecuting  war?  I 
think  not.  She  will  be  controlled  by  other  considerations,  as 
we  shall  be  controlled  by  other  considerations. 

In  these  days  war  should  not  be  undertaken  except  for  the 
preservation  of  national  honor,  or  the  protection  of  public  or 
private  rights — rights  not  merely  menaced,  but  actually 
invaded. 

As  I  go  on  I  shall  consider  the  means  of  escape  from  the 
calamity  of  war,  if,  indeed,  any  honorable  means  of  escape 
can  be  found,  if  we  follow  in  the  path  that  the  President  has 
marked  out. 


8 

But  first,  and  as  preliminary,  I  ask  attention  more  specif 
ically  to  the  two  propositions  as  I  have  presented  them,  and 
which  appear  to  be  embodied  in  the  President's  policy. 

It  is  assumed  by  the  President  that  England,  by  its  refusal 
to  submit  the  question  of  boundary  to  arbitration,  has  failed 
in  some  duty  that  rested  upon  her  as  one  nation  in  the  family 
of  nations.  If  the  so-called  law  of  nations  be  considered  as  a 
code,  which,  assuredly,  it  is  not,  its  rules  are  silent  in  regard 
to  arbitration.  The  obligations  resting  upon  states  to  submit 
questions  in  controversy  to  the  decision  of  arbitrators  are 
obligations  which  are  moral  in  their  quality,  or  obligations 
which  spring  from  considerations  of  state  policy. 

V/e  must  all  agree  that  nations  and  peoples  should  insist 
upon  arbitration  as  the  wisest  means  of  adjusting  controver 
sies  between  states.  At  the  end,  however,  the  admission 
must  be  made  that  in  the  absence  of  treaty  stipulations 
between  particular  states,  nations  in  controversy  with  each 
other  are  free  as  to  the  method  of  adjustment. 

If,  then,  England  cannot  be  arraigned  for  refusing  to  sub 
mit  the  question  of  boundaries  to  the  judgment  of  arbitrators, 
it  may  yet  be  said  that  her  present  position  is  not  a  tenable 
position.  She  has  recognized  the  propriety  of  submitting  her 
rights  to  arbitration  as  to  certain  territory  in  controversy,  and 
then  she  assumes  to  decide  what  territory  is  in  controversy. 

As  between  nations,  there  may  be  a  claim  to  territory  by 
one  party  that  the  opposing  party  could  not  submit  to  arbi 
tration.  If,  as  an  example,  Mexico  should  now  claim  the 
territory  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande,  we  should 
decline  to  submit  that  claim  to  arbitration.  Our  reason 
would  be  apparent.  Our  paper  evidence  of  title  is  complete. 
It  is  known  of  all  men ;  and  for  nearly  two  generations  our 
occupancy  has  been  actual,  it  has  been  uninterrupted,  it  has 
never  been  disputed.  To  the  demand  of  England  for  an 
arbitration  to  fix  the  boundaries  of  Alaska  we  could  make  no 
such  answer. 


The  grave  question  is  this :    Has  England  such  evidence  of 


9 

title  to  the  territory  within  the  Schomburgk  line  that  its 
presentation  would  at  once  and  without  debate  satisfy  impar 
tial  men  that  her  claim  is  valid? 

If  such  evidence  exists  England's  error  in  not  having  pre 
sented  this  evidence  a  long  time  ago  is  a  most  serious  error, 
and,  apparently,  without  excuse.  Her  omission  to  present 
such  evidence,  and  her  admissions  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
evidence  which  is  at  her  command,  warrant  the  conclusion, 
for  the  time  being,  that  such  evidence  does  not  exist. 

It  is  admitted  by  Lord  Salisbury  in  his  dispatch  of  Nov. 
26,  1895,  that  the  Schomburgk  line  when  it  was  run  was 
a  tentative  line ;  that  the  man  whose  name  it  bears  made  no 
attempt  to  follow  any  authoritative  chart,  treaty  or  historical 
descriptive  account  of  the  boundaries  of  the  two  countries. 

Lord  Salisbury  admits,  further,  in  the  dispatch  referred  to, 
what  was  alleged  by  Mr.  Olney,  that  it  "  seems  impossible  to 
treat  the  Schomburgk  line  as  being  the  boundary  claimed 
by  Great  Britain  as  a  matter  of  right,  or  as  anything  but  a 
line  originating  in  considerations  of  convenience  and  expedi 
ency."  This  admission  relates  to  the  year  1840,  and  in  that 
year  the  British  Government  refused  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of 
boundaries,  and  for  the  reason  that  a  survey  was  a  necessary 
preliminary,  and  that  the  survey  was  then  proceeding. 

From  these  admitted  facts  some  conclusions  are  deducible, 
viz. :  That  whatever  may  have  been  the  rights  of  Great 
Britain  under  Spain  and  the  Danish  treaty,  yet,  in  1840, 
there  had  been  no  authorized  delimitation  of  the  territory  of 
British  Guiana  from  the  contiguous  territory  of  Venezuela. 
And,  secondly,  that  in  the  survey  of  1840,  Schomburgk 
made  no  attempt  to  follow  the  treaties,  or  to  ascertain 
whether,  during  the  rule  of  Spain,  any  line  had  been  observed 
by  both  parties  as  the  line  either  of  occupation  or  of  jurisdic 
tion.  Third :  That  Venezuela  has  never  assented  to  the 
Schomburgk  line. 

.  Upon  these  facts  and  this  analysis  it  is  difficult  to  under 
stand  how  England  can  claim  that  the  territory  within  the 
Schomburgk  line  is  territory  not  in  controversy. 


10 

Other  admissions  of  Lord  Salisbury  tend  to  show  that  the 
Schomburgk  line  is  an  arbitrary  line.  We  know  that  it  was 
run  ex  parte,  and,  consequently,  it  has  no  binding  force  upon 
Venezuela.  Lord  Salisbury  says:  "The  Schomburgk  line 
was  in  fact  a  great  reduction  of  the  boundary  claimed  by 
Great  Britain  as  matter  of  right." 

Again,  he  says  of  the  British  claim:  "It  will  be  seen  from 
the  preceding  statement  that  the  Government  of  Great  Britain 
have  from  the  first  held  the  same  view  as  to  the  extent  of  ter 
ritory  which  they  are  entitled  to  claim  as  matter  of  right.  It 
comprised  the  coast  line  up  to  the  river  Amacura,  and  the 
whole  basin  of  the  Essequibo  river  and  its  tributaries."  This 
statement  is  a  declaration,  in  substance,  that  the  title  on 
which  England  rests  for  support  of  its  claim  to  the  territory 
within  the  Schomburgk  line  covers  the  entire  valley  of  the 
Essequibo  river.  It  follows  further  from  this  statement  that 
if  any  portion  of  the  territory  in  the  valley  of  the  Essequibo 
river  is  the  subject  of  controversy,  then  the  territory  of  the 
entire  valley  is  the  subject  of  controversy,  for  there  is  no  pre 
tence  by  England  that  any  line  has  been  drawn  through  the 
valley,  within  the  limits  of  the  territory  in  dispute,  to  which 
Venezuela  has  assented. 

Another  statement  by  Lord  Salisbury  leads  to  the  same 
conclusion  :  "  A  portion  of  that  claim,  however,  they" — that 
is,  the  British  Government —  "  have  always  been  willing  to 
waive  altogether;  in  regard  to  another  portion  they  have 
been  and  continue  to  be  perfectly  ready  to  submit  the  ques 
tion  of  their  title  to  arbitration." 

England's  position  is  this :  Our  title  is  one  and  the  same 
to  the  entire  valley  of  the  Essequibo  river.  As  to  a  portion 
of  this  valley,  we  surrender  it  to  Venezuela  without  inquiry 
and  without  compensation.  We  are  willing  to  submit  the 
question  of  the  validity  of  our  title  to  a  second  portion  to 
the  decision  of  arbitrators ;  but  the  remainder  we  claim  by  a 
valid  title,  and  we  will  not  submit  the  question  to  inquiry  or 
to  the  judgment  of  anyone. 


1 1 

In  the  concluding  paragraph  of  Lord  Salisbury's  dispatch 
he  makes  a  statement  which  is  well  worthy  of  serious  consid 
eration.  Speaking  of  the  British  Government,  he  says : 
"  They  cannot  consent  to  entertain,  or  to  submit  to  arbitra 
tion  of  another  power,  or  of  foreign  jurists,  however  eminent, 
claims  based  on  the  extravagant  pretensions  of  Spanish  offi 
cials  in  the  last  century,  and  involving  the  transfer  of  large 
numbers  of  British  subjects,  who  have  for  many  years 
enjoyed  the  settled  rule  of  a  British  colony,  to  a  nation  of 
a  different  race  and  language,  whose  political  system  is  sub 
ject  to  frequent  disturbance,  and  whose  institutions  as  yet  too 
often  afford  very  inadequate  protection  to  life  and  property." 

Without  considering  the  necessity  or  the  propriety  of  the 
statements  contained  in  the  last  branch  of  this  sentence,  it  is 
yet  true  that  the  allegation  that  there  are  resident  upon  the 
territory  claimed  by  Venezuela  "large  numbers  of  British 
subjects,  who  have  for  many  years  enjoyed  the  settled  rule  of 
a  British  colony,"  opened  the  way  for  the  further  exercise  of 
the  good  offices  of  the  United  States.  Among  the  calamities 
which  have  fallen  upon  mankind  there  are  but  few  which  are 
more  serious  than  the  forcible  transfer  of  populations  from 
one  jurisdiction  to  another. 


The  statement  of  Lord  Salisbury  opened  the  way  for  an 
adjustment  upon  a  new  basis  —  the  cession  to  Great  Britain 
of  the  territory  occupied  by  British  subjects,  on  the  condition 
that  Venezuela  should  be  compensated  for  whatever  loss  of 
jurisdiction  she  might  suffer.  Neither  the  Secretary  of  State 
nor  the  President  saw  the  way  that  was  thus  opened,  and  in 
one  sentence  the  President  transferred  the  controversy,  as  far 
as  the  Executive  Department  of  our  Government  could  act, 
from  the  field  of  negotiation,  of  arbitrament,  of  possible  ami 
cable  adjustment,  to  the  alternative  of  force,  or  the  submission 
by  Great  Britain  to  the  ex  parte  judgment  of  the  United 
States  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  England's  jurisdiction  in 
British  Guiana. 

This  for  the  reason  that  Great  Britain  had  refused  to  sub- 


12 

mit  the  controversy,  in  all  its  fullness,  to  the  decision  of  arbi 
trators.  I  have  attempted  to  show  that  Great  Britain  erred 
in  that  respect,  but,  even  if  I  am  correct  in  the  conclusion 
reached,  the  fact  remains  that  Great  Britain  was  not  bound  to 
arbitrate  the  question.  There  is  no  treaty  to  that  effect 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  nor  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  and  at  the  end,  as  has  been 
said,  the  law  of  nations  is  silent. 

If  this  be  so,  then  it  may  be  asserted  that  on  that  seven 
teenth  day  of  December  Great  Britain  had  not  done  any  act 
nor  taken  any  position  of  which  we  had  a  right  to  complain. 
The  Monroe  doctrine,  however  broad  may  be  the  interpreta 
tion  given  to  it,  had  not  been  violated  in  any  particular.  On 
the  contrary,  it  might  happen  that  it  would  not  be  violated. 
At  that  moment  there  were  possible  ways  of  adjustment  with 
out  resorting  to  arbitration.  Indeed,  the  President  suggested 
a  way :  An  agreement  with  Venezuela,  and  that  without 
regard  to  the  wishes,  interests  or  rights  of  the  United  States. 

To  this  theory  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  I  do  not  give  my 
assent  without  qualification,  although  I  cannot  anticipate  the 
consummation  of  any  arrangement  between  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela  which  could  give  rise  to  any  objection  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States. 

The  President  has  committed  the  Executive  Department 
to  that  doctrine  for  the  time  being,  but  I  do  not  anticipate  its 
ratification  by  Congress  or  by  the  country. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  is  not  for  the  benefit,  primarily,  of 
Venezuela,  or  any  other  American  state,  but  first  for  the  pro 
tection  of  the  interests  and  rights  of  the  United  States,  and 
then  in  aid  of  the  acceptance  and  maintenance  of  republican 
institutions  on  this  continent.  Within  these  limits  the  United 
States  is  concerned  in  whatever  is  done  in  or  by  any  other 
American  state,  either  by  aggressions  from  without  or  by  the 
inauguration  of  a  dangerous  public  policy  from  within. 

If  Mexico  had  been  content  to  accept  Maximilian  as 
emperor,  our  right  of  intervention  would  have  been  what  it 
was  when  his  attempt  at  empire  was  supported  by  the  armies 


13 

of  France,  and  when  they  were  acting  in  hostility  to  the 
authorities  and  people  of  Mexico.  The  President's  position 
may  be  accepted  for  the  existing  case  of  England  and  Ven 
ezuela,  but,  as  a  doctrine,  applicable  to  all  cases  that  may 
arise,  it  should  be  rejected. 


Kindred  to  this  error  is  the  error  of  Senator  Lodge,  who 
recognizes  the  act  of  the  British  authorities  at  Corinto  as  an 
unobjectionable  proceeding.  In  the  particular  case,  the  sei 
zure  of  the  custom-house  at  Corinto  may  not  have  been  prop 
erly  the  subject  of  adverse  comment  on  our  part,  but  we 
may  assume  the  seizure  of  all  the  custom-houses  of  a  country, 
and  then,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  or  of  increasing  the 
revenues,  the  occupation  might  be  extended  to  the  sources  of 
revenue  and  the  means  of  communication,  and  thus  the  main 
features  of  administration  might  pass  into  the  control  of  the 
invading  party. 


It  is  an  infelicity  of  the  situation  in  which  the  country  has 
been  placed  by  the  President,  that  Great  Britain  is  challenged 
by  a  threat  that  force  will  be  resorted  to  when  a  conclusion 
shall  have  been  reached  by  the  United  States,  if  that  conclu 
sion  should  not  be  accepted  by  Great  Britain.  It  is  by  no 
means  certain  that  the  Commission  can  reach  any  trustworthy 
conclusion,  and  there  is  but  little  prospect  that  Congress 
would  sanction  any  line  upon  the  understanding  or  declara 
tion  that  the  "  United  States  would  resist,  by  every  means  in 
its  power,  as  a  wilful  aggression  upon  its  rights  and  interests, 
the  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exer 
cise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which, 
after  investigation,  we  had  determined  of  right"  belonged  to 
Venezuela. 

Would  it  not  have  been  wise  for  the  President  to  have 
instituted  the  commission,  waited  for  its  report,  and  invited 
the  judgment  of  Congress  upon  its  merits,  and  all  in  advance 
of  a  hostile  declaration? 

Any  one  of  several  results  may  happen,  and  the  happening 


14 

of  any  one  of  them  may  place  the  Executive  Department  of 
the  Government  in  an  unenviable  position. 

The  Commission  may  find  that  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  is 
sustained  by  the  evidence ;  or  it  may  find  that  the  evidence 
is  insufficient  to  warrant  the  recognition  of  any  line  upon 
legal  and  historical  grounds ;  or  the  Commission  may  divide 
in  opinion,  in  which  case  the  majority  and  minority  reports 
would  be  alike  valueless  as  the  basis  of  definite  action. 

Either  of  these  results,  however  disagreeable  it  might  be 
to  the  executive  branch  of  the  Government,  would  be  a  most 
fortunate  event  for  the  country.  No  further  thought  would 
be  given  to  the  threat  of  the  President,  and  the  menace  of 
war  would  disappear  as  suddenly  as  it  came. 


I  return  to  one  aspect  of  this  case  which,  as  far  as  its  his 
tory  is  known  to  me,  is  presented  to  the  country  for  the  first 
time  in  Lord  Salisbury's  dispatch  of  Nov.  22. 

If,  as  is  alleged,  there  are  considerable  numbers  of  British 
subjects,  who  are  residents  upon  the  territory  in  dispute, 
who  speak  the  English  language,  and  who  are  accustomed 
to  English  law,  Venezuela  ought  not  to  demand  the  transfer 
of  that  territory;  and  the  United  States  should  not  be  con 
tent  with  the  exercise  of  its  good  offices  merely ;  it  should 
exert  its  active  influence  in  aid  of  the  cession  to  England  of 
the  territory  so  occupied,  assuming,  always,  reasonable  com 
pensation  to  Venezuela,  in  case  a  right  to  compensation 
should  be  established. 

Nor  can  Venezuela  afford  to  assume  jurisdiction  of  a  con 
siderable  body  of  people  who  cannot  speak  the  language  of 
the  country,  and  who  for  generations  may  fail  to  understand 
and  accept  its  institutions  and  laws. 

The  fact  seems  to  open  a  way  for  an  adjustment  of  the 
controversy  upon  a  basis  which  recognizes  the  claims  of 
those  who  are  most  interested  in  the  settlement  of  the 
question. 

It  is  a  case  in  which  justice  to  men  may  be  set  off  against 
claims  of  jurisdiction,  whether  derived  from  ancient  discov- 


15 

cries,  from  conquest,  or  from  treaties  signed  under  duress  at 
the  end  of  unsuccessful  wars. 


In  dealing  with  the  Monroe  doctrine  attention  must  be 
directed  to  several  points :  its  meaning,  as  the  doctrine  was 
understood  by  its  authors ;  the  obligations  which  the  doc 
trine  imposes  upon  the  United  States ;  the  limitations  that  it 
imposes  upon  foreign  states  if  it  shall  be  observed  by  them ; 
and,  lastly,  whether  the  original  scope  of  the  doctrine  should 
be  changed  in  presence  of  the  fact  that  our  influence  in 
the  family  of  nations  has  been  increased  immensely  since 
1823. 

The  first  announcement  of  the  doctrine  is  reported  by  Mr. 
Adams  in  his  diary  under  date  of  July  17,  1823.  He  recites 
a  conversation  that  he  had  that  day  with  Baron  Tuyl,  the 
Russian  minister,  and  he  then  adds :  "  I  told  him  specially 
that  we  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any  territorial 
establishment  on  this  continent,  and  that  we  should  assume 
distinctly  the  principle  that  the  American  continents  are  no 
longer  subjects  for  any  new  European  colonial  establish 
ments." 

This  declaration  is  of  two  parts :  that  which  relates  to 
Russia  and  that  which  relates  to  the  states  of  Europe.  The 
part  relating  to  Russia  is  of  no  importance  at  this  time. 

In  the  December  following  President  Monroe  announced 
the  doctrine  to  Congress,  to  the  country  and  to  the  world. 
After  reciting  the  facts  of  negotiations  with  Russia  and  Eng 
land,  he  says:  "  In  the  discussions  to  which  this  interest  has 
given  rise  and  in  the  arrangements  by  which  they  may  ter 
minate,  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting  as 
a  principle,  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the 
free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed 
and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects 
for  future  colonization  by  any  European  power." 

If  we  accept  the  natural  and  common  meaning  of  the 
words  used  by  Mr.  Adams  and  by  President  Monroe,  our 


i6 

conclusions  must  be  these,  viz. :  That  the  then  existing  colo 
nies  and  territories  of  European  nations  were  recognized  as 
valid,  and  to  be  respected  by  us ;  and,  second,  that  any 
future  colonization  would  not  be  recognized  by  us. 

The  message  does  not  contain  any  threats,  nor  even  a 
statement  of  our  purposes  in  case  the  declaration  of  Presi 
dent  Monroe  should  not  be  observed  by  the  states  of 
Europe.  With  a  single  exception  —  the  advent  of  Maxi 
milian  into  Mexico  —  the  declaration  has  been  observed 
through  a  period  of  nearly  three-fourths  of  a  century. 

We  know  what  colonization  is.  There  is  no  ambiguity  in 
the  word.  It  is  the  establishment  of  a  government  where 
none  before  existed,  or  it  is  the  substitution  of  a  new  gov 
ernment  for  a  government  previously  existing,  and  coincident 
with  a  transfer  of  jurisdiction.  It  is  only  argumentatively, 
or,  rather,  by  assertion  which  does  not  rise  to  the  dignity  of 
argument,  that  the  phrase  "  future  colonization,"  or  the 
phrase  "  new  European  colonial  establishment,"  can  be 
construed  to  include,  or  to  have  reference  to,  the  adjustment 
of  the  boundaries  of  existing  states,  even  if,  by  such  adjust 
ment,  there  should  be  an  increase  of  the  territory  of  a 
European  colony  or  province.  The  statement  in  its  value 
is  kindred  to  the  statement  so  often  made  that  the  power  to 
levy  taxes  involves  the  power  to  confiscate  estates  through 
the  process  of  taxation. 

There  is  no  suggestion  in  any  phrase  that  has  been  set 
forth  by  the  British  authorities,  nor  can  any  inference  be 
drawn  from  anything  that  has  been  done  in  South  America 
or  on  the  coast  of  South  America,  that  can  lead  an  impar 
tial  mind  to  the  conclusion  that  Great  Britain  intends  to  sub 
vert  the  Government  of  Venezuela.  Nor  can  it  yet  be 
assumed  that  she  seeks  to  acquire  territory  to  which  she 
has  no  just  claim.  Else  why  the  Commission? 

Nor  ought  the  country  to  accept  the  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine  as  it  was  rendered  by  Senator  Lodge  in  the 
Senate.  "The  Monroe  doctrine,"  says  Senator  Lodge,  "is 
very  simple.  It  is  merely  the  declaration  that  no  foreign 


power  must  establish  a  new  government,  acquire  new  terri 
tory  by  any  method  whatever,  or  seek  to  control  existing 
governments  in  the  Americas." 


If  all  this  were  true,  the  controversy  between  Venezuela 
and  Great  Britain  would  not  be  touched  by  the  application 
of  the  Monroe  doctrine  as  it  is  thus  laid  down  by  Senator 
Lodge.  Great  Britain  does  not  aim  at  the  establishment  of 
a  new  government ;  there  is  not  a  tittle  of  testimony  which 
tends  to  show  that  she  is  seeking  to  control  the  existing  Gov 
ernment  of  Venezuela,  nor  does  she  make  claim  to  new  ter 
ritory.  On  the  contrary,  she  asserts  a  treaty  title  to  the 
territory  in  dispute  which  dates  from  the  year  1814,  when 
the  republic  of  Venezuela  did  not  exist. 

An  assertion  that  Great  Britain  is  seeking  to  acquire  new 
territory  cannot  be  made  in  justice  until  her  claim  of  title 
under  the  Danish  treaty  is  shown  to  be  invalid.  Hence  the 
effort  to  ascertain  through  a  commission  the  relative  rights  of 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  Until  that  question  is  settled 
there  can  be  no  ground  for  the  allegation  that  Great  Britain 
is  seeking  to  acquire  territory  to  which  she  has  not  title. 


The  interpretation  which  I  have  given  to  the  Monroe  doc 
trine  finds  some  support  in  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
doctrine  had  its  origin. 

After  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  the  Holy  Alliance  was 
formed  for  the  security  of  the  doctrine  of  absolutism  in 
governments ;  and  of  necessity  the  alliance  aimed  at  the 
suppression  of  liberal  ideas  and  theories  and  the  overthrow 
of  liberal  institutions. 

The  governments  most  interested  in  the  doctrine  of  abso 
lutism  were  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia.  The  purposes  of 
the  alliance  were  set  forth  in  a  circular  called  the  Laybach 
circular,  from  the  name  of  the  place  at  which  the  congress 
was  held,  in  the  year  1820.  That  circular  was  generally 
known  in  the  United  States,  where  it  produced  a  deep  im 
pression,  and  within  my  own  time  it  was  referred  to  occasion- 


i8 

ally  as  evidence  of  the  hostility  of  Europe  to  the  republican 
ideas  and  institutions  of  America. 

By  the  census  of  1820  the  population  of  the  United  States 
was  less  than  9,700,000  souls.  Of  the  states  that  had 
thrown  off  the  yoke  of  Spain,  not  any  one  of  them,  nor  all  of 
them,  could  have  made  a  successful  resistance  to  the  combined 
assault  of  the  nations  composing  the  Holy  Alliance. 

From  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  to  the  advent  of  Louis 
Philippe  to  the  throne  of  France,  the  continent  of  Europe 
was  dominated  by  the  doctrines  of  absolutism  in  governments. 

It  was  the  necessity  of  the  situation  that  the  United  States 
should  protest  against  any  attempt  by  European  states  to  sub 
vert  the  republican  governments  that  had  been  recently  set 
up  on  this  continent.  The  subjugation  of  those  states  would 
have  created  apprehension  as  to  the  fate  of  the  United  States. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  was  born  of  an  apprehension  —  the 
apprehension  that  the  states  of  this  continent  might  be  re 
stored  to  Spain  through  the  intervention  and  aid  of  the  Holy 
Alliance.  The  Monroe  doctrine,  in  its  announcement,  was 
directed  against  that  specific  danger,  and,  except  for  that 
danger,  it  would  not  have  been  announced. 

Is  it  within  the  limits  of  reason  to  suppose  that  Mr.  Adams, 
when  he  served  notice  on  the  Russian  minister,  had  any 
thought  that  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  that  notice,  had 
acquired  the  authority  to  supervise,  or  had  accepted  the  duty 
of  supervising,  questions  of  boundary  between  existing  states, 
whether  sovereignty  in  those  states  was  in  Europe  or 
America?  Or  that  President  Monroe,  when  he  announced 
the  same  doctrine  to  Congress  and  to  the  world,  intended  to 
assume  for  the  United  States  the  responsibility  of  supervising 
the  adjustment  of  questions  of  boundary,  even  though  the 
parties  might  be  an  American  republican  state  on  one  side 
and  the  colony  of  a  European  government  on  the  other. 

With  stronger  reason,  it  may  be  said  that  neither  Mr. 
Adams  nor  President  Monroe  intended  to  assume  jurisdiction 
over  questions  that  might  arise  in  the  enforcement  of  claims 


19 

by  European  governments  in  behalf  of  their  subjects  or 
citizens,  or  of  questions  that  might  arise  touching  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  ministers  and  diplomatic  agents. 

Under  the  Monroe  doctrine,  properly  interpreted,  we  stand 
aloof,  free,  entirely  free  from  the  contentions  that  from  time 
to  time  may  arise  between  the  republican  states  of  America 
and  the  dynastic  states  of  Europe ;  but  when  in  the  course 
of  events  it  shall  appear,  from  evidence  then  existing,  that  it 
is  the  purpose  of  a  European  state  to  overthrow  the  govern 
ment  and  subvert  the  institutions  of  a  republican  American 
state,  the  United  States  can  then,  as  to  that  case,  and  upon 
the  facts  then  known,  decide  what  ought  to  be  done.  There 
fore,  I  esteem  it  good  fortune,  if  it  is  not  the  result  of  a  wise 
policy,  that  in  these  seventy-five  years  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  abstained  from  any  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine  more  definite  than  President  Monroe's 
statement,  as  set  forth  in  his  message  of  1823.  For  the  same 
reason,  I  look  with  apprehension  upon  each  and  every 
project  for  an  official  definition  of  the  Monroe  doctrine. 
Any  definition  must  contain  limitations  to  the  exercise  of 
power  on  our  part.  Nations  will  proceed  at  once  to  consider 
what  they  may  do  and  what  they  may  not  do.  In  the 
changing'  events  of  national  life  no  one  can  foresee  the  circum- 

o        o 

stances  which  may  justify  the  active  intervention  of  the 
United  States. 

Upon  the  Monroe  doctrine,  as  laid  down  by  President 
Monroe,  we  may  intervene  in  any  case,  whatever  its  nature 
or  its  origin,  in  which  "  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  are  involved."  That  declaration  puts  every  nation 
upon  the  inquiry,  whenever  a  movement  concerning  an 
American  state  is  contemplated,  whether,  in  the  execution  of 
the  plan,  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  will  be 
affected. 

If,  however,  we  indulge  ourselves  in  an  official  enumeration 
of  acts  that  may  not  be  done,  we  thereby  consent  to  the 
doing  of  any  act  not  enumerated ;  and,  further,  we  pledge 
the  Government  to  the  task  of  resistance  whenever  any  other 


20 

government  shall  do  an  act  which  we  have  forbidden.  Can 
there  be  any  wisdom  in  thus  binding  our  own  hands,  which 
now  are  free  ? 


The  President,  in  his  message  of  the  i/th  of  December, 
gave  voice  to  the  thought  that  the  Monroe  doctrine  deserves 
a  place  in  the  law  of  nations.  "  If,"  says  the  President,  "  the 
enforcement  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  is  something  we  may 
justly  claim,  it  has  its  place  in  the  code  of  international  law 
as  certainly  and  as  securely  as  if  it  were  specifically  men 
tioned." 

Fortunately,  the  Monroe  doctrine  is  not  an  article  in  the 
code  of  international  law.  It  can  be  there  only  by  the  recog 
nition  of  states,  few  or  many,  and  if  there  by  the  recognition 
of  states,  the  states  recognizing  it  will  interpret  it,  and  of 
those  states  the  United  States  would  be  but  one.  This, 
again,  would  work  a  limitation  of  our  power. 

By  others  it  is  asserted  that  Mr.  Canning  advised  the  Mon 
roe  doctrine,  and  therefore  it  is  claimed,  argumentatively, 
that  England  ought  to  recognize  it.  We  ought  not  to  ask, 
nor  ought  we  to  accept,  its  recognition  by  any  nation.  If 
recognized,  it  must  be  recognized  upon  some  understanding 
of  what  it  means.  The  Monroe  doctrine  is  not  a  law  for  any 
body.  It  is  a  declaration  of  a  public  policy  by  and  for  the 
United  States.  We  should  not  ask  other  nations  to  indorse 
it;  we  should  not  allow  other  nations  to  interpret  it. 


The  President's  message  and  the  action  of  Congress  have 
led  states  of  the  South,  even  in  the  few  weeks  that  have  tran 
spired  since  the  i/th  of  December,  to  look  to  the  United 
States  for  protection  against  the  enforcement  of  claims  that 
are  unjust,  as  is  alleged.  These  expectations  are  the  first 
fruits  of  an  erroneous  policy  —  a  policy  which  will  be  burden 
some  to  us  and  injurious  to  the  states  that  shall  rely  upon  us 
for  protection. 

The  Monroe  doctrine  is  for  us,  and  not  for  them.  If  any 
good  to  other  states  shall  result,  that  good  will  be  an  incident 


21 

of  the  enforcement  of  a  policy,  but  always  when  enforced, 
enforced  for  our  own  benefit,  primarily. 

We  cannot  afford  to  assume  the  office  of  protector  of  the 
states  on  this  continent.  The  states  on  this  continent  cannot 
afford  to  accept  the  guardianship  of  the  United  States. 

There  is  no  affection  among  states.  Their  relations  are 
dictated  by  self-interest,  and  the  Monroe  doctrine,  as 
announced,  was  made  to  rest  on  "the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  United  States."  The  states  of  this  continent  should 
manage  their  own  controversies,  settle  their  own  disputes,  and 
thus  make  their  independence  something  more  than  a  name. 
The  weaker  states  of  this  continent  should  not  be  misled  by 
the  idea  that  the  United  States  will  engage  in  sympathetic 
wars  on  their  behalf.  The  states  of  this  continent  should  not 
be  misled  by  the  idea  that  the  policy  announced  in  the  Presi 
dent's  message  has  been  indorsed  by  the  country,  or  that  it 
will  be  indorsed  by  the  country. 

Nor  should  they  be  misled  by  the  hope  that  that  policy,  if 
even  now  it  is  acceptable,  will  continue  to  be  the  policy  of 
this  country  for  a  century,  or  even  for  a  decade.  We  are 
interested  in  the  prosperity  of  every  state  on  this  continent, 
and,  that  they  may  be  prosperous,  they  must  be  self-reliant. 

The  patronge  of  states  is  dangerous  to  the  states  patronized. 
For  favors  and  protection  rendered  by  the  strong  to  the  weak, 
concessions  will  be  demanded  and  exacted.  Through  favors 

o 

granted  and  protection  promised,  Russia  is  gaining  a  foothold 
in  China  and  Turkey.  By  a  like  policy  the  sovereignty  of 
Egypt  is  passing  to  England.  For  the  friendship  and  aid 
of  France  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  we  made  the  treaty  of 
alliance  of  1/78,  which  bound  us  to  the  war  train  of  our  ally. 
We  freed  ourselves  from  a  condition  of  vassalage  by  the 
abrogation  of  the  treaty  and  an  open  disregard  of  the  obliga 
tions  we  had  assumed.  These  events  are  teachers  whose 
lessons  should  be  heeded  by  the  weaker  republican  states  of 
this  continent. 


In  returning  to  the  important  aspect  of  the  case,  can  any- 


22 

one  point  to  any  fact  or  feature  of  the  controversy  between 
Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  that  invades  any  right  of  the 
United  States,  or  affects  injuriously  any  interest  that  is  at 
once  appreciable  and  valuable? 

The  apprehension  that  something  more  unjust  may  yet  be 
done  is  not  an  adequate  reason  for  declaring  that  what  has 
been  done  is  an  invasion  of  our  rights  and  interests.  The 
country  will  be  competent  to  take  notice  of  and  to  dispose  of 
the  case  in  its  new  aspect  whenever  it  is  presented. 

England  has  fixed  its  limit  on  the  Schomburgk  line. 
Assume  that  England  shall  maintain  that  line  by  force,  will 
anyone  then  be  able  to  say  that  any  right  of  the  United 
States  has  been  invaded,  or  that  any  interest  that  is  at  once 
appreciable  and  valuable  has  been  affected  injuriously? 
And,  if  not,  is  it  not  then  clear  that  the  case  of  Venezuela 
and  Great  Britain  is  outside  of  the  Monroe  doctrine,  as  that 
doctrine  was  announced  by  Mr.  Adams  and  President 
Monroe? 

Nor  is  it  pertinent  to  the  inquiry  that  we  should  marshal 
the  doings  of  England,  by  which  she  has  established  colonies 
on  every  continent,  and  acquired  possession,  and  exercised 
jurisdiction,  over  islands  in  every  sea.  Nor  does  argument 
upon  this  basis  become  valid  through  the  suggestion,  or  the 
assertion  even,  that  in  all  the  controversies  and  contests  inci 
dent  to  these  acquisitions  England  has  been  in  the  wrong  and 
the  suffering  party  in  the  right.  The  question  still  remains: 
Has  England,  by  these  acquisitions,  invaded  any  right  of  the 
United  States  which  can  be  set  forth  specifically,  or  done  any 
act  which  has  affected  appreciably  and  injuriously  the  inter 
ests  of  the  United  States? 

If  to  this  question  an  affirmative  answer  shall  be  tendered,, 
another  inquiry  must  follow:  Why  has  not  the  United  States 
sought  redress  directly? 

I  have  suggested  three  ways  of  escape  from  the  position  in 
which  the  country  has  been  placed  by  the  President's 
message : 


23 

1.  That  the  Commission  shall  find  that  England's  claim  is 
justified  and  sustained  by  the  evidence. 

2.  That    the    evidence    is    of    such    a    nature    that    the 
Commission  cannot  reach  a  satisfactory  conclusion. 

3.  That  the  Commission  should  divide  in  opinion. 

If,  however,  the  Commission  should  designate  a  line  as  the 
true  line,  and  England  should  disregard  that  line,  and  should 
continue  to  claim  and  to  exercise  jurisdiction  as  though  the 
Commission  had  not  existed,  what  are  the  alternatives  that 
would  then  be  presented  to  the  United  States? 

Those  who  advocate  a  war  policy,  and  at  the  same  time 
promise  peace,  may  say  England  will  accept  the  judgment  of 
the  Commission.  That  may  depend  upon  the  scope  of  the 
judgment.  If  the  line  shall  be  so  drawn  as  to  transfer  any 
considerable  number  of  English-speaking  and  English-born 
subjects  to  Venezuela,  the  cherished  traditions  of  England 
must  be  disregarded  if  she  should  recognize  the  line  except 
at  the  end  of  an  unsuccessful  war. 

And  shall  the  United  States  engage  in  a  war  upon  the 
question  of  the  boundary  line  of  Venezuela  and  British 
Guiana  through  the  valley  of  the  river  Essequibo? 

And  was  there  any  wisdom  in  the  creation  of  a  commission 
not  authorized  by  the  constitution,  a  commission  not  bound 
to  ^the  country  by  an  oath,  nor  liable  to  impeachment  for 
misconduct,  a  commission  instructed  to  deal  with  a  question 
not  within  our  jurisdiction?  If  the  message  of  the  President 
embodies  the  opinions  and  forecasts  the  purpose  of  the 
country,  then  to  that  commission  have  been  entrusted  the 
great  issues  of  war  or  peace. 


Is  there  any  interest  in  this  country  that  can  afford  a  war 
over  the  controversy  whether  in  the  tropical  forests  of  South 
America  the  line  between  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana  shall 
be  laid  near  to  or  far  from  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
Essequibo? 

And  can  anyone  show  the  country  how  its  rights  and 
interests  will  be  secure  if  the  line  shall  be  laid  in  harmony 


24 

with  the  claim  of  Venezuela,  or  how  its  rights  will  be  invaded 
or  its  interests  imperiled  if  the  line  should  be  laid  in  conform 
ity  to  the  demand  of  England  ? 

We  can  understand  that  Venezuela  may  gain  or  lose,  but 
her  gain  or  loss  does  not  raise  an  issue  of  war  for  the  United 
States. 

If  the  exigency  indicated,  and  which  now  is  a  possibility 
only,  should  become  a  reality,  it  is  probable  that  Congress 
would  disregard  the  report  of  the  Commission,  or  if  the  line 
found  by  the  Commission  should  be  recognized,  it  is  also 
probable  that  there  would  be  no  attempt  to  enforce  its 
acceptance  by  England. 

Thus  war  may  be  avoided  by  the  abandonment  of  the 
positions  taken  by  the  President.  To  this  end  the  sentiment 
of  the  country  should  be  directed ;  for  this  end  the  opinion 
of  the  country  should  be  prepared ;  and  in  the  meantime  not 
one  dollar  of  money  should  be  appropriated  or  expended 
through  an  apprehension  that  war  with  England  is  a  prob 
able  or  even  a  possible  event. 

I  dismiss  from  my  thoughts,  as  far  as  possible,  the  senti 
mental  aspect  of  the  case,  arising  from  the  facts  that  we  are 
of  the  same  race  and  that  we  speak  the  same  language.  We 
can  accord  nothing  to  England  that  we  would  not  accord  to 
France,  Russia  or  Germany.  Nor  should  we  tolerate  injus 
tice  on  the  part  of  England  more  readily  than  we  should 
tolerate  injustice  from  other  states. 

Thus  far  in  the  Venezuelan  controversy  England  has  not 
done  us  any  wrong.  She  has  neither  invaded  nor  put  in 
peril  any  right,  nor  touched  injuriously  any  interest  of  the 
United  States. 

For  the  war  spirit  that  has  been  aroused  in  this  country 
and  in  Great  Britain  we  are  responsible,  and  it  is  our  duty  to 
suppress  it.  Appropriations  and  expenditures  now  made 
upon  the  belief  or  the  statement  that  war  with  England  is 
impending,  or  is  even  possible,  will  prove  efficient  agencies  of 
provoking  war. 


25 

Let  the  thoughts  of  the  country  be  turned  to  peace ;  to 
the  repair  of  the  wasted  places  that  even  yet  remain  as  wit 
nesses  of  the  ravages  of  war. 

War  is  to  be  accepted  only  as  the  final  act  of  the  nation 
when  rights  are  invaded ;  and  not  then  until  all  other  means 
of  adjustment  and  redress  have  failed. 

A  war  on  account  of  the  boundary  line  of  Venezuela  must 
be  characterized  as  a  war  of  sympathy ;  and  in  such  a  war, 
is  the  nation  prepared  to  add  millions  and  hundreds  of 
millions  to  the  public  debt,  to  send  sorrow  into  thousands 
of  happy  homes,  and  to  see  the  pension  roll  increased  by  an 
army  of  new  recruits? 

Well  may  the  advocates  of  warlike  armaments  protest  that 
there  will  be  no  war. 

Let  us  first  obey  in  its  fullness  the  injunction  laid  upon  the 
country  by  President  Lincoln  in  his  second  inaugural  address : 

"  Let  us  strive  to  finish  the  work  we  are  in,  to  bind  up 
the  nation's  wounds ;  to  care  for  him  who  shall  have  borne 
the  battle,  and  for  his  widow  and  his  orphan  —  to  do  all 
which  may  achieve  a  just  and  lasting  peace  among  our 
selves  and  with  all  nations." 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION. 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION. 


BEFORE  this  day's  doings  had  become  a  part  of  our  social 
history,  my  obligations  to  the  Massachusetts  Club  were  too 
great  for  full  recognition  on  my  part.  On  several  former 
occasions  I  have  sought  to  convey  to  you  some  evidence  of 
my  appreciation  of  your  signal  kindness,  many  times  ex 
hibited  and  in  many  ways.  I  pass  on  today  to  the  topic 
which  we  have  in  mind  without  further  attempt  to  set  forth 
my  sense  of  the  additional  obligation  which  you  now  lay 
upon  me. 

Our  secretary,  Mr.  Blanchard,  with  a  kindness  of  nature 
which,  at  times,  threatens  to  overmaster  his  judgment,  has 
mentioned  my  name  in  the  invitations  that  were  sent  to  the 
members  of  the  club.  This  mention  appears  to  have  been 
due  to  the  circumstance  that  within  the  last  ten  days  I  have 
stepped  into  my  eightieth  year.  In  this  there  is  neither 
merit  nor  blame.  None  of  us  have  more  than  an  alternative. 
We  must  grow  old  or  die.  Most  of  us  prefer  age  to  death. 
However  barren  and  gloomy  age  may  appear  to  the  young, 
it  is  not  destitute  of  charms  and  pleasures. 

At  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa  dinner  at  Cambridge  in  the  year 
1 86 1  Mr.  Quincy,  who  had  been  the  second  mayor  of  the 
city  of  Boston,  and  who,  afterwards,  was  president  of  Har 
vard  College,  controverted  the  teachings  of  Solomon  and 
Cicero  in  regard  to  the  evils  and  miseries  of  old  age,  and 
asserted  that  neither  of  those  teachers  had  had  any  experi 
ence  of  the  period  of  life  that  he  denounced. 

Old  age  is  not  free  from  discomforts,  neither  is  youth  nor 
middle  age,  but  in  every  period  there  are  charms  and  pleas 
ures,  and  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  accept  with  gratitude, 
in  age  as  in  youth,  those  opportunities  for  enjoyment  which 

NOTE.— Address  before  the  Massachusetts  Club,  Feb.  6,  1897.  29 


30 

we  may  be  able  to  command.  In  this  presence  and  today  I 
gather  in  pleasures  which  were  not  within  my  reach  at  the 
middle  period  of  my  life. 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed,  however,  that  this  meeting  of  the 
club  has  been  called  for  personal  purposes,  or  for  the  special 
gratification  of  anyone.  We  are  to  engage  in  the  exercise 
of  a  high  privilege  of  citizenship  —  the  examination  of  a 
proposed  measure  of  public  policy  which  concerns  directly 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  which  may  aid  in 
turning  the  thoughts  and  conduct  of  mankind  from  war  and 
the  evils  of  war  to  peace  and  the  more  acceptable  triumphs 
that  are  sure  to  come  from  a  condition  of  universal  peace. 

I  have  no  means  for  an  estimate  of  the  losses  of  life  in 
war  since  the  opening  of  the  Christian  era,  but  it  is  safe  to 
speak  of  hundreds  of  millions,  and  not  a  small  part  merely 
of  this  sacrifice  was  made  in  the  prosecution  of  religious 
wars. 

Less  important,  but  yet  worthy  of  notice,  are  the  burdens 
of  taxation  that  have  been  laid  upon  the  people,  and  the 
debts  that  have  been  created  and  which  yet  rest  upon  the 
nations. 

England  has  not  passed  out  from  the  pressure  of  the  debt 
created  by  the  Napoleonic  wars,  and  the  continental  nations, 
from  Spain  to  Russia,  are  menaced  by  insolvency  and  repu 
diation. 

The  war  of  the  Rebellion  has  left  upon  the  United  States 
an  annual  charge  which,  in  the  year  1897,  i-s  about 
$200,000,000,  and  we  are  indulging  in  large  expenditures 
which  can  have  neither  meaning  nor  value  except  as  prepa 
rations  for  fresh  wars  in  the  near  future. 

A  public  policy  which  diminishes  the  chances  of  war 
among  the  nations  is  a  wise  public  policy.  As  much  as  this 
has  been  accomplished  already  by  arbitration.  The  war  of 
the  Rebellion  left  to  the  country  the  inheritance  of  the  claim 
against  England  for  the  losses  caused  by  the  depredations 
of  the  Alabama  and  her  sister  ships  upon  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States.  The  treaty  of  1871  between  the  United 


States  and  Great  Britain,  negotiated  on  our  part  by  Mr. 
Fish,  whose  name  and  services  deserve  more  consideration 
than  they  have  received  from  the  country,  ended  all  thought 
of  war  —  a  thought  that  had  disturbed  the  public  mind  for 
more  than  five  years. 

At  the  same  time  the  controversy  over  the  fisheries  on  our 
northeastern  coast,  and  the  jurisdiction  of  the  island  of  San 
Juan  on  our  northwestern  coast,  were  adjusted  by  arbitration. 
Criticism  on  our  part  was  limited  to  one  of  the  three  judg 
ments  that  were  rendered  —  the  amount  of  the  award  for  the 
freedom  of  the  fisheries. 

Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  the  adjustment  of  the  three 
questions  was  a  gain  —  an  appreciable  gain  to  both  countries 
—  and  that  without  considering  the  justice  of  the  judgments 
that  were  rendered  ? 

Since  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  in  1814,  now  more  than  eighty 
years  away,  the  United  States  has  not  been  a  sufferer  either 
through  diplomatic  adjustments  of  differences  nor  by  arbitra 
tion,  except  in  a  single  instance,  and  then  not  through  the 
greed  or  power  of  England.  In  1846  the  administration  of 
President  Polk  surrendered  the  territory  of  Oregon  north  of 
the  forty-ninth  parallel  of  latitude. 

That  surrender  was  due  to  the  domination  of  slaveholders 
in  the  affairs  of  the  country.  Unoccupied  territory  in  the 
north  meant  more  and  more  free  states,  more  and  more  anti- 
slavery  votes  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Hence 
the  surrender  of  northern  territory  was  in  the  line  of  the 
public  policy  of  the  country. 

The  settlement  of  international  differences  by  arbitration  is 
the  contribution  —  the  great  contribution  of  the  last  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  —  to  the  welfare  of  mankind.  It  is  true 
that  in  that  period  there  have  been  several  great  wars  in  the 
western  world,  and  it  is  also  true  that  the  public  opinion  of 
nations  and  the  policy  of  statesmen  were  not  so  advanced  as 
to  check  the  warlike  tendency  of  the  people  and  to  curb  the 
ambitions  of  leaders. 

In  the  case  of  the  Franco-Prussian  controversy  of  1870,  it 


32 

is  not  probable  that  either  party  could  have  framed  an  issue 
worthy  of  submission  to  an  impartial  arbitration. 

It  may  not  be  possible  to  control  the  tendency  to  civil 
wars  by  any  system  of  international  arbitration.  Treaties  can 
only  subsist  between  nations.  In  a  controversy  between  a 
government  and  its  discontented  citizens  or  subjects,  there 
cannot  be  equality  of  position,  and  to  such  cases  arbitration 
is  inapplicable.  The  government  is  on  one  side ;  on  the 
other  side  there  are  insurgents  only.  In  such  a  controversy 
a  government  can  not  allow  an  appeal  to  any  other  tribunal 
than  its  own  authority. 

It  may  happen,  however,  that  a  general  system  of  arbitra 
tion  may  temper  the  policy  of  states  in  their  dealings  with 
disturbed  colonies  and  restless  classes.  The  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  United  States,  and  through  the  force  of  our 
example,  was  followed  by  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  colo 
nies  of  Spain  and  in  the  empire  of  Brazil. 

Of  the  causes  for  controversy  between  nations,  those  which 
are  more  likely  to  end  in  war  ought  to  be  within  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  arbitration  tribunals,  whenever  provision  is  made  by 
treaty  for  the  creation  of  such  tribunals. 

Ordinary  matters  of  controversy,  such  as  the  adjustment  of 
claims  by  citizens  or  subjects  of  one  government  against 
another  government,  will  be  settled  by  diplomatic  processes 
that  are  now  well  understood  and  easily  applied.  These  will 
be  adjusted  without  the  aid  of  international  permanent 
treaties. 

In  international  treaties  provision  should  be  made  for  the 
adjustment  of  controversies  which  may  arouse  the  sympathies 
and  excite  the  passions  of  the  masses,  and  so  force  the 
authorities  into  war  even  against  their  own  judgment.  Under 
arbitration  treaties  there  will  be,  first  of  all,  a  period  of  delay, 
an  assurance  that  the  controversy  will  be  adjusted  in  con 
formity  to  the  treaty,  and  an  entire  freedom  from  business 
paralysis,  which  the  possibility  of  war  is  certain  to  produce. 
It  is  probable  that  the  closing  years  of  this  century  may  be 
made  memorable  by  two  international  arbitration  treaties. 


33 

Chile  and  Bolivia  have  formulated  a  protocol,  which  may 
ripen  into  a  treaty,  in  which  provision  is  made  for  the  refer 
ence  of  all  controversies  to  arbitration. 

Of  special  importance  to  us,  and  of  more  importance  to 
a  world  in  arms,  is  the  treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  now  pending  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States.  As  far  as  can  be  foreseen,  the  moral  value  of  such 
a  treaty  will  be  its  chief  value.  Questions  of  great  magni 
tude  may  arise  between  the  two  countries,  but  the  appearance 
of  such  questions  is  not  probable.  , 

The  Alaskan  boundary  question  will  be  disposed  of  by  a 
special  treaty,  although  it  has  been  reported  that  a  senator 
expressed  the  opinion  that  that  question  was  of  such  gravity 
that  it  ought  to  be  excepted  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
arbitration  treaty. 

The  seal  fishery  is  the  only  other  matter  of  disquiet.  The 
arbitration  treaty,  when  ratified,  may  aid  the  states  of  con 
tinental  Europe  in  entering  upon  a  policy  of  disarmament, 
and  it  may  lead  us  to  abandon  the  wild  scheme  of  creating  a 
navy  that  shall  rival  the  navy  of  England,  and  for  which 
there  can  be  no  use  except  in  a  war  with  England. 

It  may  be  asserted  with  confidence  that  the  country  is 
quite  unanimous  in  the  opinion  that  the  opportunity  now 
presented  for  a  treaty  of  arbitration  with  England  ought  to 
be  accepted,  and  that  the  merits  of  persons  and  parties 
should  be  referred  to  another  generation. 

Next,  there  must  be  a  majority  opinion  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic  that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  should  include  the 
most  important  questions  that  can  arise.  The  exclusion  of 
specified  questions  or  classes  of  questions  is  notice  to  the 
world  that  those  questions  are  reserved  for  the  arbitrament 
of  war.  The  fact  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that  in  every  case 
the  ordinary  diplomatic  processes  for  adjustment  must  have 
been  exhausted  before  a  case  is  submitted  to  arbitration. 
Hence  it  must  happen  that  when  an  excepted  case  of  differ 
ence  has  failed  of  adjustment  through  such  processes,  then 
war  is  inevitable.  Hence  it  must  be  that  the  exception  of 


34 

cases  or  classes  of  cases  leaves  the  country  and  the  world  to 
the  ills  that  are  incident  to  a  general  apprehension  that  war 
is  impending,  and  possibly  to  the  losses  and  miseries  that  are 
incident  to  a  condition  of  war. 

The  importance  of  an  international  treaty  of  arbitration  is 
not  in  the  fact  that  it  provides  for  cases  and  classes  of  cases 
that  are  likely  to  be  adjusted  by  negotiation,  or  by  amicable 
arbitrament,  but  that  it  includes  cases  in  which  the  interests 
or  passions  of  the  parties  are  so  much  involved  that  an 
arrangement  by  them  and  between  them  has  become  im 
possible. 

A  conclusion  reached  by  legal  processes  and  in  obedience 
to  rules  theretofore  prescribed,  will  be  accepted  by  England 
and  America,  even  if  the  result  should  be  disagreeable  to  the 
losing  party  —  and  in  every  controversy  there  must  be  a 
losing  party.  Our  recent  experience  furnishes  ground  for 
this  statement. 

The  Supreme  Court  made  a  decision  that  was  adverse  to 
the  opinion  of  not  less  than  a  majority  of  the  American 
people,  but  it  was  reached  by  a  due  course  of  action,  and  the 
result  has  been  accepted  by  all  except  a  few,  who  yielded  to 
the  impulse  of  the  moment. 

The  President's  message  of  Dec.  17,  1895,  paralyzed  the 
business  of  England  and  America,  and  in  both  countries 
there  were  serious  and  disturbing  apprehensions  that  a  con 
troversy,  in  which  the  United  States  had  only  a  sentimental 
interest,  might  involve  the  nations  in  war.  The  paralysis 
was  arrested,  and  the  apprehensions  were  allayed  when  the 
announcement  was  made  that  the  question  of  boundary 
between  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana  had  been  referred  to 
arbitrators,  and  the  reference  was  accepted  without  thought 
or  care  as  to  the  loss  or  augmentation  of  territory  by  either 
party. 

These  instances  are  worthy  of  notice  as  illustrative  of  the 
deference  that  is  paid  to  results  reached  by  "  due  process  of 
law."  Herein  is  the  great  advantage  to  be  gained  from 
permanent  arrangements  for  the  settlement  of  controversies. 


35 

In  the  presence  of  such  arrangements  the  appearance  of  a 
new  controversy  will  not  give  rise  to  any  disturbance  of 
business,  nor  to  any  anxiety  in  the  public  mind  or  on  the 
part  of  public  authorities. 

Is  the  treaty  now  pending  in  the  Senate  so  framed  as  to 
meet  the  questions  that  are  likely  to  arise  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain? 

We  are  not  to  imagine  possible  differences,  and  especially 
we  are  not  to  conjecture  that  differences  may  arise  over 
national  and  international  changes  which  may  never  occur. 

It  may  be  assumed  that  neither  England  nor  the  United 
States  will  set  up  and  press  claims  that  are  either  manufac 
tured  or  groundless.  We  must  assume  that  the  countries 
are  acting  in  good  faith,  and  we  know  that  in  each  country 
there  is  a  public  sentiment  that  will  rebuke  any  administra 
tion  that  enters  upon  a  dishonorable  course  of  conduct. 

The  treaty  provides  for  three  classes  of  cases,  although  as 
arranged  in  the  treaty  there  appear  to  be  four.  Articles  two 
and  four  provide  for  "  pecuniary  claims  or  groups  of  pecu 
niary  claims."  These  are  divided  into  two  classes.  In  the 
first  class  are  those  which  in  the  group  do  not  in  amount 
exceed  ^"100,000,  and  in  the  second  class  are  those  which  in 
the  group  exceed  that  sum. 

These  provisions  include  direct  claims  by  one  government 
against  the  other.  Such  claims,  however,  do  not  exist,  and 
they  are  not  likely  to  arise.  These  provisions  are  designed 
to  provide  for  the  adjustments  of  claims  by  citizens  or  sub 
jects  of  one  government  against  the  other  government. 
Usually  the  claimant  government  has  no  other  purpose  in 
view  than  the  protection  of  its  own  citizens. 

In  1880  a  treaty  was  made  with  France  by  which  claims 
of  French  citizens  resident  in  the  South  during  the  Rebel 
lion,  amounting  in  number  to  more  than  seven  hundred  and 
aggregating  $35,000,000,  were  adjusted  by  a  tribunal  of 
three  commissioners,  one  of  whom  was  appointed  by  the 
United  States,  one  by  France,  and  the  president  of  the  com 
mission  was  appointed  by  the  Emperor  of  Brazil.  More 


36 

recently  a  similar  treaty  was  made  with  Chile.  The  articles 
of  the  proposed  treaty  provide  a  standing  rule  for  a  course 
of  action  which  is  already  the  settled  policy  of  the  United 
States. 

The  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  gives  jurisdiction  of 
another  class  of  cases,  which  is  set  forth  by  the  exclusion  of 
pecuniary  claims  for  which  provision  is  otherwise  made,  and 
of  territorial  claims,  which  are  placed  under  the  control  of 
Article  6. 

The  fourth  article  reads  thus:  "All  pecuniary  claims  or 
groups  of  pecuniary  claims  which  shall  exceed  ,£100,000  in 
amount  and  all  other  matters  in  difference,  in  respect  of 
which  either  of  the  high  contracting  parties  shall  have  rights 
against  the  other  under  treaty  or  otherwise,  provided  that 
such  matters  in  difference  do  not  involve  the  determination 
of  territorial  claims,  shall  be  dealt  with  and  decided  by  an 
arbitral  tribunal,  constituted  as  provided  in  the  next  following 
article." 

I  do  not  concern  myself  with  the  constitution  of  the 
tribunals.  It  has  been  my  fortune  to  act  as  counsel  before 
three  international  arbitration  tribunals,  and  in  each  case  I 
was  fully  convinced  of  the  upright  and  intelligent  perform 
ance  of  duty  by  the  arbitrators. 

Article  6  gives  jurisdiction  of  "territorial  claims"  to  a 
board  of  arbitrators,  and  to  this  there  can  be  no  objection, 
unless  an  objection  should  be  made  to  rest  upon  the  fact 
that  the  constitution  of  the  board  is  such  as  to  render  a 
decision  impossible,  unless  the  weight  of  evidence  should  be 
so  great  as  to  extort  a  concurrent  opinion  from  five  arbitra 
tors  in  a  board  composed  of  six  persons. 

It  is  declared  in  Article  9  that  "  territorial  claims  in  this 
treaty  shall  include  all  claims  to  territory,  and  all  claims 
involving  questions  of  servitude,  right  of  navigation  and  of 
access,  fisheries,  and  all  rights  and  interests  necessary  to  the 
control  and  enjoyment  of  the  territory  claimed  by  either  of 
the  high  contracting  parties." 

From  this  analysis  I  reach  the  conclusion  that  there  can 


37 

be  no  valid  objection  to  so  much  of  the  treaty  as  relates  to 
"  pecuniary  claims "  and  to  "  territorial  claims,"  with  the 
appurtenances  thereto,  as  set  forth  in  Article  9.  The  debata 
ble  phrases  are  found  in  Article  4,  and  it  may  not  be  safe 
to  indulge  in  any  predictions  concerning  their  scope.  For 
the  moment  I  am  persuaded  that  they  are  not  dangerous 
phrases. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  scope  of  the  main  phrase  is 
self-limited.  Consider  the  words  used  :  "  In  respect  of  which 
either  of  the  high  contracting  parties  shall  have  rights 
against  the  other  under  treaty  or  otherwise." 

The  committee  of  the  Senate  on  foreign  relations  seems  to 
have  acted  under  the  apprehension  that  by  this  language  the 
Monroe  doctrine  would  be  brought  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
arbitrators. 

With  less  adequate  means  for  reaching  a  safe  conclusion, 
it  is  the  requirement  of  the  position  in  which  I  am  placed 
that  I  should  give  expression  to  my  own  views. 

On  a  former  occasion  and  in  a  different  connection  I  made 
this  remark  when  speaking  of  the  Monroe  doctrine :  We 
ought  not  to  ask,  nor  ougJit  we  to  accept,  its  recognition  by  any 
nation.  ^The  Monroe  doctrine  is  not  a  law  for  anybody.  It 
is  a  declaration  of  a  public  policy  by  and  for  the  United  States. 
We  should  not  ask  other  nations  to  indorse  it.  We  should  not 
allow  other  nations  to  interpret  it. 

England  has  not  recognized  the  Monroe  doctrine,  and 
therefore  she  has  no  rights  against  us,  derived  or  derivable 
from  that  do'ctrine.  Nothing  is  granted  in  the  pending 
treaty,  dnd  our  rights  to  act  under  the  Monroe  doctrine  will 
be  what  they  now  are,  and  what  they  have  been  since  the 
year  1823. 

If  England  had  recognized  and  accepted  the  Monroe  doc 
trine  as  the  law  of  the  two  nations,  the  question  arising  under 
Article  4  ol  the  treaty  might  have  been  open  to  a  different 
interpretation. 

The  scope  of  arbitration,  as  set  forth  in  the  treaty,  is  in  the 
affirmative,  and  therefore  every  subject-matter  of  arbitration 


38 

is  excluded  which  is  not  included,  and  therefore  the  proposed 
amendment  seems  to  be  either  dangerous  or  unnecessary. 
This  amendment  has  been  proposed  in  the  Senate : 

"  But  no  question  which  affects  the  foreign  or  domestic 
policy  of  either  of  the  high  contracting  parties,  or  the  rela 
tions  of  either  to  any  other  state  or  power,  by  treaty  or  other 
wise,  snail  be  a  subject  for  arbitration  under  this  treaty,, 
except  by  special  agreement." 

If  it  is  intended  by  this  amendment  to  limit  the  affirmative 
propositions  of  the  treaty,  then  some  very  grave  questions 
may  arise ;  but  if,  as  is  probable,  it  is  designed  to  exclude 
matters  not  within  the  scope  of  the  treaty,  then  the  amend 
ment  is  not  necessary. 

The  phrase  "  but  no  question  which  affects  the  foreign  or 
domestic  policy  of  either  of  the  high  contracting  parties" 
may  give  rise  to  serious  difficulties.  It  may,  indeed,  be  said, 
and  without  resort  to  captious  criticism,  that  many  questions* 
between  nations  ''affect  the  foreign  or  domestic  policy"  of 
one  party  or  the  other. 

At  the  present  moment  there  is  no  question  pending  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  which  can  disturb 
the  relations  of  the  two  countries,  and  no  harm  can  come 
from  such  a  period  of  delay  as  may  be  required  for  a  full 
discussion  of  the  treaty  by  the  country,  as  well  as  by  the 
Senate,  the  department  of  the  Government  on  which  the 
responsibility  now  rests. 


HAWAIIAN  ANNEXATION. 


HAWAIIAN    ANNEXATION. 


As  I  was  forewarned  by  the  gentleman  from  whom  I  re 
ceived  your  invitation  to  meet  the  members  of  the  Boston 
Boot  and  Shoe  Club  this  evening,  that  the  time  for  the  dis 
cussion  of  the  topic  before  us  was  limited  to  two  hours,  and 
that  four  persons  were  to  participate  in  the  debate,  I  have 
forecast  the  observations  that  I  have  had  in  mind  that  I 
might  avoid  the  danger  of  trespassing  upon  the  privileges  of 
others  who  are  to  address  you. 

Since  the  organization  of  the  Government  there  have  been 
four  opportunities  for  the  annexation  of  territory  within  con 
tinental  lines,  and  all  of  them  have  been  accepted.  In  the 
same  period  of  time  there  have  been  three  tenders  of  insular 
possessions,  two  of  them  without  direct  consideration  in 
money,  and  all  of  them  have  been  declined. 

The  first  of  these  was  the  tender  of  the  Sandwich  Islands, 
made  through  our  then  commissioner,  Mr.  Elisha  H.  Allen, 
in  the  year  1852.  It  was  in  the  early  months  of  Mr.  Fill- 
more's  administration,  when  Mr.  Webster  was  Secretary  of 
State. 

Mr.  Allen  had  been  my  acquaintance  and  friend  from  the 
year  1847,  when  we  were  associated  as  members  of  the 
Massachusetts  House  of  Representatives,  and  as  members 
also  of  an  important  special  committee. 

Upon  his  arrival  in  Boston  he  took  lodgings  at  the  Adams 
House,  where  I  was  then  living.  Our  meetings  at  the  table 
and  otherwise  were  frequent,  and  it  was  then  that  I  received 
from  Mr.  Allen  the  statement  that  he  came  with  authority, 
carte  blancJie,  from  the  king  to  tender  the  islands  to  the 
United  States.  There  may  have  been  terms  and  conditions, 
but  none  were  mentioned  by  Mr.  Allen.  At  the  same  time 

NOTE. —  Address  delivered  before  the  Boot  and  Shoe  Club  of  Boston,  Dec.  22,  1897.      41 


42 

he  informed  me  that  the  offer  had  been  declined  by  Mr. 
Webster. 

The  treaty  for  the  acquisition  of  the  island  of  St.  Thomas, 
that  was  negotiated  by  Mr.  Seward  in  President  Johnson's 
administration,  was  not  ratified  by  the  Senate.  The  cause 
of  its  failure,  or  the  circumstances  incident  to  its  failure,  have 
been  the  subject  of  controversy.  The  undertaking  failed, 
and  that  controversy  should  not  now  be  revived. 

In  General  Grant's  first  term  the  country  had  an  oppor 
tunity  to  acquire  so  much  of  the  island  of  San  Domingo 
as  is  known  by  that  name.  The  terms  of  acquisition  were 
favorable.  The  project  was  supported  resolutely  by  General 
Grant,  when  his  influence  in  the  country  had  not  suffered 
any  serious  impairment.  The  offer  was  rejected  by  the 
Senate,  and  there  were  no  indications  of  a  controlling  public 
opinion  adverse  to  its  action. 

Thus  it  appears  that  there  have  been  three  favorable 
opportunities  for  the  acquisition  of  insular  possessions,  all  of 
which  have  been  declined.  Two  of  them  were  within  a  day's 
sail  of  our  mainland  coasts,  while  one  of  them,  and  that  the 
one  now  urged  upon  the  country,  is  more  than  two  thousand 
miles  from  our  nearest  harbor  on  the  Pacific  ocean. 

The  question  of  the  extension  of  slavery  was  involved  in 
the  projects  for  the  annexation  of  Louisiana,  Texas  and  Cali 
fornia,  and  except  for  the  existence  of  that  question  the 
acquisition  of  those  vast  territories  would  have  received  a 
general  support  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

The  fourth  was  the  acquisition  of  Alaska,  a  territory  that 
in  1867  offered  but  few  attractions  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  men  of  the  revolu 
tionary  era  contemplated  a  union  with  Canada. 

This  resume  warrants  the  statement  that  the  country  has 
accepted  continental  territory  as  a  wise  public  policy,  now 
fully  justified  by  experience,  and  that  it  has  as  uniformly 
rejected  insular  possessions. 

And,  further,  this  resume  warrants  the  statement  that  the 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  those  who  demand  a  change  in  our 
public  policy. 


43 

The  public  policy  of  the  country  may  not  have  been 
based  upon  distinct  propositions  resting  in  the  public  mind, 
but  I  formulate  that  policy  in  two  propositions,  namely: 
first,  continental  acquisitions  of  contiguous  territory  tend  to 
peace ;  second,  the  acquisition  of  insular  territories  increases 
the  chances  of  war  and  adds  to  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
conducting  war. 

If  the  first  proposition  is  under  question  in  the  mind  of 
anyone,  much  support  may  be  found  in  our  own  experience 
and  in  the  recent  experience  of  other  countries.  The  force 
of  the  North  was  augmented  immensely  in  our  Civil  War  by 
the  consideration  that  two  contiguous  nations  would  not 
remain  at  peace,  except  during  brief  intervals  between  long 
and  lengthening  periods  of  open  or  smothered  hostilities. 

By  unification  the  provinces  and  states  of  Germany  and 
Italy  have  been  forced  into  peaceful  relations  with  each 
other. 

And,  if  now  it  were  possible  for  France,  Italy,  Spain  and 
Portugal  to  unite  into  one  confederated  republic,  they  would 
not  only  command  peace  for  themselves,  but  they  might  dic 
tate  peace  for  Europe. 

The  possession  by  Great  Britain  of  the  Canadas  has  given 
rise  to  many,  I  may  say  to  most,  of  the  questions  that  have 
disturbed  our  relations  with  England  during  the  last  sixty 
years.  I  mention  the  Oregon  dispute,  the  San  Juan  dispute, 
the  Caroline  affair,  the  northeastern  boundary  controversy, 
the  Fenian  invasions,  the  fisheries  and  now  the  seal  fishery 
in  Behring  sea. 

If  the  United  States  and  the  Canadas  were  under  one 
government  the  killing  of  seal  upon  the  open  sea  would  not 
be  defended  by  anyone. 

It  is  to  be  admitted  that  small  countries  and  minor  com 
munities  are  strengthened  and  protected  by  union  with 
strong  states.  That,  as  a  practical  question,  is  their  ques 
tion  and  not  our  question.  If  the  gain  is  theirs  and  the  loss 
is  ours,  there  can  be  no  ground  of  defence  for  a  policy  of 
annexation,  unless  it  can  be  found  in  the  indulgence  of  the 


44 

feeling  called  sympathy.  Sympathy  is  akin  to  one  of  the 
passions,  and  the  guidance  of  the  passions  in  public  affairs 
ought  never  to  be  accepted. 

My  second  proposition  is  not  within  the  limits  of  actual 
demonstration,  but  it  can  command  some  support  argu- 
mentatively. 

Assume  a  war  with  England,  would  our  position  be 
strengthened  or  weakened  by  the  possession  of  St.  Thomas, 
San  Domingo  or  Hayti,  or  by  the  possession  of  one  or  all 
of  the  islands  of  the  Caribbean  sea? 

Assume  a  war  with  England  or  Russia  or  Japan  or  China, 
a  possible,  aggressive  and  warlike  power  in  a  future  not  far 
away,  and  would  the  possession  of  the  eight  tropical  islands 
in  the  mid-Pacific  and  extending  over  three  degrees  of  lati 
tude  and  six  meridians  of  longitude,  be  a  help  or  a  peril? 
Would  a  coaling  station  or  a  harbor  of  resort  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Pearl  river,  two  thousand  miles  and  more  from  our 
Pacific  coasts,  give  security,  either  in  form  or  in  fact,  to  Cali 
fornia,  Oregon,  Washington,  or  to  the  dwellers  on  the  shore 
and  islands  of  Alaska? 

Does  the  example  of  England  attract  us?  The  august 
ceremonies  which  closed  the  sixtieth  year  of  the  reign  of 
Queen  Victoria  were  clouded  by  the  fact  that  those  had 
been  years  of  uninterrupted  wars, —  wars  in  which  there  had 
been  hardships  and  dangers  in  unequal  contests  with  inferior 
peoples ;  wars  made  necessary  by  the  policy  of  England  to 
preserve  unbroken  and  to  strengthen,  if  possible,  the  chain 
of  empire,  that  England  has  carried  around  the  globe.  For 
England  this  may  have  been  a  wise  policy.  An  attempt  at 
its  imitation  by  us  cannot  bring  either  success  or  honor. 
England  conquers  that  she  may  inhabit  and  trade.  A 
small  island  in  a  northern  sea  with  a  hardy  and  adventur 
ous  population  must  gain  new  lands  as  a  refuge  and  home 
for  its  accumulating  masses.  Thus  it  seeks  and  secures  pro 
tection  for  its  home  industries  by  first  subduing  and  then 
clothing  the  millions  of  Asia  and  the  half-clad  tribes  of 
Africa. 


45 

Thus  and  by  such  processes  was  the  foundation  laid  for  the 
great  eulogium  which  Mr.  Webster  pronounced  upon  our 
ancestors  in  America  and  in  England  when  he  said  of  the 
Colonists:  "  They  raised  their  flag  against  a  power  to  which, 
for  purposes  of  foreign  conquest  and  subjugation,  Rome  in 
the  height  of  her  glory  is  not  to  be  compared ;  a  power  that 
has  dotted  over  the  surface  of  the  whole  globe  with  its  pos 
sessions  and  military  posts  whose  morning  drum-beat,  follow 
ing  the  sun  and  keeping  company  with  the  hours,  circles  the 
earth  with  one  continuous  and  unbroken  strain  of  the  martial 
airs  of  England." 

But  the  example  of  England  is  not  for  us.  The  field  for 
conquest,  for  appropriation,  is  about  all  occupied.  Our 
theory  is  a  theory  of  self-government.  Such  has  been  our 
practice.  Next  we  demand  equality  of  citizenship  in  the 
states  and  equality  of  states  in  the  Union.  All  this  is  incon 
sistent  with  the  acquisition  of  distant  and  incongruous  popu 
lations.  And  nowhere  can  there  be  found  a  more  incongru 
ous  population  than  the  present  population  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands. 

The  future  of  the  United  States  cannot  be  predicted,  but 
of  unoccupied  territory  we  have  a  vast  domain.  Its  vastness 
may  be  set  forth  in  one  statement :  If  the  population  of  all 
the  states  and  territories  of  the  Union  could  be  transported 
to  the  state  of  Texas  the  number  of  inhabitants  to  the 
square  mile  would  not  exceed  the  number  now  resident  in 
the  states  of  Rhode  Island  and  Massachusetts. 

By  the  treaty  of  1875  and  the  amendment  of  1887,  we 
have  as  full  control  of  the  trade  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  as 
we  should  have  were  those  islands  made  a  part  of  the  United 
States.  Our  manufactures,  from  iron  bridges  to  friction 
matches,  are  entered  without  duty,  and  in  return  the  sugar, 
rice,  coffee  and  other  products  of  the  islands  are  admitted 
free  of  duty  at  all  our  custom-houses. 

By  the  treaty  of  1887  we  acquired  Pearl  river  harbor, 
the  most  valuable  harbor  of  the  islands. 

The  treaty  of   1875   contains  a  stipulation  that  as  long  as 


46 

the  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  the  authorities  of  the  islands 
will  not  "  dispose  of  or  create  any  lien  upon  this  port, 
harbor,  or  other  territory,  ...  or  grant  any  special 
privilege  or  right  of  use  therein,  to  any  other  power,  state 
or  government,  nor  make  any  treaty  by  which  any  other 
nation  shall  obtain  the  same  privileges,  relative  to  the  admis 
sion  of  any  articles  free  of  duty." 

These  agreements  and  stipulations  are  all  very  well,  says 
the  advocate  of  annexation,  but  the  treaty  may  be  abrogated 
whenever  we  decline  the  treaty  of  annexation.  What  are  the 
probabilities?  In  1875,  when  the  islands  were  free  to  deal 
with  England  or  with  any  other  nation,  when  the  United 
States  had  no  foothold,  we  dictated  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 

Again,  in  1887,  under  the  lead  of  Senator  Edmunds,  and 
when  there  was  a  heavy  adverse  public  sentiment  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  treaty  was  in  peril  from  our  action, 
the  Hawaiian  authorities  conceded  the  possession  of  Pearl 
river  harbor.  For  what  reason  have  all  these  concessions 
been  made?  For  fifty  years  the  fortunes  of  the  islands  have 
been  in  our  hands,  and  the  day  of  their  freedom  from  our 
control  is  far  away. 

All  the  benefits  that  can  come  from  annexation  are  now 
enjoyed  by  us,  and  they  will  continue  to  be  enjoyed  by  us 
and  by  our  successors  through  many  generations,  while  we 
now  are,  and  they  hereafter  are  to  be  relieved  of  all  respon 
sibility  for  the  government  of  the  islands.  Moreover,  the 
islands  can  rest  securely  in  mid-ocean,  freed  from  the 
anxieties  and  apprehensions  of  war,  as  Belgium  and  Switzer 
land  are  secure,  though  surrounded  by  rival  and  hostile 
states. 

Whence  this  security  for  our  supremacy  in  the  islands? 
It  is  to  be  found  in  two  facts.  First,  in  the  situation  of  the 
islands  with  reference  to  other  countries.  When  we  had 
acquired  California  and  had  connected  it  by  railroads  with 
the  older  states  of  the  Union,  the  United  States  became  the 
convenient,  indeed,  the  only  valuable  market  for  the  products 
of  the  islands.  Distant  as  we  are  from  the  islands,  we  are 


47 

their  only  neighbors.  Japan  is  3,400  miles  from  Honolulu. 
Hong  Kong  is  5,000  miles  away.  The  countries  of  Central 
and  South  America  can  only  be  reached  by  ocean  voyages 
of  three,  four,  five  and  six  thousand  miles. 

My  second  reason  is  equally  conclusive.  Those  distant 
countries  are  of  no  considerable  value  as  markets  for  the 
products  of  the  islands. 

In  1896  the  total  of  exports  was  $15,515,230,  and  of  this 
the  sum  of  $55,132  found  a  market  in  other  countries.  In 
the  same  year  the  imports  amounted  to  $7,164,562.  Of  this 
sum  the  imports  from  the  United  States  amounted  to 
$5,235,729.  The  exports  of  sugar  to  the  United  States  in 
the  year  1896  amounted  to  $14,932,173. 

What  would  be  the  consequences  of  the  abrogation  of  the 
treaty?  What  the  consequences  of  the  annexation  of  the 
islands  by  Japan  or  by  England?  The  loss  of  the  free 
American  market  and  the  imposition  of  a  duty  by  the  United 
States  of  forty  per  cent  or  more  on  the  sugar  product  of  the 
islands  would  inevitably  follow.  What  next?  The  depreci 
ation  of  the  sugar  plantations  at  the  rate  of  twenty-five  per 
cent  or  more,  and  the  ruin  of  the  owners.  And  who  are  the 
owners?  The  owners  of  the  plantations  are  the  two  thousand 
and  seven  hundred  voters  in  a  population  of  109,000,  and 
those  whom  they  represent.  The  owners  are  the  meager 
minority  now  in  authority  and  who  constitute  the  Government 
of  Hawaii.  They  cannot  consent  to  annexation  by  any  other 
country.  They  cannot  afford  to  abrogate  the  treaty.  From 
1882  to  1887,  when  propositions  for  the  abrogation  of  the 
treaty  were  pending  in  our  Congress,  the  business  of  the 
islands  was  interrupted,  property  was  depressed,  the  sugar 
planters  were  threatened  with  bankruptcy  and  tire  represent 
atives  of  the  Hawaiians  appeared  before  the  committees  on 
foreign  affairs,  pleading  for  the  preservation  of  the  treaty. 

The  pecuniary  interests  are  much  larger  now  than  they 
then  were,  and  by  those  interests  any  and  every  government 
that  may  be  set  up,  by  whatever  name  called  and  by  whom 
soever  managed,  will  be  controlled.  The  old  monarchy  had 


48 

no  affection  for  the  United  States,  but  its  policy  was  subordi 
nated  to  our  policy,  and  such  must  be  the  condition  of  every 
successor,  whether  an  oligarchy,  a  monarchy,  or  a  republic. 

From  these  general  remarks  I  turn  to  the  consideration  of 
the  circumstances  under  which  we  are  invited  to  accept  the 
annexation  of  the  Hawaiians  Islands.  We  are  not  so  far 
removed  in  time  from  the  events  that  occurred  in  Hawaii  in 
the  early  months  of  the  year  1893,  that  we  may  disregard  the 
political  character  and  moral  quality  of  the  proceedings, 
called  a  revolution,  when  we  are  invited  to  accept  the  terri 
tory  that  was  then  and  thus  wrested  from  its  ancient  pro 
prietors. 

There  is  nothing  sacred  in  a  monarchy;  indeed,  there  is 
nothing  sacred  in  any  government,  whatever  its  form  or 
name.  The  right  of  a  government  to  exist  comes  from  the 
will  of  the  people  freely  expressed.  This  test  is  fatal  to  the 
claim  of  those  who  now  rule  in  Hawaii. 

There  are  forty  thousand  Hawaiians  in  the  islands  and 
of  those  thirty-one  thousand  are  of  unmixed  blood.  It  is 
claimed  that  under  the  old  regime  there  were  ten  thousand 
voters.  They  owed  allegiance  to  the  old  government.  There 
may  have  been  others  who  were  subjects.  These  as  a  body 
have  never  been  consulted.  Assume,  what  I  do  assume, 
that  the  Queen  had  no  rights  except  such  as  may  have  been 
derived  from  the  people,  and  that  there  was  a  continuing 
right  in  the  people  to  supersede  her  in  authority,  and  yet  the 
fact  remains  that  that  power  in  the  people  has  never  been 
exercised. 

Mr.  Secretary  Foster,  in  the  treaty  which  he  prepared  in 
the  last  days  of  President  Harrison's  administration,  admitted 
a  right  as  then  existing  in  the  Queen  and  beyond  her  in  the 
heir  apparent  to  the  throne. 

By  that  projet  of  a  treaty  the  Queen  was  to  be  paid  the 
sum  of  $20,000  annually  during  her  life  and  the  Princess 
was  to  receive  in  hand  from  the  United  States  the  sum  of 
$150,000,  provided,  however,  that  those  two  women,  respec 
tively,  should,  "  in  good  faith,  submit  to  the  authority  of 


49 

the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  local  govern 
ment  of  the  islands." 

Thus  did  that  projet  recognize  the  personal  rights  of  the 
Queen  and  also  the  right  of  succession  in  the  dynasty  of 
which  she  was  then  the  head. 

There  may  be  those  who  favor  annexation,  who  will  ex 
cuse  themselves  in  the  thought  that  the  government  was 
only  a  monarchy,  and  that  its  overthrow,  however  accom 
plished,  was  a  praiseworthy  act. 

Governments  ought  not  to  disregard  their  moral  obliga 
tions. 

This  transaction  is  tainted  with  injustice.  Injustice  it  may 
be  to  the  deposed  Queen,  but  assuredly  it  is  tainted  with 
injustice  to  the  40,000  Hawaiians  who  should  be  permitted 
to  speak  in  regard  to  the  government  of  their  native  land. 
And  we  who  have  maintained  the  doctrine  of  home  rule, 
who  have  pleaded  for  Ireland,  who  have  raised  millions  of 
men  from  slavery  to  citizenship,  can  we  either  defend  this 
proceeding  or  accept  the  fruit  thereof? 

Finally,  what  disposition  is  to  be  made  of  the  present 
population?  Of  the  native  Hawaiians  there  are  about 
40,000,  of  Japanese  24,000,  of  Chinese  21,000,  of  Portu 
guese  15,000,  of  Americans  3,000,  of  British,  Germans  and 
French  combined  there  are  4,000,  of  other  nationalities  a 
thousand.  Thus  the  islands  contain  a  population  of  109,000. 
Are  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  to  be  deported,  the  planta 
tions  to  be  abandoned  and  their  owners  to  be  consigned  to 
ruin? 

The  pending  treaty  prohibits  the  further  immigration 
of  Chinese,  and  those  who  are  now  resident  in  the  islands 
are  excluded  from  the  mainland  of  the  United  States. 
By  annexation  the  country  will  have  in  view  the  alternative 
of  a  vassal  population  within  its  jurisdiction  or  the  presence 
of  a  Mongolian  state  in  the  Union. 


WAR,  AND  A  CHANGE  OF  OUR 
PUBLIC  POLICY. 


WAR,  AND  A  CHANGE  OF  OUR  PUBLIC 
POLICY. 


IN  a  time  of  war —  a  war  which  in  the  brief  period  of  ten 
days  from  the  formal  declaration  ripened  into  active  and 
aggressive  hostilities  in  two  hemispheres  —  the  attention  of 
the  country  cannot  be  turned  to  any  other  topic  than  war. 
To  most  persons  war  is  an  enforced  theme  of  thought  and 
discussion.  I  shall  limit  myself  in  this  address  to  a  single 
aspect  of  the  war  in  which  we  are  now  involved,  and  then 
after  some  observations  on  war  as  an  agency  in  advancing  or 
retarding  the  progress  of  mankind,  I  shall  consider  the 
•change  in  our  public  policy  that  may  follow  the  contest  now 
going  on  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

The  apothegm,  or  maxim,  "  Our  country,  right  or  wrong," 
is,  as  a  proposition,  not  more  applicable  to  a  condition  of  war 
than  to  a  condition  of  peace.  Indeed,  as  a  measure  or  rule 
for  the  guidance  of  individuals  in  their  relations  to  the  gov 
ernment,  it  is  not  applicable  to  a  condition  of  peace  nor  to  a 
condition  of  war. 

The  duties  of  citizenship  are  the  same  whether  the  citizen 
approves  or  disapproves  the  policy  on  which  his  government 
has  entered.  This  rule  applies  to  times  of  peace,  but  its 
observance  is  more  imperative  in  times  of  war.  A  declara 
tion  of  war  is  the  most  solemn  and  important  act  of  a 
government,  inasmuch  as  the  act  involves  results  which 
always  are  uncertain  and  often  they  are  of  the  gravest 
nature. 

Our  Constitution  has  placed  the  war-making  power  in  the 
hands  of  Congress.  When  Congress  makes  a  declaration  of 
war  the  act  is  the  act  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
speaking  through  their  duly  authorized  representatives,  and 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  all  are  bound  to  meet  the 

NOTE. —  Address  delivered  at  Kingston,  Mass.,  Memorial  Day,  1898.  53 


54 

requisitions  of  the  Government,  whether  in  money  or  by  per 
sonal  service,  as  requisitions  may  be  made. 

For  the  purposes  of  the  Government  and  as  a  measure  of 
private  duty,  the  war  is  a  just  and  proper  war.  The  citizen 
cannot  measure  his  duty  to  the  state  by  any  notion  that  he 
may  entertain  concerning  the  merits  of  the  contest.  It  is  his 
contest  and  it  is  his  duty  to  contribute  to  the  extent  of  his 
ability,  that  it  may  be  brought  to  a  conclusion  speedily  and 
with  honor  to  the  country. 

Wars  that  have  become  historical  will  be  judged  arid 
adjudged,  finally,  upon  ethical  principles.  The  sentiment  of 
justice  is  universal  in  mankind,  and  in  some  form,  whether 
rude  or  cultured,  it  must  find 'expression.  There  have  been 
wars  for  which  the  quality  of  justice  cannot  be  invoked  in 
behalf  of  either  party.  Of  that  class  a  conspicuous  example 
may  be  found  in  the  war  of  1870,  between  France  and 
Prussia.  France  made  a  demand  upon  Prussia  concerning 
the  throne  of  Spain  in  a  contingency  of  fortune  which  might 
never  happen.  Prussia  replied  by  a  declaration  of  war. 
Put  that  case  to  a  test:  could  either  party  have  framed  an 
issue  for  the  adjudication  of  a  board  of  international,  impar 
tial  arbitrators? 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  and  to  claim,  that  in  every  con 
troversy  between  nations  which  is  of  such  magnitude  as 
to  menace  the  peace  of  the  countries  interested,  the  contest 
should  be  so  well  defined  as  to  enable  the  parties  or  the 
party,  claiming  to  be  aggrieved,  to  frame  issues  for  the  con 
sideration  and  judgment  of  an  international  board  of  arbitra 
tion.  This  proposition,  as  a  proposition  in  ethics,  must  be 
true,  even  though  provision  may  not  have  been  made  for  the 
peaceful  adjustment  of  national  controversies. 

In  the  war  of  1812,  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  the  issue  was  well  defined.  Great  Britain  claimed 
the  right  to  examine  our  merchant  vessels  and  to  seize  and 

o 

to  carry  away  seamen  upon  the  unsupported  allegation  that 
they  were  British  subjects.  A  ship  of  a  country  is  a  part  of 
the  territory  of  the  country.  The  seizure  of  a  ship  is  the 


55 

invasion  of  the  country  to  which  the  ship  belongs.  The 
seizure  and  detention  of  American  ships  was  the  equivalent  in 
law  and  in  the  nature  of  things  with  the  invasion  of  American 
territory.  Thus  was  our  case  clear  and  the  issue  was  well 
defined. 

Of  all  the  causes  of  war  no  one  is  so  worthy  of  defense  on 
ethical  grounds  as  a  demand  for  the  surrender  of  well-estab 
lished  and  long-continued  territorial  jurisdiction,  especially 
when  such  jurisdiction  includes  the  protection  of  citizens  in 
their  property  and  in  their  rights  of  government,  according 
to  the  forms  to  which  they  may  have  been  accustomed. 

Lord  Salisbury  asserted  this  doctrine,  and  he  maintained  it 
successfully  in  the  Venezuelan  controversy.  In  his  letter  to 
Mr.  Olney,  of  Nov.  26,  1895,  Lord  Salisbury  sets  forth  the 
correct  doctrine  concerning  the  rights  and  duties  of  states 
touching  jurisdiction,  and  the  rights  of  persons  inhabiting 
territory  that  may  have  become  the  subject  of  controversy 
between  governments.  The  questions  then  existing  between 
Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  were  adjusted  upon  the  basis  of 
Lord  Salisbury's  communication.  He  asserted  a  claim  of 
title  to  all  the  valley  of  the  Essequibo  river,  and  of  its  tribu 
taries,  and  also  to  the  coast  line  up 'to  the  river  Amacura. 
On  this  statement  of  legal  title  he  asserted  one  claim  that 
was  not  open  to  negotiation,  and  he  recognized  one  duty  in 
the  nature  of  a  concession  which  would  be  performed  without 
debate. 

First,  so  much  of  the  territory  as  was  occupied  by  British 
subjects  would  not  be  yielded,  nor  submitted  to  arbitration. 

Secondly,  so  much  of  the  territory  as  was  occupied  by 
citizens  of  Venezuela  would  be  conceded  without  controversy. 
Further,  that  the  remaining  portion  was  open  to  arbitration 
upon  the  question  of  sovereignty. 

Two  propositions  are  embodied  in  that  declaration, 
namely :  First,  a  nation  cannot  retain  its  essential  quality  of 
sovereignty,  except  by  a  sturdy  defense  of  its  territory  and 
the  homes  of  its  citizens  or  subjects.  Second,  the  settlers 
upon  unoccupied  territory  may,  by  occupation  and  the  lapse 


56 

of  time,  acquire  a  title  superior  in  its  nature  to  a  title  over 
unoccupied  lands  derived  from  discovery  or  conquest. 

On  this  basis  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Vene 
zuela  was  consummated,  and  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
United  States,  notwithstanding  President  Cleveland's  unwise 
message  of  Dec.  17,  1895.  The  treaty  provides  that  each 
of  the  contending  parties  is  to  enjoy  jurisdiction  over  all  ter 
ritory  that  it  has  occupied  for  fifty  years.  That  fact  the 
arbitrators  are  to  find  in  each  case.  The  intermediate  terri 
tory  is  subject  to  arbitration.  Thus  was  there  no  departure 
from  Lord  Salisbury's  proposal  of  November,  1895;  and 
thus  was  the  menace  of  war  suppressed  by  the  acceptance  of 
a  rule  of  action  that  was  tendered  to  Venezuela  and  the 
United  States  before  the  menace  of  war  was  announced, 
which  through  many  months  disturbed  the  peaceful  relations 
of  the  great  empire  and  the  great  republic  of  the  western 
world. 

Of  one  war  only,  can  the  claim  be  made  upon  tenable 
grounds  that  each  party  was  in  the  right  or  had  a  justifying 
appearance  of  being  in  the  right,  —  that  war  was  the  war  for 
the  independence  of  the  American  colonies.  The  case  of 
the  colonies  has  been  often  set  forth,  and  its  sufficiency  is 
recognized  by  historians  and  by  the  statesmen  and  moralists 
of  England. 

England's  position  may  be  thus  stated :  The  discovery  of 
this  part  of  the  continent  was  made  by  England.  By  the 
permission  of  England  and  from  grants  made  by  the  sover 
eigns,  the  colonists  had  been  enabled  to  found  settlements. 
The  jurisdiction  of  England  over  the  entire  territory  had 
never  been  ceded.  Jurisdiction  carries  with  it  the  right  to 
legislate.  Who  shall  set  limits  to  the  exercise  of  the  right? 

Thus  we  have,  in  brief,  England's  case.  Not  satisfactory 
at  the  bar  of  posterity,  but  sufficient  for  a  living  generation 
whose  interests  were  involved  in  the  controversy. 

There  may  not  be  another  case  in  modern  limes  where  as 
much  can  be  offered  in  extenuation  of  the  wrong-doing 
party.  Finally,  it  may  be  asserted  of  all  controversies  which 


57 

have  terminated  in  war,  that  one  party,  at  least,  was  in  the 
wrong,  and  that  a  tribunal  of  impartial  men  could  have 
named  the  party  in  the  wrong. 

From  what  I  have  said  this  may  be  deduced,  possibly: 
that  wars  for  the  mere  conquest  of  territory  cannot  be 
defended,  and,  as  the  necessary  corollary,  that  the  only  wars 
which  can  be  justified  are  wars  waged  in  defense  of  territory 
and  of  the  inhabitants  dwelling  upon  territory,  over  which 
jurisdiction  —  established  and  recognized  jurisdiction  —  exists. 
As  in  other  cases  of  legal  rights,  a  right  of  jurisdiction  may 
be  lost  by  the  nonuse  or  by  the  misuse  of  power. 

Many  suggestions  are  made  in  defense  of  war  on  general 
grounds,  or  in  palliation  of  war  in  special  cases.  Some  speak 
of  war  as  a  proper  means  of  retarding  the  population  of  this 
earth,  not  realizing  the  fact  that  there  are  immense  unsettled 
regions  in  Africa  and  South  America;  or  the  fact,  that  upon 
the  ratio  to  the  square  mile  of  inhabitants  now  dwelling  in 
Massachusetts  and  Rhode  Island,  the  state  of  Texas  can  fur 
nish  homes  for  seventy  million  people ;  or  the  more  impor 
tant  fact,  that  war  destroys  the  best  of  every  nation,  the 
young  and  the  vigorous,  thus  violating  the  rule  of  nature, 
whose  law  of  life  and  of  death,  and  of  the  progress  of  the 
human  race,  is  the  destruction  of  the  weaker. 

Others  imagine  that  war  is  a  legitimate  means  for  the 
promulgation  of  higher  ideas  in  religion  and  government, 
and  that  republican  institutions  may  be  extended  by  force. 
When  the  war  of  the  Rebellion  was  brought  to  an  end,  sys 
tems  of  slavery  existed  in  the  colonies  of  Spain,  and  in  the 
empire  of  Brazil.  By  our  example,  and  by  mild  persuasion, 
slavery  was  abolished  on  this  continent  during  General 
Grant's  administration.  Could  as  much  have  been  accom 
plished  by  war  or  by  threats  of  war,  in  the  brief  period  of 
twenty  years? 

j  And  there  are  some,  of  ministers  of  the  gospel  there  are 
some,  who  tolerate  wars  as  furnishing  opportunities  for  the 
extension  of  the  doctrines  of  Christianity.  They  should 
realize  that  ideas  are  not  disseminated  by  force,  that  errors 
cannot  be  uprooted  by  authority. 


58 

What  is  the  teaching  of  history?  This,  assuredly  this: 
that  excommunications,  inquisitions,  tortures,  burnings  and 
wars  for  the  dissemination  of  opinions  and  the  bettering  of 
institutions  in  matters  of  morals  and  religion  and  govern 
ment  have  retarded  the  causes  that  they  were  intended  to 
promote.  It  may  be  true  that  a  lie  will  go  around  the  world 
while  truth  is  putting  on  its  boots,  but  it  is  also  true  that  a 
lie  goes  around  the  world  but  once,  while  the  progress  of 
truth  is  never  interrupted,  permanently.  Let  us  abandon 
the  notion  that  views  of  religion,  or  theories  of  government, 
or  that  institutions  which  are  the  outgrowth  of  such  views 
and  theories,  can  be  promulgated  and  extended  by  force. 
Ideas  that  contain  truths  that  concern  the  welfare  and 
progress  of  mankind  are  immortal.  The  humanities,  in 
some  degree  of  excellence,  are  found  in  all  the  religions  of 
the  world ;  and  if  the  religions  may  not  be  promulgated  by 
force,  then  with  stronger  reasons  the  humanities  may  not. 

The  contest  in  which  we  are  now  engaged  portends  a 
change  in  our  public  policy.  Thus  far  the  country  has 
rejected  or  put  aside  every  opportunity  for  the  acquisition  of 
insular  possessions,  except  as  islands  were  appurtenant  to 
the  mainland  of  Florida,  California  and  Alaska.  In  the 
administration  of  President  Fillmore,  Mr.  Webster  declined 
the  free  gift  of  Hawaii,  and  in  General  Grant's  administration 
we  refused  to  accept  San  Domingo. 

We  are  now  engaged  in  a  war  in  which  the  objects —  I 
may  not  say  prizes — are  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philip 
pine  Islands.  I  say  objects  in  the  sense  of  acquiring 
possession.  Occupation  and  holding,  either  permanently  or 
for  the  time  being,  are  events  more  remote,  and  yet  they  are 
events  to  be  met  and  to  be  dealt  with  in  case  of  naval  and 
military  successes. 

Congress  has  given  a  pledge  to  the  world,  which  the  world 
will  not  believe,  that  the  United  States  has  no  purpose  to 
appropriate  Cuba  to  itself;  but  events  may  change  opinions, 
and  opinions  may  change  Congresses.  As  to  Porto 
Rico  and  the  Philippines,  no  pledge  has  been  given,  and 


59 

there  is  no  probability  that  we  shall  restore  them  to  Spain  as 
a  free  gift.  Spain  will  not  be  in  a  condition  at  the  end  of  the 
war  to  make  compensation  in  money.  The  islands  will 
remain  with  us  as  dependencies  to  be  governed  as  circum 
stances  may  dictate.  As  dependencies  they  must  be  pro 
tected  that  they  may  be  governed.  Protection  implies  naval 
power  and  military  power,  proportionate  to  the  circumstances. 
Naval  power  and  military  power  involve  expenditures,— 
enormous  expenditures  ;  —  and  the  expenditures  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  a  continent  resting  on  two  oceans,  and  of 
islands  in  two  hemispheres,  will  require  a  system  of  perma 
nent  taxation  equal  to  that  which  was  borne  by  the  country  in 
the  years  following  the  close  of  the  Civil  War. 

There  are  public  men  who  anticipate,  and  with  reason, 
apparently,  an  understanding  with  England  for  an  interna 
tional  union  for  the  arrangement  or  the  rearrangement  of 
the  affairs  of  the  world.  Senator  Chandler  has  spoken  in 
their  behalf.  In  his  view  there  is  to  be  an  arrangement,  but 
it  is  not  to  be  called  an  alliance. 

An  international  arrangement,  by  whatever  name  it  may  be 
called,  must  rest  upon  mutual  obligations ;  and  obligations 
imply  co-operation  for  some  purposes  and  under  some 
conditions. 

Such  suggestions  indicate  conscious  weakness  on  the  part 
of  those  by  whom  the  suggestions  are  made.  For  the 
moment  the  United  States  does  not  need  the  aid  of  England, 
and  England  does  not  need  the  aid  of  America.  The  sug 
gestion  looks  to  a  new  policy.  It  is  a  humiliation  for  us  to 
entertain  the  thought  that  we  need  the  aid  of  England.  But 
for  what  purpose  is  an  arrangement  to  be  made  with  Eng 
land?  Must  not  the  answer  be  this:  that  whatever  either 
has  is  to  be  defended,  and  that  whatever  either  takes  is  to  be 
kept? 

In  the  closing  quarter  of  the  last  century  the  United  States 
passed  through  a  serious  experience,  due  to  the  alliance  of 
1778,  with  France.  The  ratifications  of  a  treaty  were 
exchanged  in  July,  1778,  and  in  July,  1798,  the  treaty  was 


6o 

abrogated  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  For  the 
period  of  about  six  years,  from  1794  to  1800,  the  two 
countries  were  engaged  in  hostile  acts  without  a  formal 
declaration  of  war.  Several  hundred  ships  of  the  United 
States  were  seized  by  French  cruisers,  taken  into  French 
ports,  where  they  were  condemned  and  sold  as  prizes  for  the 
benefit  of  the  captors.  Congress  made  preparations  for  war, 
and  General  Washington  was  appointed  lieutenant-general 
and  commander-in-chief  of  the  army. 

Peace  came  with  the  treaty  of  1800,  but  the  country  was 
divided  into  a  French  party  and  an  English  party, —  a  contest 
which  contributed  to  the  war  of  1812.  Such  were  some  of 
the  evil  consequences  of  a  treaty  of  alliance  which  opened 
with  these  attractive  phrases:  "  There  shall  be  a  firm, 
inviolable  and  universal  peace,  and  a  true  and  sincere  friend 
ship  between  the  Most  Christian  King,  his  heirs  and  suc 
cessors,  and  the  United  States ;  and  the  terms  hereinafter 
mentioned  shall  be  perpetual  between  the  Most  Christian 
King,  his  heirs  and  successors,  and  the  said  United  States." 

It  may  not  be  possible  to  avert  the  first  step  in  an  erro 
neous  policy, —  the  possession  of  islands  in  seas  near,  and  in 
seas  remote,  —  but  it  is  not  too  late  to  utter  a  word  of 
caution  against  a  second  step  by  which  we  are  to  exchange 
the  good  will  of  the  nations  of  the  world  over,  for  an  alliance 
with  England.  Let  England  be  and  remain  to  us  what 
Russia,  what  Japan,  what  Germany,  what  the  states  of 
Europe  are  to  us, —  friends  always,  it  may  be  hoped,  but 
allies  never. 

When  the  second  quarter  of  this  century  opened,  wooden 
ships  moved  under  sails  were  the  means  of  naval  warfare,  and 
a  seventy-four  gun  ship  was  a  spectacular  exhibition  of  the 
power  of  maritime  states.  These  disappeared  and  their 
place  was  taken  by  ships  of  wood  propelled  by  steam. 
These  were  succeeded  by  iron  vessels  driven  by  steam.  All 
are  now  obsolete.  None  of  them  could  withstand  a  modern 
projectile.  When  the  Cumberland  was  destroyed  in  the  bay 
of  Fortress  Monroe  by  the  Merrimac,  an  ironclad  ship,  the 


6i 

country  was  in  a  panic  under  the  belief  that  she  was  invul 
nerable,  and  that  our  seaboard  cities  were  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Confederacy.  That  apprehension  was  removed  by  the 
appearance  of  Ericson's  monitor  and  the  destruction  of 
the  Merrimac.  Now  we  have  improved  monitors,  torpedo 
boats,  torpedo  destroyers,  and  battleships  of  enormous 
size —  clad  with  impenetrable  armor. 

The  tragedy  of  the  battleship  Maine,  and  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  fleet  in  the  harbor  of  Manila,  teach  the  awful 
lesson  that  when  one  of  these  great  engines  of  war  is  struck 
fatally,  it  is  transformed  in  an  instant  into  an  iron  coffin 
in  which  all  must  perish. 

Thus  in  these  seventy  years  has  naval  warfare  become 
a  more  scientific,  a  more  desperate  and  a  more  deadly 
struggle. 

Greater  changes,  even,  have  taken  place  in  the  enginery  of 
war  on  the  land.  Where  now  are  the  muzzle-loading,  flint 
lock  muskets  of  1840,  and  of  the  Mexican  War?  the  cum 
brous  two  and  four  pound  fieldpieces  drawn  by  men?  They 
are  to  be  found  only  in  the  museums,  and  the  showrooms  of 
arsenals. 

In  the  year  1851,  Captain  Braxton  Bragg  came  to  Boston 
with  his  battery,  drawn  and  manoeuvred  by  horses.  It  was 
called  the  Flying  Artillery.  As  governor  of  the  state  I 
reviewed  the  corps  on  Boston  Common.  It  was  an  occasion 
of  considerable  interest,  as  no  one  among  us  had  then  seen 
such  an  exhibition  of  skill  and  power. 

Bragg  was  a  more  celebrated  person  in  1851  than  he  was 
in  1863,  when  he  was  in  command  of  the  Confederate  forces 
at  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge ;  for  it  was  to  him  that 
General  Taylor  gave  the  much  quoted  order,  spoken  at  the 
battle  of  Buena  Vista,  and  which  aided  Taylor  in  the  election 
of  1848  :  "  Give  them  a  little  more  grape ',  Captain  Bragg." 

Now  we  have  breech-loading  rifled  cannon  of  sizes  enor 
mous,  and  projectiles  that  can  penetrate  even  the  heavily 
plated  and  armored  ships  of  war.  We  have  telescopic 
apparatus  for  musketry,  breech-loading  muskets,  magazine 


62 

guns  and  gatling  guns  which  render  an  open  field  fight  like 
that  of  the  plains  of  Chippewa,  in  the  war  of  1812,  an  impos 
sibility. 

In  my  last  conversation  with  General  Sheridan  he  ex 
pressed  the  hope  and  the  belief  that  the  instruments  of  war 
would  become  so  deadly  that  the  nations  could  not  engage 
in  war.  That  hope  and  belief  I  also  entertain.  What  has 
been  done  justifies  the  opinion  that  science  and  the  inventive 
faculties  of  men  may  secure  for  mankind  eras  of  peace 
which  all  the  religions  of  the  world  and  of  the  ages  have  not 
been  able  to  command. 


PROBLEMS  RAISED  BY  THE  WAR. 


PROBLEMS  RAISED  BY  THE  WAR. 


OUR  estimate  of  the  importance  of  passing  events  is  often 
erroneous ;  and  therefore,  it  cannot  be  assumed  with  full 
confidence  that  the  evil  consequences  which  some  of  us 
apprehend  from  the  policy  of  insular,  territorial  expansion 
will  be  realized  by  the  country,  either  in  the  near  or  the  dis 
tant  future.  The  remarks,  however,  that  I  am  to  submit  to 
you  all  proceed  upon  the  opinion,  which  I  entertain,  that  evil 
consequences  of  the  most  serious  character  are  not  only 
probable,  but  that  they  are  inevitable,  as  incidents  of  the 
policy  on  which  the  country  is  entering. 

It  has  been  my  fortune  on  several  occasions  to  express 
opinions  upon  public  questions  and  pending  measures  that 
were  not  in  harmony  with  the  prevailing  sentiment  of  the 
people.  In  some  instances  my  views  have  been  vindicated 
by  time  and  experience,  but  in  other  cases,  and  in  a  like 
authoritative  way,  my  opinions  have  been  condemned. 

While  I  am  not  dismayed  by  this  experience,  it  chastens 
any  disposition  that  I  may  have  to  rely  with  implicit  con 
fidence  upon  the  wisdom  of  the  views  that  I  am  now  to  set 
forth. 

It  is  known  to  some  of  my  friends  that  I  was  opposed  to 
the  war  with  Spain.  I  was  not  a  believer  in  the  necessity,  or 
the  wisdom  or  the  justice  of  the  undertaking.  The  resolu 
tions  of  Congress  of  April  19,  made  the  war  a  constitutional 
war,  and  thenceforward  we  were  all  and  alike  bound  to  its 
support. 

PRINCIPLES    OF    OUR    GOVERNMENT   AT    STAKE. 

For  myself,  however,  I  could  not  foresee  nor  forecast  any 
fortunate  outcome  of  the  contest.  On  the  one  hand  we  could 
not  tolerate  defeat,  but  on  the  other  hand,  with  success,  we 


NOTE.  —  Address  before  the  Twentieth  Century  Club,  Boston,  Oct.  8,  1898.  65 


66 

are  called  to  the  discussion  and  decision  of  practical  ques 
tions,  which  challenge  the  principles  on  which  the  govern 
ment  was  framed,  and  which  in  their  final  adjudication  may 
work  a  change  in  our  political  institutions. 

The  war  as  a  war  has  been  a  signal  success ;  but  the  sum 
of  the  difficulties  that  confront  us  is  proportionate  to  the 
magnitude  of  that  success.  For  one  I  overestimated  the 
the  ability  of  the  Spanish  people  and  the  capacity  of  the 
Spanish  Government.  The  Madrid  administration  has  ex 
hibited  a  marvelous  incapacity  for  the  business  of  govern 
ment,  and  we  are  indebted  to  that  incapacity  for  the  speedy 
conclusion  of  the  war.  If  only  this  had  happened :  If 
Spain  had  kept  its  fleets  in  the  waters  of  the  Mediterranean 
sea,  our  army  might  even  now  be  engaged  in  an  unequal 
struggle  with  pestilential  diseases  and  death  in  the  morasses 
and  among  the  mountains  of  Cuba. 


We  may  assume  that  the  war  of  arms  is  ended  and,  there 
fore,  I  shall  use  a  paragraph  in  a  summary  statement  of  the 
causes  on  which  the  war  has  been  made  to  rest : 

First  of  all,  and  most  important  of  all,  was  the  destruction 
of  the  battleship  Maine.  A  tragedy  and  a  criminal  tragedy, 
probably,  but  as  yet  the  responsibility  has  not  been  fastened 
upon  anybody.  Passion  and  excitement  laid  the  crime  upon 
the  Spanish  Government.  The  reason  of  the  case  justified  a 
suspicion  that  the  act  was  the  work  of  the  Cuban  junta  in  the 
city  of  New  York. 

Next,  the  country  had  come  to  look  upon  the  insurgents 
as  patriotic  imitators  of  Washington  and  the  men  of  our  rev 
olution,  and  it  had  reached  the  conclusion  that  we  ought  to 
act  the  part  of  Lafayette  and  the  French  nation.  I  was  not 
influenced  by  these  considerations.  I  had  known  something 
of  the  revolutionists  of  1868.  To  me  they  were  the  least 
worthy  and  the  most  untrustworthy  of  the  Spanish  race  in  the 
island  of  Cuba.  I  had  evidence  satisfactory  that  it  was  of 
their  settled  policy  to  delude  and  deceive  the  credulous,  and 
to  bribe  the  corrupt. 


67 

I  had  also  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  plantation 
owners  were  giving  aid  to  the  insurgents,  and  that  they 
looked  to  the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  and 
not  to  the  independence  of  the  island  except  as  a  step  in  their 
scheme.  When  the  independence  of  Cuba  shall  have  become 
an  accomplished  fact  the  landowners,  resident  and  non 
resident,  will  struggle  for  annexation  and  the  consequent 
freedom  of  sugar  and  tobacco  from  the  tariff  duties  that  are 
now  imposed  upon  those  articles,  to  be  followed  by  an 
immense  increase  in  the  value  of  their  estates.  Annexation 
may  not  bring  peace  to  Cuba,  but  peace  will  not  be  the  gen 
eral  condition  of  Cuba  until  the  annexation  of  the  island  to 
the  United  States  shall  have  been  effected,  and  the  end  for 
which  the  insurrection  was  fomented  shall  have  been 
attained. 

Other  considerations  contributed  to  the  public  sentiment  in 
favor  of  the  war.  Some  were  influenced  by  the  injustice  and 
brutality  of  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba,  and  the  consequent  suffer 
ings  of  the  inhabitants ;  some  by  a  wish  to  enlarge  the 
American  markets ;  some  by  the  belief  that  a  new  and  fruit 
ful  missionary  ground  would  be  opened ;  some  by  a  purpose 
to  enlarge  the  scope  of  republican  institutions;  some  by  a 
wish  to  secure  coaling  stations  in  the  Caribbean  sea ;  and  at 
the  critical  moment  an  immense  impetus  was  given  to  the  war 
spirit  by  Senator  Proctor's  speech  in  which  he  set  forth  the 
sufferings  of  masses  of  human  beings  in  Cuba,  but  with  an 
exhibition  of  emotional  humanitarianism  not  often  witnessed 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  These  incidents  and 
events  had  large  influence  in  the  country,  and  they  had  a 
controlling  influence  in  Congress. 

It  was  in  the  critical  condition  of  affairs  so  existing  that  I 
wrote  two  letters  to  Governor  Long.  They  were  dated 
March  29  and  April  3.  To  me  they  are  a  connecting  link 
between  the  opinions  that  I  then  entertained,  and  the  views 
that  I  am  now  to  lay  before  you. 


68 

BOSTON,  MASS.,  March  29,  1898. 
The  Hon.  John  D.  Long,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  It  is  always  a  question  of  doubt  with  me  whether  a 
letter  from  an  outsider  can  be  of  any  value  to  those  who  are  intrusted 
with  the  management  of  affairs ;  but  there  are  indications  in  the  news 
papers  that  the  public  opinion  of  this  section  of  the  country  in  respect 
to  the  difficulties  with  Spain  may  be  misunderstood  at  Washington. 

I  have  been  in  contact  daily  for  the  month  preceding,  with  many 
persons  in  varying  conditions  of  life,  and  I  have  not  met  one  who  is  in 
favor  of  hostilities  with  Spain  upon  any  of  the  grounds  that  are  supposed 
to  exist.  There  is,  as  you  might  expect,  a  very  general  concurrence  in 
the  opinion  that  if  unhappily  we  should  be  brought  into  a  condition  of 
war,  the  government  must  be  sustained  in  its  prosecution  until  an  hon 
orable  peace  can  be  secured.  I  think  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  any 
arrangement  by  which  peace  shall  be  secured  will  be  acceptable  to  the 
people  of  Massachusetts,  and  I  think  it  will  be  acceptable  to  the  people 
of  this  part  of  the  country. 

As  to  forcible  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  peace,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  there  are  no  advocates  of  such  a 
policy. 

For  myself,  I  may  say  from  my  experience  of  four  years  during  the 
former  war,  and  from  my  knowledge  of  Spanish  character,  acquired 
then  and  since,  that  Spain  will  never  yield  her  hold  upon  Cuba  except 
through  war  with  the  United  States. 

Should  such  a  war  occur,  the  administration  will  find  support  in 
Massachusetts,  but  few  or  no  advocates  of  the  policy  which  may  have 
led  to  such  a  war.  It  may  be  practicable  —  and  on  this  point  you  can 
judge  much  better  than  I  —  but  it  may  be  practicable  to  effect  an 
arrangement  by  which  as  much  freedom  in  government  shall  be  secured 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  as  is  now  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants  of 
Canada.  If  such  an  arrangement  can  be  made  it  will  be  accepted  and 
approved  very  generally  in  this  part  of  the  country. 

If  in  Congress  and  out  there  should  be  wordy  declamation  against 
such  a  policy,  its  effect  will  be  temporary,  and  its  influence  limited  to  a 
very  few  persons.  In  one  phrase,  I  am  of  opinion,  in  which  I  think  there 
is  very  general  concurrence  here,  that  forcible  intervention  in  the  affairs 
of  Cuba  should  not  be  thought  of  ;  and  that  it  would  be  wholly  indefen 
sible  on  moral  grounds,  as  well  as  a  proceeding  hostile  to  the  best 
interests  of  the  country. 

The  second  letter  was  within  the  limits  of  a  single  sen 
tence  : 


69 

GROTON,  MASS.,  April  3,  1898. 

MY  DEAR  LONG  :  If  the  President  can  say  to  the  country  that  he 
has  exhausted  diplomacy  and  secured  for  the  insurgents  everything 
except  absolute  independence,  and  that  the  United  States  cannot  afford 
a  war  in  their  behalf  on  that  issue,  the  country  will  be  so  nearly  unani 
mous  in  his  support  that  dissenters  will  be  silenced  without  much 
delay. 

As  having  some  connection  with  these  letters,  I  may  say, 
without  impropriety,  that  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  April  I  had 
a  brief  interview  with  the  President.  From  that  interview  I 
received  the  impression  that  the  President  was  anxious  for 
•delay,  and  that  he  was  apprehensive  of  the  speedy  passage  of 
war  resolutions  by  Congress. 

What  he  apprehended  came  to  pass,  and  the  immediate 
and  unconditional  concurrence  of  the  President  in  the  action 
of  Congress  was  the  necessity  of  the  situation. 

These  extended  remarks  are  only  prefatory,  and  I  turn  to 
the  consideration  of  questions  and  topics  that  are  the  out 
come  of  the  war. 

We  may  assume,  what  is  not  impossible,  that  the  country 
will  retain  all  the  islands  and  clusters  of  islands  on  which  our 
flag  has  been  set  up.  However  that  may  be,  some  acquisi 
tions  are  certain,  and  therefore  new  questions  of  government 
are  before  us.  The  questions  —  the  inevitable  questions  — 
are  these :  Shall  we  treat  the  people  and  territories  that  we 
may  acquire  as  prospective  states,  or  shall  we  deal  with  them 
as  perpetual  colonies?  These  questions,  and  questions  and 
topics  incidental  to  these,  I  propose  now  to  consider. 

First  of  all  I  am  to  discuss  a  public  policy  which  is  sug 
gested  by  advocates  of  the  scheme  of  insular  expansion  of 
territory,  and  it  is  also  forced  into  view  by  the  course  of 
•events. 

ARE   WE   TO    ENSLAVE   COMMUNITIES  ? 

We  are  assured  by  some  of  the  advocates  of  annexation 
that  the  outlying  islands  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines 
and  Hawaii,  when  acquired  and  appropriated,  are  never  to 
become  states  of  the  American  Union.  Thus  we  are  invited 


7o 

by  advocates  of  what  is  called  a  policy  of  expansion  to  enter 
into  political  arrangements  with  bodies  of  men  to  be  counted 
by  millions  on  millions,  of  other  races,  of  other  languages, 
of  other  religions,  of  other  habits  of  life  and  industry,  who 
are  never,  never  to  be  permitted  to  govern  themselves,  nor  to 
aid  in  governing  others.  This,  this  is  to  be  an  outcome  of  the 
Civil  War,  which  cost  a  half-million  lives  and  thousands  of 
millions  of  dollars,  and  which  for  a  time  we  thought  —  vainly 
thought,  it  may  now  appear — had  not  only  emancipated  a 
race,  but  had  moved  the  world  many  steps  on  towards  a  higher 
civilization  and  to  purer  views  of  personal  rights  and  of  public 
justice. 

By  what  authority,  or  by  what  example,  or  by  what  teach 
ing  may  this  country  find  justification  for  the  seizure  and 
appropriation  to  its  jurisdiction  of  vast  populations — alien 
populations — equal  in  numbers  to  the  combined  millions  of 
the  states  of  New  York  and  New  England,  and  upon  the 
avowed  purpose  of  denying  to  them  and  to  their  descendants 
forever  the  accustomed  rights  of  American  citizenship?  In 
what  American  precedent  can  this  Government  find  shelter 
for  the  doctrine  that  it  may  seize  communities,  exercise  juris 
diction  over  territories  and  deny  to  the  inhabitants  the  right 
—  I  do  not  say  the  privilege  —  I  say  the  right —  of  self-gov 
ernment?  On  the  contrary,  I  maintain  that  every  person  over 
whom  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  is  thrown  should 
see  before  him  the  prospect  —  the  certain  prospect  —  of  citi 
zenship  in  the  United  States  and  in  a  state  which  shall  include 
and  protect  his  own  home,  and  give  promise  that  the  homes 
of  his  descendants  will  be  protected  through  all  coming  time. 
Whenever  an  opportunity  is  offered  for  an  increase  of  popu 
lation  by  an  extension  of  territory,  this  question  should  be 
considered  and  answered  affirmatively,  or  the  opportunity 
should  be  rejected  :  Are  the  inhabitants  adapted  to  citizen 
ship  and  statehood  in  the  American  Union?  Put  this  ques 
tion  to  those  who  advocated  the  annexation  of  Hawaii.  What 
will  President  McKinley  answer?  What  answer  can  Senator 
Hoar  make?  What  is  the  answer  of  senators  north,  south, 


east  and  west?  Will  anyone  give  an  affirmative  answer? 
What  will  be  the  answer  in  regard  to  Cuba,  which  has  a  popu 
lation  far  in  excess  of  the  population  in  any  one  of  twenty 
states  of  the  Union  that  may  be  named?  What  will  be  the 
answer  in  regard  to  the  Philippines,  which  have  a  population 
equal  to  the  combined  populations  of  the  great  states  of  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania?  Are  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  and 
the  Philippines  to  be  brought  under  the  control  of  the  United 
States,  and  kept  in  a  condition  of  vassalage?  Having  abol 
ished  one  form  of  slavery,  are  we  to  create  another  form  of 
slavery?  Having  emancipated  individuals,  are  we  to  enslave 
communities? 

Do  we  say  that  we  can  govern  Hawaii,  Cuba,  and  the 
Philippines  better  than  the  inhabitants  of  those  islands  can 
govern  themselves?  That  was  the  claim  of  the  slaveholder 
of  1860.  It  is  the  claim  that  we  trampled  under  our  feet  by 
the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  amendments  to  the  constitution. 

First  of  all  and  always,  as  one  citizen,  I  have  advised  and 
protested  against  the  acquisition  of  these  distant  islands  and 
against  any  and  every  form  of  jurisdiction  over  their  alien, 
incompatible,  incapable  populations  ;  but  more  than  all  I  now 
protest  against  the  assembling  of  these  waifs  of  the  ocean 
upon  our  borders,  and  then  subjecting  them  to  a  condition  of 
vassalage,  which  we  shall  attempt  to  conceal  in  some  form  of 
euphemistic  phraseology.  Let  us  be  consistent  in  our  form 
of  government,  if  we  cannot  be  wise  in  fact.  If  we  are  to 
take  the  islands  of  the  sea  by  force,  or  to  receive  them  as 
free  gifts,  let  us  observe  the  forms  of  personal  rights  and  the 
privileges  of  citizenship  in  states  of  the  American  Union  to 
which  we  and  our  ancestors  have  been  accustomed. 

If  we  are  compelled  to  choose  between  vassal  populations 
to  be  now  counted  by  millions,  and  at  the  end  of  the  twen 
tieth  century  to  be  counted  by  tens  of  millions,  or  the  endow 
ment  of  the  sovereignty  of  statehood  upon  ignorant,  incapable, 
dangerous  communities  and  tribes  who  know  nothing  of  the 
great  work  and  responsible  duties  of  self-government,  let  us 
at  least  preserve  the  forms  of  the  republic  even  if  its  princi 
ples  must  perish. 


72 

If  these  millions  of  denizens  of  distant  lands  are  to  be 
brought  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  republic,  let  us  pay  due 
respect  to  the  ancient  principles  of  the  republic.  Slavery 
and  despotism  are  connected,  and  forever  and  inseparably 
must  they  be  connected.  When  we  create  a  vassal  popula 
tion  within  the  republic,  the  republic  becomes  a  despotism. 

When,  in  the  same  country  we  have  provided  for  a  gov 
erning  class  and  a  subordinate  class,  we  have  established  an 
oligarchy,  whatever  may  be  the  difference  in  numbers  of  the 
two  classes.  Such  is  Hawaii  today,  and  such  it  has  been  for 
now  five  years  and  more,  since  the  eventful  moment,  already 
fruitful  in  consequences  of  evil,  when  President  Harrison, 
without  authority  of  law,  set  up  the  flag  of  the  republic  in  a 
foreign  land  where  he  himself  had  no  right  to  set  his  foot. 

Thus  he  aided,  encouraged,  indeed,  thus  and  by  such 
means  he  called  into  existence  the  little  oligarchy,  dignified 
now  as  a  government,  over  which  we  assume  jurisdiction  by 
an  arrangement  with  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  inhabitants, 
and  they  for  the  larger  part  foreigners,  or  the  immediate 
descendants  of  foreigners,  and  upon  the  understanding,  ap 
parently,  that  the  inhabitants  as  a  body  are  never  to  become 
American  citizens  in  a  constitutional  sense.  It  will  be  well  for 
those  who  maintain  this  doctrine  to  examine  the  fourteenth 
amendment  of  the  constitution,  by  force  of  which  all  the  de 
scendants  of  Chinese,  Japanese  and  Mongolians  of  every  other 
nationality  born  within  our  jurisdiction  will  be  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  Thus  in  less  than  three  generations  these  mil 
lions  of  other  races  and  languages  in  Hawaii,  Cuba  and  the 
Philippines,  will  be  transformed  into  American  citizens.  It 
will  also  be  wise  for  them  to  consider  the  authorities  now  exist 
ing  from  the  reading  of  which  it  may  appear  that  all  the  perma 
nent  residents  of  Hawaii  are  now  citizens  of  the  United  States 
by  virtue  of  the  act  of  annexation.  Annexation,  in  whatever 
form  it  may  be  made,  means  citizenship  for  the  inhabitants 
of  the  countries  annexed. 


73 


SHALL    WE    HAVE   TWO    CLASSES    OF    CITIZENS? 

Are  we  to  have  two  classes  of  American  citizens  —  some 
of  a  governing  class  and  some  of  a  subordinate  class? 
Whenever  this  change  shall  have  been  accomplished,  we 
shall  have  admitted  the  imperfectness  of  the  form  of  govern 
ment  which  our  ancestors  set  up,  and  we  shall  have  paid  a 
fatal  and  humiliating  tribute  to  the  supremacy  of  the  aristo 
cratic  and  monarchical  governments  of  the  world. 

The  time  has  come  when  those  who  maintain  the  doctrine 
of  expansion  and  sovereignty,  and  advocate  the  consequent 
public  policy  of  which  I  have  spoken,  should  put  aside  the 
teachings  of  Washington  and  disregard  avowedly  the  example 
of  the  fathers  of  the  republic. 

Already  alarmed  by  the  actual  results  of  their  departure 
from  those  teachings,  and  apprehensive  of  other  evil  conse 
quences,  they  turn  to  England  for  succor  and  support.  If 
an  alliance  with  England  has  become  a  necessity  then  is 
America  doubly  humiliated  —  humiliated  by  the  adoption  of 
a  policy  which  has  created  an  apparent  necessity  for  an 
alliance  with  a  foreign  country,  and  humiliated  by  the  sug 
gestion  of  an  alliance  with  England,  the  country  which  of  all 
others  should  be  to  us  what  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
made  England,  and  the  people  of  England  —  "  Enemies  in 
war,  in  peace  friends."  Any  arrangement  with  England, 
whether  for  mutual  support  or  for  common  plunder,  must 
become  an  entangling  alliance,  not  less  fruitful  of  evil  than 
the  alliance  of  1778  between  France  and  the  United  States. 

If  we  are  to  enter  upon  an  extra  or  an  ultra  continental 
policy,  let  us  not  present  ourselves  to  the  world  as  subservi 
ent  imitators  of  England,  nor  as  dependents  upon  her  superior 
power.  Let  us  stand  and  speak  and  act  for  America  and 
for  America  only.  Any  alliance  with  any  nation  contem 
plates  undertakings  which,  upon  our  own  estimate  of  our 
selves,  are  beyond  our  capacity.  What  must  be  the  nature, 
the  character  of  those  undertakings?  Did  the  contest  with 
Spain  grow  in  the  brief  space  of  seventy  days  to  such  pro- 


74 

portions  that  the  advocates  of  expansion  and  sovereignty 
were  alarmed  lest  the  country  should  prove  to  be  incapable 
of  its  solution  either  by  arms  or  by  diplomacy?  Or  are  we  to 
co-operate  with  England  in  the  division  of  the  Chinese 
empire  and  the  redistribution  of  the  islands  of  the  eastern 
Pacific  ocean?  Is  there  no  Monroe  doctrine  for  any  nation 
but  the  United  States? 

And  who  so  blind  as  not  to  see  that  an  alliance  with  Eng 
land  for  any  purpose  in  the  East  means  hostility  with  Russia, 
and  with  a  probability  approaching  certainty,  it  means 
hostilities  with  Germany,  France  and  Japan?  Indeed,  any 
alliance  between  England  and  the  United  States,  however 
formal  and  indefinite  it  may  appear  in  the  phraseology  used, 
must  awaken  the  suspicions  and  excite  the  jealousies  of  the 
nations  the  globe  around. 

But  if  we  are  to  form  an  alliance,  whether  for  protection  or 
for  conquests,  let  our  arrangements  be  made  with  a  growing 
power  rather  than  with  a  decaying  power. 

Prophecies  as  prophecies  are  vain,  but  public  action  must 
always  rest  upon  the  probabilities  of  national  public  life. 
Counting  national  life  by  centuries,  and  viewing  England  and 
Russia  as  they  appear  today,  which  is  to  increase,  and  which 
is  to  decrease  with  the  progress  of  time? 

ALLIANCES    MEAN   WAR,    NOT    PEACE. 

But,  more  than  all  things  else,  why,  why  should  we,  a 
young  nation,  already  great  and  powerful,  with  capacities 
equal  to  any  exigency  that  is  within  the  scope  of  any  reason 
able  probability,  —  why  should  we  form  an  alliance  with  Japan, 
Russia  or  England?  Any  alliance  or  arrangement,  by  what 
ever  name  called,  implies  an  obligation  to  act  or  not  to  act 
upon  the  judgment  of  another.  Thus  should  we  limit  our 
power,  thus  should  we,  in  some  degree,  become  the  servant  of 
another,  placing  ourselves,  voluntarily,  under  a  qualified  pro 
tectorate.  After  an  experience  of  a  century  and  a  quarter  of 
established,  recognized  and  prosperous  independence,  are  we 
to  be  tempted  into  an  alliance  with  any  nation  for  purposes 


75 

either  of  peace  or  of  war?  But  alliances  are  for  war,  and  not 
for  peace.  Read  the  treaty  of  1778  with  France  and  note  the 
consequences  that  followed.  Read  the  history  of  the  alliance 
which  resulted  in  the  Crimean  War.  Except  for  the  alliance 
that  war  would  have  been  impossible.  Neither  of  the  allied 
parties  would  have  entered  upon  the  contest  unaided.  The 
alliance  made  the  war  possible.  Again,  I  say,  alliances  are 
formed  for  war,  and  not  for  peace. 

But  why  does  England  now  turn  to  us,  and  why  do  her  states 
men  now  speak  approvingly  of  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States?  We  are  told  that  we  are  of  the  same  race,  that  we 
speak  the  same  language,  that  the  same  blood  runs  in  all  our 
veins,  that  we  are  all  and  alike  the  worshippers  of  Shakes 
peare  and  the  admirers  of  the  great  lights  of  English  litera 
ture.  Have  we  not  been  this  and  these  for  two  and  a  half 
centuries,  and,  since  we  disappeared  as  colonies,  has  Great 
Britain  ever,  until  now,  sought  for  any  closer  tie  than  the  tie 
formed  by  a  common  treaty  of  peace  and  friendship?  Have 
not  the  war  with  Spain  and  the  occupation  of  Manila  bay 
stimulated,  if  those  events  have  not  caused,  the  sentiment  in 
England  in  favor  of  an  alliance  with  the  United  States?  If 
our  possession  of  the  Philippines  shall  become  permanent,  we 
are  thenceforth  to  participate  in  the  affairs  of  the  Pacific,  and 
in  the  adjustment  of  those  affairs  our  friendship  and  an 
alliance  with  us  may  be  important  to  England.  Her  adver 
sary,  her  natural  enemy  in  the  East  is  Russia,  and  an  impor 
tant  point  will  have  been  gained  by  England  if  a  feeling  of 
antagonism  between  the  United  States  and  Russia  can  be 
substituted  for  our  long-continued  and  unbroken  friendship. 

Whichever  way  we  turn  for  an  alliance  we  are  to  create 
enemies.  That  the  nations  of  the  world  may  be  our  friends 
our  treatment  of  them  must  be  just  and  equal  to  all  alike.  An 
.alliance  with  any  one  invites  and  provokes  the  hostility  of  all 
others. 


76 


BRITISH    COLONIAL    FORMS    OF  GOVERNMENT  UN-AMERICAN. 

The  suggestion  has  been  made  that  we  may  govern  out 
lying  possessions  as  England  governs  her  colonies,  whom  she 
admits  to  no  considerable  self-government.  That  is  the 
phrase  of  Senator  Hoar  as  he  has  been  reported.  He  may 
have  said  "  whom  she  admits  to  no  inconsiderable  self-gov 
ernment."  England  has  two  or  more  systems  of  civil 
government  for  the  provinces  and  countries  that  are  under 
her  rule.  It  cannot  be  said  that  any  system  of  self-govern 
ment  exists  in  British  India,  and  I  assume  that  we  are  not  re 
ferred  to  British  India  for  our  American  policy.  On  the 
other  hand,  Canada  may  be  quoted  as  a  colony  in  which  the 
people  manage  their  own  affairs  with  but  little  interference 
from  the  home  government.  The  difficulties  that  have  arisen 
in  the  management  of  foreign  affairs  in  which  the  Canadas 
have  had  a  direct  interest,  justify  the  opinion  that  our  gov 
ernment  would  be  greatly  embarrassed  if  similar  colonial 
arrangements  should  be  established  between  the  United 
States  and  Hawaii,  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines. 
It  is  manifest  that  the  interests  of  those  islands,  in  foreign 
affairs,  especially  in  matters  of  trade,  would  not  correspond 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

There  are  degrees  of  subordination,  but  in  Canada  and 
in  Australia,  as  in  India,  the  inhabitants  are  subordinated  to 
a  government  in  which  they  are  not  represented.  All  these 
forms  of  government  are  un-American.  To  us  they  are 
alien  institutions.  Their  acceptance  by  us  is  an  admission 
that  our  form  of  government  is  incapable  of  indefinite  exten 
sion,  and  it  is  a  verdict  of  wrong-doing  against  our  ancestors, 
who  carried  on  a  seven  years'  war  in  support  of  the  doctrine 
that  there  can  be  no  taxation  without  representation. 

There  are  limits  to  any  system  of  self-government.  There 
must  be  some  preparatory  training  on  the  part  of  the  peoples. 
A  government  organized  as  is  our  government,  may  receive 
and  assimilate  foreign  elements  from  time  to  time,  but  in  what 
quantities  none  can  foresay.  Although  I  have  objected  to 


77 

the  acquisition  of  Hawaii,  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philip 
pines,  I  yet  maintain  that  they  should  be  treated  as  we  have 
treated  the  peoples  and  territories  acquired  of  France,  Spain, 
Mexico  and  Russia.  First  of  all,  the  inhabitants  so  acquired 
should  be  recognized  as  citizens  of  the  United  States ;  next, 
territorial  governments  should  be  set  up,  and  upon  the  under 
standing  that  there  may  come  a  time,  and  that  there  will  come 
a  time,  when  from  the  presence  of  numbers  and  of  other 
favoring  conditions,  they  will  be  admitted  as  states  into  the 
American  Union.  I  am  of  opinion  that  this  policy,  however 
hazardous  it  may  appear,  is  a  less  dangerous  policy  than  any 
form  of  political  subordination  which  can  be  devised. 

This  view  of  duty  and  of  public  policy  should  have  led 
to  conservative  action  upon  measures  touching  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  the  country. 

WISDOM    OF   THE    POLICY   OF   SELF-GOVERNMENT. 

Time  and  experience  have  not  lessened  my  confidence  in 
the  disposition  of  mankind  to  make  advances  in  the  principles 
and  agencies  of  self-government. 

In  the  year  1796,  in  his  historical  speech  on  the  Jay  treaty, 
Fisher  Ames  made  this  startling  declaration,  which,  in  a  half- 
century,  was  transformed  into  a  prophecy  by  the  events  in 
Van  Diemen's  Land  :  "  If  there  could  be  a  resurrection  from 
the  foot  of  the  gallows,"  said  Mr.  Ames,  "  if  the  victims  of 
justice  could  live  again,  collect  together  and  form  a  society, 
they  would,  however  loath,  soon  find  themselves  obliged  to 
make  justice —  that  justice  under  which  they  fell  —  the  funda 
mental  law  of  their  state." 

I  regret  to  observe  that  there  are  statesmen,  some  of  whom 
had  a  part  in  the  work  of  reconstructing  the  government  at 
the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  who  now  question  the  wisdom  of 
the  fifteenth  amendment  to  the  constitution,  by  which  the  right 
to  vote  was  guaranteed  to  the  freedmen  of  the  country.  I 
do  not  share  their  doubts.  On  the  other  hand,  I  think  that 
time  and  experience  have  demonstrated  the  wisdom  of  the 
policy  then  adopted.  The  freedmen  of  the  South  have  made 


78 

great  advances  in  political  knowledge  of  the  business  of  gov 
ernment,  and  the  white  people  have  made  signal  progress  in 
the  recognition  of  the  equality  of  all  men  before  the  law. 
The  evidence  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  votes  of  negroes  are 
received  and  counted  in  one-half  of  the  old  slave  states,  and 
that  perceptible  gains  have  been  made  in  the  other  half. 

Overmuch  reliance,  however,  must  not  be  placed  upon  this 
experience  when  we  contemplate  the  extension  of  the  suffrage 
to  the  million  and  a  half  of  untrained  inhabitants  of  Cuba,  or 
to  the  extension  of  the  suffrage  to  the  eight  or  ten  million  in 
the  Philippines,  many  of  whom  are  yet  in  a  condition  of  sava- 
gism.  The  negro  of  the  South  had  had  some  training  in 
political  affairs.  He  had  attended  political  meetings  in  towns 
and  villages,  and  he  had  been  a  listener  to  conversations  and 
debates  in  communities  where  political  action  was  the  leading 
topic  of  thought  and  discussion. 

Our  success  with  the  negro,  whatever  may  be  the  degree 
attained,  does  not  justify  the  experiment  with  untutored 
populations  concerning  whom  no  obligation  was  upon  us. 

The  negro  was  a  resident  of  the  United  States.  He  had 
no  abiding-place  elsewhere.  He  could  not  be  expatriated. 
We  had  only  an  alternative :  his  elevation  to  citizenship  and 
a  practical  recognition  of  the  doctrine  of  political  equality, 
on  the  one  hand,  or  the  establishment  of  a  race  aristocracy 
on  the  other. 

If  our  political  ideas  and  institutions  are  of  a  superior  sort, 
the  superiority  is  due  to  centuries  of  training  in  England  and 
in  the  United  States,  and  of  such  training  all  the  Asiatic  races 
are  signally  deficient.  In  Europe  and  America  the  Latin 
races  are  engaged  even  now  in  an  uncertain  struggle  for  the 
maintenance  of  institutions  framed  on  the  model  of  our  dec 
laration  of  independence. 

The  great  error,  the  error  from  whose  sad  consequences 
there  is  no  certain  way  of  escape,  has  been  committed  already 
in  the  extension  of  our  jurisdiction  over  the  islands  of  the 
sea  and  over  the  races  that  occupy  them.  The  question 
before  us  is  this :  By  what  policy  can  the  more  serious  of 
the  probable  or  possible  evils  be  avoided  ? 


79 

First  of  all,  let  us  abide  by  and  maintain  the  principles  on 
which  our  government  was  framed.  This,  I  say,  should  be 
done  without  regard  to  any  ulterior  consideration.  Some  of 
the  requisites  are  these :  ( i )  Citizenship,  universal  and 
co-extensive  with  the  jurisdiction  of  the  country.  (2) 
Local  self-government,  and  upon  the  basis  of  ultimate  admis 
sion  into  the  United  States.  (3)  Freedom  to  travel,  to 
labor  and  to  engage  in  business  in  any  part  of  the  country. 

These  conditions  imply  the  early  abandonment  of  military 
government,  a  form  of  government  always  hostile  to  republi 
can  institutions. 

Next,  neither  the  successful  revolutionists  in  Hawaii,  nor 
the  revolting  insurgents  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  should 
be  recognized  by  us.  Nor  should  the  Catholic  Church  or  any 
other  church  be  consulted  by  our  authorities,  or  heeded  in 
the  conduct  of  public  affairs.  The  churches  will  be  pro 
tected  in  their  rights  of  property  and  in  freedom  of  worship 
undisturbed.  Nothing  more  ought  they  to  ask ;  nothing 
more  should  they  secure.  Finally,  the  nation  should  provide 
for  a  system  of  public  instruction  in  which  the  English 
language  should  be  taught  as  the  language  of  the  country. 

As  these  limitations  and  exactions  are  fundamental  in  our 
scheme  of  government,  they  should  be  enforced  and  accepted 
as  the  basis  of  the  organizations  out  of  which  states  are  to  be 
formed. 

I  do  not  trouble  myself  with  a  conjecture  as  to  the  time 
that  may  be  required  for  the  transformation  of  these  untu 
tored  millions  into  capable  and  trustworthy  American  citizens. 
I  say  only  this :  Give  to  any  people  an  opportunity  to 
govern  themselves,  and  out  of  their  experience  they  will 
gain  in  capacity  for  self-government.  In  thought,  I  quote 
again  the  prophecy  of  Fisher  Ames. 


Nor  do  I  delay  you  with  an  enumeration  of  the  difficulties, 
possible  or  probable,  that  are  to  be  encountered  in  the  exer 
cise  of  jurisdiction,  over  the  territories  and  peoples  that  we 
are  acquiring.  Outside  of  the  possible  or  probable  difficul- 


8o 

ties,  there  are  difficulties  which  we  can  foresee — difficulties 
that  are  certain  to  arise,  and  which  are  uncertain  only  as  to 
their  magnitude,  cost  and  duration :  standing  armies, 
quartered  in  distant  regions,  and  under  the  control  of  mili 
tary  chieftains  or  civil  governors,  corresponding  in  their 
functions  to  the  provincial  pretors  of  ancient  Rome ;  a  navy 
capable  of  defending  these  remote  and  disconnected  posses 
sions  against  the  most  powerful  of  the  nations  of  the  earth, 
or  otherwise  to  be  preserved  by  humiliating  alliances,  des 
tined  at  some  time  to  be  sundered  violently ;  and  all  to  be 
supported  by  an  all-pervading  and  burdensome  system  of 
taxation  upon  the  inhabitants  and  industries  of  the  United 
States. 

INHABITANCY  ESSENTIAL  TO  SUCCESS  IN  COLONIZATION. 

I  pass  on  now  to  one  serious  aspect  of  this  most  serious 
condition  of  affairs  which,  as  far  as  I  have  observed,  has  not 
been  considered  by  anyone  in  a  public  way,  unless  Mr.  Bryce 
may  have  taken  a  similar  view  in  an  article  which  I  have  not 
read  nor  seen.  Seneca  said  of  the  Romans:  "  Wherever  the 
Roman  conquers  he  inhabits."  Inhabitancy  is  the  essential 
condition  to  success  in  the  work  of  colonizing  new  regions. 
England  may  be  cited  as  an  example  to  those  who  urge  us  to 
take  up  the  role  that  England  may  soon  be  compelled  to  lay 
down.  I  do  not  speak  of  political  relations, —  they  may  be 
broken  ; —  but  England  will  live  in  Canada  and  Australia,  for 
Canada  and  Australia  are  inhabited  by  Englishmen.  But 
what  of  Egypt  and  India?  Whenever  the  political  power  of 
England  shall  be  withdrawn  from  Egypt,  the  Egypt  of 
former  days  will  reappear.  England  has  sent  officers,  rulers 
and  administrators  of  various  sorts  to  India,  but  the  English 
emigrant,  who  went  forth  in  search  of  a  home  for  himself  and 
his  family,  is  not  to  be  found  in  India. 

England's  rule  of  a  century  in  India  has  not  changed 
essentially  the  habits  and  customs  of  the  people,  nor  wrought 
the  overflow  of  their  ancient  religions.  England  has  con 
quered  India,  but  she  has  not  inhabited  India,  and  her  influ- 


8i 

ence  will  disappear  when  her  dominion  as  a  ruler  passes 
away.  The  English  Church  is  not  an  accepted  religion  by 
more  than  a  very  small  minority  of  the  inhabitants  of  India, 
and  the  political  institutions  of  England  will  disappear  with 
the  withdrawal  of  political  and  military  power. 

The  accessible  parts  of  India  are  within  the  tropics. 
These  parts  are  occupied  to  some  extent,  and  for  temporary 
purposes,  by  Englishmen,  but  they  are  not  inhabited  by 
Englishmen. 

The  same  statement  applies  to  Ceylon  and  to  Jamaica,  and 
to  the  tropical  possessions  of  Great  Britain  generally.  But 
not  thus  with  South  Africa.  That  country  has  an  English 
population.  It  is  inhabited  by  Englishmen,  and  English 
ideas  and  English  institutions  will  remain  whatever  may  be 
the  political  fortunes  of  that  part  of  the  African  continent. 


Are  we  to  overcome  what,  to  England,  has  been  an  obstacle 
for  a  century?  Can  we  carry  on  a  successful  war  against  a 
climate? 

Mark  the  experiment  of  the  hundred  days'  war  with  Spain. 
Bring  before  your  minds  the  array  of  young  men  who  went 
out  from  our  cities,  towns  and  hillsides  to  do  service  for  the 
country.  They  were  animated  by  an  enduring  courage, 
moved  by  a  lofty  patriotism,  and  in  health  and  strength  they 
were  the  select  of  our  vigorous  population.  Bring  before 
your  minds  the  appearance  of  those  who  return,  and  contem 
plate  the  fate  of  those  who  do  not  return  ! 

I  neither  assail  nor  defend  the  department  of  war.  State 
your  account.  Charge  against  the  department  whatever  you 
please  as  the  consequences  of  its  misdoings  and  its  not  doing, 
and  there  will  remain  a  sum  of  horrors  due  to  climatic  condi 
tions  that  will  prevent  family  emigration  from  the  United 
States  to  Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  not 
for  our  time  only,  but  for  all  time.  A  small  number  of 
Americans  will  reside  in  the  islands  for  special  purposes  and 
for  limited  periods.  The  majority  rule,  however,  will  con 
tinue  in  the  hands  of  the  existing  populations  and  be 


82 

continued  for  generations,  in  the  hands  of  their  descendants. 
The  development  of  the  human  race  is  obedient  to  fixed 
climatic  laws. 

There  are  no  great  men  and  no  great  races  in  the  regions 
where  the  icy  hand  of  winter  is  never  relaxed ;  and  the 
law  of  human  progress  is  arrested  in  the  broad  zone  where 
nature  never  purifies  herself  by  the  influence  of  autumn 
frosts. 


In  the  order  of  events  colonial  possessions  exact  a  form  of 
servitude  on  the  part  of  the  possessor.  England  is  forced  to 
accept  a  degree  of  subordination  to  her  colonies. 

Consider  the  long  and  unwholesome  controversy  that  Eng 
land  has  carried  on  with  the  United  States,  while  we  have 
argued  and  pleaded  for  the  protection  of  the  seals  of  Alaska, 
—  animals  that,  from  their  human-like  appearance,  habits 
and  intelligence,  excite  our  admiration  and  compassion  at 
once, —  and  yet  England  has  subordinated  its  own  opinion  of 
what  is  right  and  just  to  the  demands  of  Canadian  poachers 
on  the  Pacific  coast. 

Her  subordination  to  Turkey  is  more  exacting  and  more 
permanent.  The  Sultan  is  the  head  of  the  Mohammedan 
Church,  and  it  is  believed  that  he  has  the  power,  as  he  has 
the  power,  to  promote  rebellion  among  the  Mohammedan 
subjects  of  the  British  queen.  It  is  not,  then,  an  unreason 
able  conjecture  that  Lord  Salisbury  feared  to  apply  force  to 
Turkey  for  the  protection  of  the  Armenians  in  the  valley  of 
the  Euphrates.  Thus  are  the  rulers  of  colonies  brought  into 
subjection  to  the  colonies  that  they  rule. 

The  questions  to  which  I  invited  attention  in  my  opening 
have  now  been  considered.  The  questions  were  these: 
Shall  we  treat  Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  Cuba  and  the  Philippines 
as  prospective  states,  or  shall  we  deal  with  them  as  perpetual 
colonies? 

On  these  questions  and  the  discussion  in  which  I  have 
indulged,  I  impose  two  other  questions,  namely  :  Is  there  any 
statesman  or  taxpayer  who  can  approve  of  the  acquisition  of 


83 

the  islands  named,  and  upon  the  certain  assurance  that  one 
branch  or  the  other  of  the  alternative  proposition  must  be 
accepted  by  the  country?  Or  is  there  a  statesman  who  can 
name  a  third  proposition,  and  a  proposition  different  in  sub 
stance  and  not  in  form  merely,  that  he  will  defend  before  the 
country?  In  the  presence  of  accomplished  facts  the  impor 
tant  question  is  this:  WHAT  OUGHT  NOW  TO  BE  DONE? 

Hawaii  is  annexed  to  the  United  States,  and  Porto  Rico  is 
a  possession  of  the  United  States.  Without  hesitation  I  say 
give  them  territorial  governments  upon  the  American  basis, 
with  the  largest  opportunity  for  progress  and  for  statehood  in 
the  American  Union. 

Cuba  is  not  a  possession  of  the  United  States,  and  our 
policy  in  regard  to  that  island  should  correspond  to  the  dec 
laration  of  Congress.  Cuba  has  been  freed  from  the  domin 
ion  of  Spain  and  upon  the  understanding  that  the  inhabitants 
of  the  island  are  to  set  up  and  maintain  a  republican  govern 
ment.  If  the  United  States  is  bound  to  Cuba,  the  obligation 
hath  this  extent  only  —  that  the  inhabitants  shall  be  free  from 
any  interference  while  the  work  of  organization  is  going  on. 

This  obligation  can  be  kept  easily,  but  it  will  not  be 
accepted  and  acted  upon  in  good  faith  by  the  leaders  who 
have  carried  on  the  war  against  Spain.  From  the  first  their 
ultimate  object  has  been  the  annexation  of  the  island  to  the 
United  States.  That  object  they  will  pursue  through  many 
years,  and  with  the  tenacity  that  they  have  exhibited  in  the 
thirty  years  of  contest  with  Spain.  In  the  contest  now  before 
us,  the  landowners  and  the  political  leaders  of  the  insurgents  of 
Cuba,  transformed  into  ardent  friends  of  the  United  States,  will 
receive  the  support  of  a  large  body  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  especially  in  the  manufacturing  and  trading  districts  of 
the  country.  Every  attempt  to  frame  a  popular  government 
will  be  resisted,  and  any  government  that  may  be  set  up  will 
be  denounced  as  a  failure.  Aside  from  political  considerations 
there  are,  however,  three  large  classes  of  Americans  who  are 
interested  in  adhering  to  the  declaration  of  Congress. 

First,  the  taxpayers,  who,  in  case  of  the  annexation  of  the 


34 

island,  must  supply  the  deficiency  in  revenue,  say  not  less 
than  $60,000,000  a  year,  caused  by  the  loss  of  duties  on  sugar 
and  tobacco  brought  from  Cuba  to  the  United  States. 

Second,  the  mass  of  American  laborers,  of  every  grade  and 
occupation,  who  will  be  forced  into  competition  with  the 
millions  of  underpaid  and  unclothed  workers  of  the  tropics. 

Third,  the  owners  and  workers  of  land  whose  interest  in 
the  sugar-producing  industry  is  to  be  destroyed. 

My  conclusion,  however,  must  be  this :  After  such  a  sur 
vey  of  the  situation  as  I  have  been  able  to  make,  and  not 
withstanding  the  declaration  of  Congress,  and  notwithstanding 
the  many  valid  objections  to  the  annexation  of  Cuba,  I  reach 
the  conclusion  that  there  is  much  reason  to  fear  that  the 
project  for  annexation  will  have  become  an  accomplished 
fact  in  the  near  future 


Even  more  serious  are  the  questions  that  must  arise  from 
our  possession  of  Manila  bay  and  the  capture  of  the  city  of 
Manila.  These  acquisitions  are,  and  for  the  moment  only, 
military  lodgments  made  in  time  of  war,  and  they  cannot  be 
treated  as  the  conquest  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  They  con 
stitute  standing  ground  for  diplomatic  debate,  or  for  further 
military  undertakings.  The  conquest  of  the  Spanish  islands 
in  the  Pacific  ocean  was  no  part  of  the  purpose  of  the  war, 
as  the  purpose  was  declared  by  us,  and  the  seizure  of  those 
islands  may  be  treated,  wisely  and  properly,  as  a  means  of 
compelling  Spain  to  yield  jurisdiction  over  the  island  of 
Cuba,  which  was  the  one  only  avowed  object  of  the  war. 
Spain  has  surrendered  all  jurisdiction  over  Cuba,  and  thereon 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  may  with  propriety, 
wisdom  and  justice,  surrender  its  temporary  possessions  and 
all  jurisdiction  in  the  islands  of  the  East,  and  that  without 
controversy,  or  debate,  or  thought  of  compensation. 

If  we  assert  a  right  in  those  islands  on  the  basis  of  con 
quest,  then  and  thenceforward  we  are,  and  are  to  be,  parties 
to  questions  and  controversies,  not  with  Spain  and  Aguinaldo 
only,  but  with  many  countries  that  have  interests  and  estab 
lishments  for  business  in  the  islands. 


85 

Consider  one  question :  By  our  constitution  the  duties 
levied  upon  foreign  products  must  be  uniform  throughout  the 
United  States.  Presumably  our  system  of  duties  is  enforced 
in  Hawaii  as  it  is  in  the  city  of  New  York.  The  trade  be 
tween  New  York  and  Honolulu  is  coastwise  trade,  and  duties 
are  not  imposed  upon  American  products.  Upon  the 
annexation  of  the  Philippines  the  trade  between  those  islands 
and  other  countries  will  be  diminished  seriously.  Will  Eng 
land,  France  and  Germany  be  content  while  we  take  into  our 
hands  the  trade  of  the  ten  million  inhabitants  of  the  Philip 
pines?  My  propositions  are  these: 

First :  Give  to  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico  territorial  govern 
ments  and  upon  a  liberal  basis. 

Second  :  Insist  upon  an  independent  government  for  Cuba, 
•and  give  no  encouragement  to  the  project  for  annexation. 

Third :  Abandon  the  Spanish  islands  of  the  Pacific  with 
out  controversy,  debate  or  negotiations  with  anyone. 

To  some,  to  many,  perhaps,  the  policy  that  I  commend 
may  seem  insignificant  when  compared  with  the  permanent 
possession  of  all  the  islands  on  which  our  flag  has  been  set 
up. 

I  have  not  been  influenced  by  the  circumstance  that  our 
flag  has  been  set  up  in  foreign  lands  as  evidence  of  temporary 
possession  gained  by  force  and  to  be  held  by  force.  Con 
quests  in  war  are  temporary  until  jurisdiction  is  recognized  by 
the  losing  party.  The  flag  as  a  symbol  of  established  right, 
follows  legal  recognized  jurisdiction.  There  can  be  no  dis 
honor  in  the  abandonment  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  The 
sovereignty  has  never  been  in  us. 

If  it  be  charged  that  I  am  reducing  our  acquisitions  to  the 
minimum  quantity,  then  I  admit  the  justice  of  the  charge. 
Such  has  been  my  purpose.  Every  acquisition  in  the  tropics 
is  freighted  with  misfortunes  for  the  country.  As  we  diminish 
the  extent  of  these  acquisitions  we  lessen  the  sum  or  moderate 
the  intensity  of  our  misfortunes. 


ISOLATION  AND  IMPERIALISM. 


ISOLATION  AND  IMPERIALISM. 


WHEN  I  accepted  the  invitation  of  the  Cantabrigia  Club,  I 
resolved  to  ask  the  women  of  Cambridge  whether  they  prefer 
a  policy  of  isolation  for  the  United  States,  as  the  policy  of 
Washington  is  now  characterized  by  its  enemies,  with  peace 
as  the  general  condition  of  the  country,  or  a  policy  of  territo 
rial  expansion  such  as  has  already  been  entered  upon  by  war, 
and  which  can  only  be  preserved  and  perpetuated  by  succes 
sive  wars.  If  not  to  be  so  perpetuated,  why  the  demand  now 
made  by  those,  or  on  behalf  of  those  who  are  responsible  for 
the  present  condition  of  affairs,  for  additions  to  the  army  and 
the  navy  at  a  cost  of  $IOO,OOO,OOO  or  $150,000,000  a  year? 

If  the  war  with  Spain  and  the  acquisitions  of  territory  now 
made,  or  already  determined  upon,  do  not  menace  the 
country  with  other  wars,  why  the  demand  for  additional 
armaments  by  sea  and  by  land  ? 

At  the  meeting  of  the  Massachusetts  Club  the  twenty-second 
day  of  October,  several  statements  were  made  by  Mr.  Boutelle 
of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  by  Mr.  Woodford,  our 
late  minister  to  Madrid,  that  open  a  new  chapter  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  war  with  Spain.  I  shall  say  something  of  that 
chapter,  but  I  cannot  assume  to  write  it. 


First  of  all,  I  am  to  speak  of  the  policy  of  isolation  which 
we  have  favored  for  a  century  and  more,  and  which  we 
ascribe  justly  to  Washington  and  his  associates  of  the  revo 
lutionary  and  constitutional  periods  of  our  history. 

The  policy  of  isolation,  however,  is  not  to  be  justified  even 
by  the  name  and  counsel  of  Washington,  although  Washing 
ton's  name  and  counsel  ought  always  to  have  great  value 
with  the  American  people.  The  policy  must  find  its  justifi 
cation  in  the  experience  of  the  country.  We  departed  from 


NOTE.  —  Speech  before  the  Cantabrigia  Club,  Cambridge,  Nov.  4,  1898. 


90 

the  policy  of  isolation  in  the  case  of  the  Samoan  islands,  and 
in  that  case  we  have  been  involved  already  in  disagreeable 
misunderstandings  with  Germany. 

Our  policy  of  isolation  has  been  a  policy  of  avoidance  of 
alliances  with  foreign  nations,  and  the  avoidance  of  policies 
in  foreign  affairs  which  would  invite  or  provoke  controversies 
with  other  governments.  In  fine,  we  have  limited  our  dis 
cussions  and  actions,  as  a  government,  to  matters  which, 
primarily  and  unavoidably,  concern  ourselves. 

President  Monroe  limited  the  application  of  the  principle 
set  forth  in  his  message  of  1823,  to  cases  in  which  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  United  States  might  be  involved. 


With  the  exception  of  the  arrangement  in  regard  to  the 
Samoan  islands,  we  had  not  passed  beyond  the  rule  so  laid 
down  until  the  annexation  of  Hawaii.  The  policy  of  isola 
tion,  which  we  have  pursued,  has  been  a  policy  of  peace;  the 
policy  of  expansion,  as  that  policy  is  now  presented  to  us,  is 
a  policy  of  war.  That  is  the  issue  which  I  make.  Our 
acquisitions  on  this  continent  have,  as  a  policy  and  upon  the 
facts,  tended  to  peace.  The  treaties  by  which  we  acquired 
Louisiana  and  Florida  saved  us  from  controversies  over  unde 
fined  territorial  claims. 

By  the  treaty  of  1803  with  France  we  quieted  the  then  ex 
isting  animosities  between  the  authorities  and  the  inhabitants 
of  the  two  countries.  It  was  provided  by  that  treaty  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  should  be  incorporated 
"  in  the  union  of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as 
possible,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  federal  constitu 
tion,  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages  and 
immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States."  A  correspond 
ing  provision  was  incorporated  in  the  treaty  of  1819  with 
Spain  by  which  we  acquired  Florida,  and  a  like  provision 
was  incorporated  in  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo  of  1848, 
by  which  we  acquired  California  and  the  then  undefined  ter 
ritory  between  the  Louisiana  purchase  and  the  Pacific  ocean. 
The  same  provision  is  found  in  the  treaty  of  1867  with 


9i 

Russia,  by  which  the  territory  of  Alaska  was  ceded  to  the 
United  States. 

All  of  these  treaties  were  in  the  line  of  peace,  and  of  the 
first  three  it  may  be  asserted  with  entire  confidence  that  the 
chances  of  war  were  diminished  immensely.  Our  peaceful 
relations  with  France  have  continued  from  1803,  with  only  a 
slight  interruption  during  the  administration  of  General  Jack 
son,  and  except  for  the  unwise  action  of  our  authorities  a  condi 
tion  of  peace  might  have  been  maintained  with  Spain  for  an 
indefinite  future. 

That  our  relations  with  Mexico,  which  were  consummated 
by  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  may  be  understood,  I 
shall  pass  in  review,  briefly,  the  issue  involved  in  the  war  of 
1846,  and  the  means  by  which  the  controversy  was  brought  to 
a  peaceful  termination.  When  the  state  or  province  of  Texas 
declared  its  independence  of  Mexico,  the  limits  of  the  state 
were  set  forth  in  the  declaration.  The  Rio  Grande  was  named 
as  the  southern  and  western  line.  Following  the  declaration  of 
independence,  the  new  government  of  Texas  was  recognized  by 
the  United  States,  by  Russia,  by  Great  Britain  and  by  France. 

Mexico  claimed  that  the  river  Nueces,  a  river  to  the  east  of 
the  Rio  Grande,  was  the  boundary  of  the  province  of  Texas. 
When  Texas  was  annexed  to  the  United  States,  in  March,  1 845 , 
that  claim  was  unadjusted.  The  war  opened  upon  that  issue. 

General  Taylor  was  sent  to  the  Nueces  at  the  head  of  a 
small  army,  known  first  as  an  army  of  observation,  then  as  an 
army  of  occupation,  and  finally  it  became  an  army  of  invasion. 

General  Scott  landed  an  army  at  Vera  Cruz,  and  from  there 
he  marched  to  the  city  of  Mexico,  fighting  several  successful 
battles  on  the  way,  and  levying  contributions  upon  the  con 
quered  cities  and  provinces. 

i  Thus  we  had  set  up  our  flag  on  two  lines,  from  the  Rio 
Grande  to  the  capital  of  Monterey  on  the  one  side,  and  from 
Vera  Cruz  to  the  city  of  Mexico  on  the  other,  and  every 
where  by  the  month  of  July,  1848,  the  flag  of  the  republic 
had  been  hauled  down. 


92 

What  is  the  new  doctrine?  Only  this  :  Wherever  the  flag- 
of  the  republic  has  been  set  up,  there  it  is  to  remain.  Every 
nation  has  hauled  down  its  flag  when  it  has  been  set  up  as 
evidence  of  possession  gained  by  war.  In  the  war  of  1812 
England  set  up  its  flag  at  Eastport  on  our  northern  frontier,, 
and  in  Washington,  the  capital  of  the  country.  We  set  up 
our  flag  in  Canada,  on  the  plains  of  Chippewa.  Let  us  not 
be  deluded  by  phrases.  Under  some  circumstances  the  flag 
is  a  symbol  of  existing  power  only  ;  in  other  circumstances 
it  is  a  representation  of  actual  and  permanent  right.  The 
two  conditions  are  distinct,  and  my  complaint  is  that  the 
friends  of  territorial  expansion  seek  to  confound  them  in  the 
public  mind,  and  so  consequently  to  misdirect  public  opinion. 
We  not  only  hauled  down  our  flag  on  two  lines  on  which  we 
had  penetrated  Mexico,  but  we  declined  to  take  any  territory 
as  due  to  conquest.  The  strip  of  land  between  the  Nueces 
and  the  Rio  Grande  was  treated  as  a  part  of  Texas.  A  new 
boundary  line  was  made.  The  territory  ceded  was  purchased, 
for  which  we  paid  $15,000,000,  and  we  released  Mexico  from 
claims  of  American  citizens  amounting  to  $3,250,000  more. 

Thus  by  the  treaty  of  1848  we  quieted  all  claims  pending 
between  Mexico  and  the  United  States,  we  paid  for  the  terri 
tory  acquired,  we  took  nothing  as  the  fruit  of  conquest,  and 
we  established  a  peace  which  has  been  undisturbed  for  a  full 
half-century. 

In  one  particular  the  men  of  that  period  may  have  erred. 
It  did  not  occur  to  them  that  the  United  States,  by  the  act  of 
conquest  and  temporary  occupation,  had  become  responsible 
for  the  future  good  government  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
cities  and  provinces  along  the  lines  traversed  by  the  armies 
of  General  Taylor  and  General  Scott. 

The  cession  of  Alaska  may  may  have  been  due  to  a  pur 
pose  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  rid  itself  of  the  burden  of  de 
fending  an  unoccupied  territory  against  Great  Britain  on  the 
western  Pacific  coast,  in  case  of  hostilities  arising  out  of  con 
flicting  policies  in  China  and  Chinese  waters.  Beyond  such 


93 

considerations,  Russia  was  not  unwilling  to  extend  our  juris 
diction  on  this  continent  as  a  menace  to  Great  Britain.  To 
us  the  cession  was  an  indication  of  good  will  on  the  part  of 
Russia,  and  it  was  so  regarded  by  the  Government  and  people 
of  the  United  States. 

Thus,  in  a  period  of  less  than  one  hundred  years,  our  ter 
ritory  has  been  augmented  many  times  over,  and  from  the 
proceedings  and  conditions  some  conclusions  may  be  de 
duced  : 

1.  Nothing  has  been  taken  by  naked  conquest. 

2.  The  territories  acquired  are  within  the  oceans,  except 
ing  only  dependent  islands  always  unimportant  and  for  the 
most  part  uninhabited. 

3.  In  each  case  the  inhabitants  were  few  in  number,  and 
in  every  case  citizenship,  self-government,  and  admission  into 
the  union  of  states  upon  the  basis  of  the  federal  constitution 
were  guaranteed  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  respective  territories. 

4.  The   countries   acquired  were   immediately  or    easily 
accessible  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  states  of  the  American 
Union. 

5.  With  the  exception  of  the  northern  parts  of  Alaska, 
the  territories  acquired  were  inviting  to  natives  of  the  tem 
perate  zone — say  between  the    thirty-fifth  degree   and   the 
fiftieth  degree  north  latitude. 

6.  Immigrants  from  the  United   States   and  from   other 
countries  within  the  degrees  named  were  not  exposed  to  the 
perils  of  acclimation,  nor  to  the  necessity  of  any  considerable 
change  in  their  habits  and  customs  of  former  life. 

7.  The    proceedings  were    promotive   of    peace  for  the 
United  States  and  promotive  of  a  general  policy  of  peace. 

8.  With  the  exception  of  the  territory  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Nueces,  over  which  we  claimed  jurisdiction  as  I  have 
stated,  all  the  territory  ceded  was  ceded  by  the  voluntary  acts 
of  those  in  whose  hands  the  sovereignty  had  been  placed. 


Can  these  conclusions  of  fact,  or  can  any  one  of  them,  be       \J 
applied    to   Hawaii,  Porto   Rico,  Cuba    or   the    Philippines? 


94 

Can  we,  as  a  nation  and  in  good  faith,  pledge  the  honor  of 
the  country  that  the  inhabitants  of  Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  Cuba 
and  the  Philippines  shall  be  admitted  into  the  American  union 
of  states  upon  an  equality  with  the  states  of  New  England, 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  the  other  states  of  the  revolu 
tionary  era,  or,  if  you  please,  are  they  to  be  accepted  upon  a 
plane  of  equality  with  the  newer  and  least  populous  states  of 
the  Union?  That  was  the  pledge  which  we  gave  to  France, 
to  Spain,  to  Mexico,  and  to  Russia.  That  pledge  we  have 
kept ;  that  pledge  we  are  keeping. 

Such  a  pledge  to  the  Philippines  would  be  only  less  bur 
densome  than  the  policy  into  which  we  appear  to  be  drifting ; 
a  policy  of  authority  on  the  one  side  and  of  vassalage  on  the 
other,  with  a  vain  attempt  at  concealment  under  the  term 
protectorate.  Can  any  American,  who  voluntarily  accepts 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  as  political  equals  or  sanc 
tions  a  policy  of  vassalage,  defend  himself  to  himself,  failing 
which,  is  the  "  last  infirmity  of  evil  "  ? 

Thus  have  I  attempted  to  pass  in  review  the  policy  of  the 
country  from  1803  to  1893.  It  was  a  policy  of  continental 
expansion,  a  policy  of  progress,  a  policy  of  justice,  a  policy 
of  peace. 


During  the  period  of  isolation  we  were  not  without  in 
fluence,  and  it  is  not  yet  an  assured  fact  that  the  nation  has 
been  advanced  by  this  war,  brilliant  as  some  of  its  achieve 
ments  were,  beyond  the  point  we  occupied  at  the  close  of  the 
Civil  War,  when  the  volume  of  reconstruction  had  been  writ 
ten,  and  we  were  again  a  united  people.  It  was  not  then 
possible  for  anyone  to  suggest  even  that  the  cause  of  the 
South  had  been  lost,  or  that  the  cause  of  the  North  had 
been  won,  through  the  timidity  or  the  incapacity  of  either 
party. 

What  then  happened,  and  without  delay,  even  when  our 
army  of  veterans  had  been  disbanded,  when  our  navy  had 
become  worthless? 

England  recognized  her  liability  for  the  depredations  upon 


95 

our  commerce  committed  during  the  war  by  the  Alabama  and 
her  associate  corsairs.  In  1873,  every  matter  of  difference 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  had  been  ad 
justed,  either  by  arbitration  or  by  compromise,  and  new  rules 
had  been  formulated  that  were  calculated  to  promote  and 
destined  to  promote  the  peace  of  mankind.  These  were  the 
achievements  of  the  country  under  a  policy  of  isolation,  as 
it  is  called,  and  made  at  a  time  when  our  army  was  not  ade 
quate  to  aggressive  undertakings,  when  our  navy  was  inca 
pable  of  defense  against  the  then  modern  modes  of  naval 
warfare. 


But  we  did  more.  In  the  administration  of  General  Grant, 
and  under  the  directing  hand  of  Hamilton  Fish,  whose  wis 
dom,  whose  positive  greatness  in  public  affairs  are  not 
appreciated  by  the  country,  the  United  States  had  a  leading 
part  in  securing  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  dominions  of 
Spain  and  Portugal,  and  in  the  empire  of  Brazil,  and  thus  the 
ocean  slave  trade  was  abolished  and  the  traffic  in  slaves  on 
the  continent  of  Africa  was  brought  to  an  end. 

Has  the  present  war  secured,  or  does  it  give  promise  that 
it  can  secure,  equivalent  advantages  for  the  country  and  for 
mankind?  Or  is  our  form  of  civilization  to  be  carried  around 
the  world  by  navies  and  by  armies  and  to  be  established  in 
foreign  lands  by  battles  and  by  conquests?  Are  we  to 
abandon  the  opinion  that  ultimately  the  world  is  to  be  ruled 
by  ideas,  and  that  it  is  most  wisely  guided  and  most  safely 
protected  by  institutions  that  rest  upon  accepted  ideas? 

Nor  let  us  be  deluded  by  the  notion  that  the  nation  has 
been  elevated  in  the  opinion  of  the  world  by  the  events  of  the 
war  with  Spain.  While  I  give  full  credit  to  the  skill  and 
valor  of  our  navy  at  Manila  and  Santiago,  and  to  the  cour 
age  and  endurance  of  our  soldiers  in  battle  and  under  tropi 
cal  heats  in  pestilential  climes,  I  am  quite  indifferent  to  the 
opinion  of  the  world  upon  the  question  of  c^ir  greatness. 
England  sanctions  and  approves  what  we  are  doing,  for  we 
are  imitating  and  justifying  her  policy  of  the  entire  century, 


96 

and  we  may  wisely  inquire  whether  the  adoption  of  that 
policy  may  not  be  followed  by  like  evil  consequences.  An 
enumeration  of  the  wars  in  which  England  has  been  engaged 
shows  that  there  have  not  been  two  consecutive  years  of 
peace  during  the  long  reign  of  Queen  Victoria.  Is  this  an 
example  to  be  imitated,  and  is  it  important  for  us  to  know 
that  what  we  are  doing  is  approved  by  Great  Britain  ?  Of 
other  European  countries  I  do  not  speak.  With  the  excep 
tion  of  Russia  their  opinions  are  of  no  consequence  to  us. 

I  have  often  said,  and  I  have  always  thought,  that  Mr. 
Webster's  conclusion  of  the  Hayne  speech  was  a  great  aid  to 
the  country  in  the  Civil  War.  Thousands  of  young  men  have 
been  touched  and  inspired  by  the  patriotic  sentiments  con 
tained  in  the  peroration  of  that  speech.  I  now  very  much 
fear  that  Mr.  Webster  has  left  a  passage  of  descriptive, 
graphic,  glowing  eloquence  which  is  an  aid  to  those  who 
wish  us  to  take  and  to  keep  the  islands  of  the  sea  the  globe 
around. 

It  is  not  more  than  three  and  a  half  centuries  since  Charles 
V.  of  Spain  boasted  that  the  sun  never  set  on  his  dominions. 
Where  now  is  the  empire  of  Spain?  Gone.  Vanished 
utterly.  Disappearing  in  blood,  with  no  recollections  for 
the  inhabitants  of  old  Spain  of  honorable  dealings  in  its 
colonial  policy.  Spain  had  an  empire.  How  was  it  main 
tained  while  it  lasted?  By  wars  —  wars  in  Europe,  wars  in 
South  America,  in  Central  America,  in  Mexico,  in  the 
islands  of  the  Caribbean  sea,  in  the  islands  of  the  northern 
Pacific  ocean. 

There  are  incidents  of  any  colonial  policy  from  which  no 
nation  can  escape.  Some  of  them  can  be  specified  :  armies, 
navies,  wars,  taxation  and  the  unrequitable  sacrifice  of  the 
young  men  of  a  state.  It  has  been  said  that  America  cannot 
now  name  one  statesman  of  influence  abroad,  or  of  command 
ing  influence  at  home,  nor  one  great  orator,  nor  one  lawyer 
of  admitted  supremacy  the  nation  over,  nor  one  great  leader 
in  any  department  of  human  thought  or  action. 


97 

If  we  are  forced  to  accept  any  part  of  this  generalization 
my  answer  is  this  :  The  country,  north  and  south,  gave  its 
young  men,  the  hope  of  the  future,  to  the  contest  of  1861, 
and  our  impoverishment,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  is  due 
to  the  sacrifices  thus  made.  The  memorials  in  all  the  uni 
versities  and  colleges,  in  all  the  cities  and  towns  of  the 
country,  may  indicate,  but  they  cannot  measure  the  extent 
or  the  magnitude  of  the  losses  that  the  nation  has  thus  been 
called  to  endure. 

This  war  has  exacted  sacrifices  of  a  like  sort,  and  like 
sacrifices  will  be  exacted  in  every  war. 


We  entered  upon  the  war  with  Spain  for  the  liberation  of 
Cuba,  and  upon  a  pledge  that  the  inhabitants  should  have  an 
opportunity  to  govern  themselves,  and  in  the  belief  enter 
tained  generally,  but  a  belief  in  which  I  had  no  share,  that 
they  could  and  would  govern  themselves.  Incidentally,  we 
were  to  relieve  the  miseries  of  masses  of  the  inhabitants  who 
had  been  driven  into  the  cities  and  fortified  towns  that  were 
controlled  by  the  Spanish  forces.  If  the  miseries  of  the 
reconcentrados  have  been  relieved  in  any  considerable  degree 
the  evidence  has  not  been  given  to  the  country. 

Next,  are  the  expectations  that  were  entertained  as  to  the 
ability  of  the  Cuban  people  to  govern  themselves  to  be 
realized  by  those  who  inaugurated  the  war?  Let  me  read 
what  Minister  Woodford  said  on  that  subject  at  the  Massa 
chusetts  Club  dinner: 

Now  I  frankly  say  to  you,  from  nothing  that  I  saw  in  Spain  and  from 
nothing  that  I  have  been  able  to  learn  with  regard  to  the  Cuban  popula 
tion,  do  I  believe  that  it  is  possible  for  Cuba  to  establish  a  government 
that  shall  protect  the  insurgents  against  the  Spaniards,  or  the  Spaniards 
against  the  insurgents,  or  establish  a  secure  and  stable  government.  I 
do  not  believe  that  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  are  qualified  to  administer  a 
home  government  either  for  their  own  advantage  or  for  the  protection  of 
our  great  and  just  American  interests  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  I  am 
constrained  to  the  personal  belief  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  maintain 
the  occupation — the  American  occupation — of  the  island  of  Cuba, 
until  such  time  as  Americans,  Englishmen,  Germans,  Frenchmen, —  peo- 


98 

pie  acquainted  with  the  methods  and  the  theory  of  self-government, — 
shall  have  gone  into  that  island  in  sufficient  numbers  to  enable  the  fever 
to  be  stamped  out  on  the  one  side  and  good  order  established  on  the 
other. 


Two  things  are  to  be  accomplished  before  the  main  result 
—  home  government  in  Cuba — can  be  realized: 

First,  the  fever  is  to  be  stamped  out.  How  is  that  work 
to  be  done  and  by  whom?  The  malarial  fevers  of  the  low 
lands  of  the  tropics  have  never  been  stamped  out.  Nor  are 
they  confined  to  the  land.  They  prevail  on  our  war  vessels 
often,  where  the  best  of  sanitary  conditions  exist. 

Upon  a  low  estimate  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  number  a 
million  and  a  half.  Who  can  say  what  time  will  be  required 
for  an  inflow  of  immigrants  from  Great  Britain,  France,  Ger 
many,  and  the  United  States  equal  to  the  present  population, 
without  considering  the  natural  increase?  In  the  meantime, 
the  United  States  must  police  the  island.  We  are  to  protect 
the  Spaniards  from  the  brutality  of  the  insurgents,  and  we 
are  to  protect  the  insurgents  against  the  brutality  of  the 
Spaniards.  Thus,  we  have  the  fruits  of  the  war  in  the  two 
particulars  for  which  the  war  was  waged. 


It  was  matter  for  regret  with  me  to  find  in  Senator  Hoar's 
most  excellent  speech  against  imperialism,  a  declaration  in 
favor  of  holding  the  Philippine  Islands  until  the  inhabitants 
were  prepared  for  self-government,  coupled  with  a  sugges 
tion  that  in  an  exigency  we  might  invite  the  co-operation  of 
other  nations.  On  another  occasion,  I  have  declared  my 
opposition  to  every  form  of  alliance  with  other  nations  for 
purposes  either  of  peace  or  of  war.  I  adhere  to  the  opinion 
then  expressed. 

It  is  now  said  that  the  President  disavows  the  imperialistic 
policy  which  Senator  Hoar  has  so  wisely  and  effectually  de 
nounced,  but  at  the  same  time  the  President  indorses  Senator 
Hoar's  plan  for  the  government  of  the  Philippines.  Thus, 
the  country  is  called  to  an  examination  of  that  plan. 

First  of  all,  we  are  to  expel  Spain  from  the  islands,  not  as 


99 

a  conquest  for  our  advantage,  but  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
to  the  inhabitants  an  opportunity,  at  some  time  in  the  future, 
to  engage  in  the  work  of  self-government.  Until  that  time 
arrives,  the  government  is  to  be  in  our  hands,  and  of  that 
time  we  are  to  be  the  judge.  Our  relation  to  the  Philippines 
will  be  that  which  England  now  sustains  to  Egypt.  We  are 
not  conquering  territory  for  ourselves,  but  for  other  people. 
We  are  to  engage  in  the  work  of  governing  Cuba  and  the 
Philippines,  not  for  our  own  benefit,  but  for  the  benefit  of 
peoples  in  whom  we  have  no  interest. 


Let  us  consider  the  magnitude  of  the  undertaking.  Let 
us  bring  into  view  some  of  the  difficulties  that  are  before  us: 

In  territorial  extent,  Cuba  is  equal  to  six  states  of  the  area 
of  Massachusetts. 

The  Philippine  Islands  extend  over  sixteen  degrees  of 
latitude,  the  distance  between  Boston  and  San  Augustine 
in  Florida.  The  twelve  hundred  islands,  more  or  less, 
are  supposed  to  contain  one  hundred  and  fourteen  thou 
sand  square  miles,  or  fourteen  times  the  area  of  Massa 
chusetts.  Of  this  vast  territory  only  one-half  is  under  the 
actual  jurisdiction  of  Spain,  and  for  the  most  part  the  exer 
cise  of  power  by  the  officers  and  agents  of  Spain  is  depend 
ent  upon  the  good  will  and  influence  of  the  priests  of  the 
Catholic  church. 

Nothing  of  what  I  say  in  this  connection  is  to  be  treated 
as  a  criticism  of  the  Catholic  church,  nor  as  an  encomium 
upon  it.  I  am  to  deal  with  the  facts  as  they  have  been  re 
ported  by  the  latest  and  most  trustworthy  authority. 

From  the  time  of  Philip  II.  the  Catholic  church  has  been 
engaged  in  missionary  work  in  the  islands.  As  a  result,  and 
in  so  far  as  they  have  penetrated  the  islands,  the  priests  are 
supreme,  not  in  matters  of  faith  alone,  but  in  public  affairs 
as  well.  It  has  come  to  pass  also  that  the  church  and  the 
priests  are  large  holders  of  the  tillable  and  available  lands  of 
the  islands.  Thus  has  the  church  come  to  be  the  dominat 
ing  power. 


IOO 

First,  then,  on  that  basis,  what  has  been  the  policy  of 
Spain?  The  local  and  tribal  chiefs  have  been  permitted  to 
govern  their  clans  and  tribes  as  long  as  the  chiefs  recognized 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain.  The  officers  of  Spain  appear  to 
have  approached  the  chiefs  with  their  exactions  and  measures 
of  policy  through  the  priests  and  the  church.  In  fine,  the 
church  and  the  priesthood  have  been  the  instrumentalities 
through  and  by  which  Spain  has  maintained  its  power  in  the 
Philippines. 

I  cannot  say  whether  the  present  insurrection  is  directed 
against  the  church  as  well  as  against  Spain,  but  one  event  of 
the  future  can  be  predicted  with  more  than  common  cer 
tainty.  If  we  enter  upon  the  work  of  governing  the  Philip 
pines  the  time  will  come  when  we  shall  be  compelled  to 
co-operate  with  the  Catholic-  cJiurch  or  to  make  war  upon  it. 
And  is  the  country  prepared  to  accept  the  alternative  ? 


The  islands  may  contain  eight  million  inhabitants,  and  in 
intellect  and  attainments  they  pass  by  rapid  gradations  from 
cultivated  Europeans  to  the  wild  mountain  negritos,  under 
sized  Malays,  who  are  hardly  more  than  the  first  remove  from 
the  walking  but  speechless  inhabitants  of  Central  Africa. 

The  population  of  the  city  of  Manila  is  the  best  which  the 
islands  can  offer,  and,  fortunately,  we  have  trustworthy  infor 
mation  as  to  its  magnitude  and  character.  The  total  is 
300,000.  Of  these  there  are  200,000  native  Malays,  50,000 
Chinese  half-castes,  40,000  Chinese  ;  of  Spaniards  and  Spanish 
Creoles  there  are  5,000,  of  Spanish  half-castes,  4,000;  of 
white  persons  from  all  other  countries  than  Spain  there  are 
about  300.  Of  the  latter,  the  number  may  vary  with  the 
seasons  and  the  years. 

What  are  we  proposing  to  do?  Certainly  this:  We  pro 
pose  to  carry  our  institutions  into  the  Philippines  and  to  set 
them  up  over  a  people  who  have  never  even  heard  of  the  ideas 
on  which  the  institutions  ought  to  rest. 

If  American  institutions  of  government  are  to  be  set  up 
and  established  firmly  in  other  countries,  the  ideas  on  which 


101 

•our  institutions  rest  must,  in  anticipation,  have  been  accepted 
by  the  people. 

Hence  I  condemn  the  attempt  to  extend  American  institu 
tions  by  the  sword.  Let  the  institutions  wait  until  the  world 
is  conquered  by  ideas.  As  the  conquest  of  ideas  goes  on, 
the  people  who  accept  the  ideas  will  create  and  protect  cor 
responding  institutions. 

In  this  aspect  of  the  case  we  may  be  assured  by  someone, 
in  whom  the  country  may  have  confidence,  that  it  is  no  part 
of  our  purpose  to  change  the  institutions  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  further  than  to  give  the  people  an  opportunity  to 
dictate  their  form  of  government.  Assume  this,  and  then  let 
us  ask  ourselves  this  question :  What  form  of  government 
will  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  set  up  at  any  time  be 
fore  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century? 

That  question  can  be  answered  without  the  help  of  prophet 
or  statesman. 

It  has  been  our  boast  that  within  this  republic  we  had 
founded  states  freed  from  the  domination  of  a  church,  and 
that  we  had  founded  a  republic  in  which  it  was  and  is  possi 
ble  to  establish  a  church  freed  from  the  domination  of  the 
state.  This  is  the  legacy  which  has  come  down  to  us  alike 
from  the  Pilgrims  of  Plymouth  and  the  Catholics  of  Mary 
land.  Let  not  the  army,  the  navy  and  the  young  men  of  the 
republic  be  employed  in  setting  up  a  state  which  must  in  the 
end  fall  under  the  domination  of  a  church. 

Instructed  by  Senator  Hoar's  speech,  I  qualify  the  proposi 
tions  with  which  I  ended  my  address  to  the  Twentieth  Century 
Club.  I  reproduce  them  in  this  form : 

1.  Give  to  Hawaii  a  territorial  government  and  upon  a 
liberal  basis. 

2.  Insist  upon  an  independent  government  for  Cuba,  and 
give  no  encouragement  to  the  project  for  annexation. 

3.  Abandon  Porto  Rico  and  the   Spanish  islands  of  the 
Pacific   ocean   without   controversy,   debate   or    negotiations 
with  anyone. 

NOTE. —  Upon  the  information  received  during  the  last  year  my  confidence  in  the  ability  of 
the  Filipinos  for  the  work  of  self-government  is  much  greater  than  it  was  in  November,  1898. 


PEACE  OR  WAR 


PEACE  OR  WAR. 


IT  is  my  purpose  on  this  occasion  to  consider  this  ques 
tion  :  Is  the  policy  on  which  the  country  is  entering  a  policy 
of  peace  or  a  policy  of  war?  The  seizure,  possession  and  oc 
cupation  of  the  Philippines,  whether  the  occupation  is  treated 
as  temporary  or  permanent,  proceeds  upon  the  theory  that  our 
present  peaceful  relations  with  England,  Russia  and  Japan  are 
never  to  be  broken  nor  disturbed  seriously.  Three  years  have 
not  yet  gone  since  England  and  the  United  States  were  on 
the  brink  of  war,  and  there  can  be  no  security  for  continued 
peace  with  Great  Britain. 

If,  as  Captain  Mahan  maintains,  navies  are  in  command 
of  the  globe,  and  the  fate  of  nations  and  empires  is  to  be 
determined  by  battles  on  the  ocean,  then  we  are  acquiring 
the  Philippines  for  the  benefit  of  England,  or  Russia,  or 
Japan  even,  unless,  indeed,  we  are  to  create  and  maintain  a 
navy  equal  to  the  navy  of  England,  and  to  keep  a  naval  force  in 
the  Pacific  equal  to  the  naval  force  that  England  may  choose 
to  keep  in  the  waters  of  the  East  and  in  the  Mediterranean 
sea.  That  force  must  be  equal  also  to  the  force  that  Russia 
or  Japan  may  be  able  to  command  on  the  moment,  combined 
as  well  as  separate. 

When  we  take  possession  of  the  Philippines,  whatever  may 
be  our  theory  of  the  future,  we  enter  upon  a  jurisdiction  from 
which  we  may  be  expelled  by  Japan,  Russia  or  England. 
The  coasts  of  Japan  are  only  two  days'  sail  from  Manila,  and 
the  distance  from  Formosa  to  Luzon  is  less  than  two  hundred 
miles.  Japan  is  a  maritime  power  already,  and  with  time  it 
may  acquire  a  position  in  the  East  that  will  bear  no  slight 
resemblance  to  the  position  that  England  has  gained  in  the 
West.  In  population  and  in  capacity  for  growth  Japan  is 
superior  to  England. 

NOTE. —  Address  before  the  Congregational  Club,  Boston,  Dec.  27,  1898.  105 


io6 

In  case  of  war  with  England  that  country  would  be  able  to 
concentrate  a  force  that  would  compel  us  to  abandon  the 
Philippines,  or  otherwise  to  witness  a  repetition  of  the  fate  of 
Spain  when  Dewey  entered  the  bay  of  Manila.  It  cannot  be 
assumed  fairly  by  anybody  that  the  United  States  can  meet 
England  upon  equal  terms  in  the  northern  Pacific  ocean. 
The  naval  force  of  England  must  always  be  considerable  in 
the  waters  of  India,  and,  with  the  control  of  the  Suez  canal, 
her  fleets  could  be  augmented  rapidly.  A  contest  with  Eng 
land  would  be  an  unequal  contest,  and  the  result  would  be 
fatal  to  our  dominion  in  the  East  and  humiliating  to  our  pride 
at  home. 


Friendships  among  nations  have  only  slight  value  in  quiet 
times,  and  when  the  passions  of  revenge  and  ambition,  the 
two  dominating  passions  in  nations  and  in  rulers,  are  in  con 
trol,  then  friendships  are  of  no  value  whatever. 

It  is  now  only  twenty-five  years  since  President  Grant  was 
able  to  say  to  the  country  that  every  question  with  England 
had  been  adjusted.  Since  that  time  many  disturbing  ques 
tions  have  arisen,  and  in  1895-96  the  nations  were  on  the 
verge  of  war,  apparently.  As  to  England,  nothing  can  be 
assumed  of  its  future. 

Nor  do  I  invade  the  regions  of  fancy  when  I  indulge  the 
conjecture  that  war  with  England  will  come  with  any  serious 
attempt  for  the  independence  of  the  Canadas.  A  revolution 
ary  movement  on  our  northern  frontier  would  give  rise  to 
projects  for  aiding  the  revolutionists,  and  even  the  silent 
co-operation  of  our  authorities  might  not  be  wanting. 

The  laxity  that  was  exhibited  by  the  administration  of 
President  Cleveland  and  by  President  McKinley  while  the 
insurgents  in  Cuba  were  carrying  on  the  war  against  Spain 
would  not  be  tolerated  by  Great  Britain.  Spanish-born  sub 
jects,  but  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  had 
been  engaged  in  the  rebellion,  were  the  cause  of  vigorous 
diplomatic  debate,  and  Spain  was  forced  to  consent  to  the 
release  of  men  who  had  been  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands 
while  making  war  on  her  authority. 


All  this  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the  course  of  the 
government  in  the  presidency  of  John  Tyler  and  when  Mr. 
Webster  was  Secretary  of  State.  In  the  year  1841  there  were 
revolutionary  proceedings  on  the  other  side  of  the  Canadian 
line  in  which  American  citizens  were  taking  part.  In  the 
month  of  September  Mr.  Webster  prepared  a  proclamation,  in 
which  this  language  may  be  found : 

Whereas,  It  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  that  sundry  secret  lodges  exist  on  the  northern  frontier, 
that  it  is  their  purpose  to  violate  the  laws  of  their  country  by  making 
military  and  lawless  incursions  into  the  territories  of  a  power  with  which 
the  United  States  is  at  peace,  Now,  therefore,  I,  John  Tyler,  President 
of  the  United  States,  do  issue  this,  my  proclamation,  admonishing  all 
such  evil-minded  persons  of  the  condign  punishment  which  is  certain  to 
overtake  them  ;  and  that,  if  in  any  lawless  incursions  into  Canada  they 
fall  into  the  hands  of  the  British  authorities,  they  will  not  be  reclaimed 
as  American  citizens,  nor  any  interference  made  by  this  government  in 
their  behalf. 

A  striking  contrast  to  the  conduct  of  the  United  States 
during  the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  when  American  citizens  who 
had  been  engaged  in  a  war  against  a  nation  with  which  the 
United  States  was  at  peace  were  reclaimed  under  a  threat  of 
war. 

The  historical  facts  to  which  this  proclamation  relates 
furnish  some  support  to  the  suggestion  that  persons  in  the 
United  States  are  likely  to  aid  and  abet  any  revolutionary 
movement  that  may  be  undertaken  in  Canada.  The  laxity 
of  our  policy  during  the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  if  imitated  by 
us  in  the  event  of  revolutionary  movements  in  Canada,  would 
open  a  controversy  with  Great  Britain  that  might  end  in  war ; 
but  my  object  is  attained  when  so  much  is  conceded  as  this 
— that  war  with  England  is  not  an  impossibility. 

Many  persons  who  advocate,  or  rather  who  tolerate,  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  seem  to  assume  that  we  are  to 
remain  at  peace  with  Great  Britain,  yet  they  are  demanding 
military  and  naval  armaments  adequate  to  a  contest  with  that 
country,  and  which  are  unnecessary  with  reference  to  any 
other  power  this  side  of  Russia. 


io8 

Having  in  view  what  I  have  said  on  this  occasion,  as  well 
as  what  I  have  said  on  former  occasions,  I  ask  you  to  accept 
two  statements,  which  I  lay  before  you  as  my  fixed  opinions 
concerning  the  future  of  the  country: 

First:  If,  by  the  treaty  with  Spain,  ratified  by  the  Ameri 
can  Senate,  we  take  jurisdiction  of  the  Philippine  Islands  for 
any  purpose  or  for  any  period  of  time,  that  jurisdiction  will 
never  be  surrendered  voluntarily  by  the  United  States. 

Second  :  That  the  sovereignty  of  the  islands  will  be  yielded 
to  force  finally,  and  that  that  force  may  be  exerted  by  the 
inhabitants  of  the  islands,  or  by  England,  or  by  Japan,  or  by 
Russia,  and  not  unlikely  by  the  combination  or  the  co-opera 
tion  of  two  or  more  of  those  powers. 

In  support  of  the  second  proposition,  which  must  provoke 
a  feeling  of  contempt  in  those  who  believe  that  our  govern 
ment  is  both  immortal  and  irresistible,  I  assume  that  we  are 
to  be  a  disturbing  element  in  the  East.  That,  indeed,  we  are 
already.  England,  Germany,  Russia  and  Japan  are  sensitive 
over  possible  tariff  regulations. 

When  our  jurisdiction  shall  have  been  established  we  shall 
be  called  to  meet  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  rest 
ing  upon  the  islands,  as  we  shall  be  called  to  meet  a  demand 
for  the  payment  of  the  Cuban  debt.  Finally,  arbitration  will 
be  tendered,  a  tender  which  we  cannot  refuse,  unless  we  de 
part  from  our  theory  and  practice  as  a  nation.  Thus  by 
these  questions  and  in  other  ways  we  are,  and  are  to  be,  a 
disturbing  and  unwelcome  power  in  the  East,  and  an  insignifi 
cant  power  in  the  East  as  compared  with  England  or  Russia, 
or  even  Japan.  We  shall  sustain  the  relation  to  those  coun 
tries  that  Spain  sustained  to  the  United  States  in  its  contest 
for  the  preservation  of  the  Antilles,  with  the  added  impedi 
ment  that  the  distance  to  the  theater  of  operations  is  magni 
fied  four  times  over,  while  the  difficulties  of  correspondence 
and  support  in  times  of  war  are  to  be  multiplied  in  a  much 
greater  ratio. 

A  slight  knowledge  of  geography,  physical  and  political,, 
may  justify  the  statement  that  it  is  unwise  for  the  United 


109 

States  to  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  any  island  in  the  Pacific 
ocean,  either  great  or  small. 


I  am  now  to  speak  of  Russia,  of  its  position,  of  its  present 
actual  power,  and  of  the  controlling  influence  it  is  to  exert 
in  the  affairs  of  the  East  through  the  centuries  that  are  ap 
proaching.  At  once  it  will  be  said,  Why  imagine  difficulties 
with  Russia?  —  that  country  is  our  friend.  Yes,  Russia  has 
been  our  friend.  She  has  had  no  occasion  to  be  other  than 
our  friend.  But  is  it  wise  to  accept  possessions  that  can  only 
be  held  by  the  preservation  of  a  friendship  with  a  nation  that 
has  the  power  to  wrest  our  possessions  from  us?  There  is 
neither  gratitude  nor  friendship  among  nations,  and  I  claim 
that  it  is  unwise  for  the  United  States  to  undertake  the  cus 
tody  of  territories  which  are  not  defensible  by  our  own 
power. 

Our  ocean  lines  were  the  best  defenses  which  nature  has 
provided  for  the  protection  of  mankind.  Our  insular  posses 
sions  must  ever  be  a  source  of  weakness.  Hawaii  has  been 
acquired  for  the  protection  of  the  Pacific  coast,  so  it  was 
claimed.  In  the  event  of  war,  however,  Hawaii  will  be  pro 
tected  by  the  Pacific  coast,  or  it  will  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  Our  theory  for  the  responsibility  of  protection 
will  be  reversed.  If  we  hold  the  Philippines  we  shall  hold 
them  because  Russia  permits  us  to  hold  them,  but  not  other 
wise.  This  in  itself  is  a  humiliation. 

Russia  extends  from  the  Baltic  sea  to  the  Sea  of  Japan, 
over  one  hundred  meridians  of  longitude,  on  the  fiftieth 
parallel  of  latitude,  or  something  more  than  a  fourth  part  of 
the  circumference  of  the  globe  on  that  parallel.  It  contains 
a  hardy  population  of  one  hundred  million,  with  abundant 
resources  for  the  support  of  one  hundred  million  more.  Its 
financial  means  are  as  limitless  as  are  our  own,  and  it  keeps 
a  vigilant  eye  upon  all  the  inventions  and  improvements  that 
relate  to  the  art  of  war.  This  century  is  to  close  with  the 
full  consummation  of  three  great  acts  of  policy  on  the  part  of 
Russia,  by  which  that  country  will  acquire  and  keep  control 


I  10 

of  the  northern  Pacific  ocean  against  every  other  jurisdiction 
and  against  every  contestant  for  dominion : 

First:  I  name  the  construction  of  the  railway  from  the 
Gulf  of  Finland  to  the  Bay  of  Corea,  a  distance  of  five  thou 
sand  miles  or  more. 

Second:  The  possession  of  Port  Arthur  as  one  of  the 
termini  of  the  railway,  while  the  other  is  to  be  at  Pekin,  the 
capital  of  the  Chinese  empire. 

Third:  A  protecting  alliance  with  China,  which  at  any 
time  may  be  changed  into  an  authoritative  government  in  the 
hands  of  Russia.  Thus  the  power  of  the  Chinese  empire  is 
to  be  subject  to  the  control  of  Russia. 

The  resources  of  China  are  underestimated,  and  the 
capacity  of  the  Chinese  is  much  undervalued,  in  the  United 
States.  I  need  not  say  that  the  empire  of  China  covers  a 
tenth  part  of  the  habitable  globe,  and  that  it  contains  a  pop 
ulation  of  four  hundred  million.  They  are  industrious  and 
time  saving,  and  in  every  way  they  are  an  economical  race. 
In  one  particular  they  surpass  all  the  rest  of  the  world  - 
they  are  a  debt-paying  people.  They  can  defy  competition, 
and  that  peculiarity  is  the  only  adequate  defense  for  our 
hostile  legislation.  They  can  manage  a  bank  or  run  a  laun 
dry  with  a  certainty  of  success  that  cannot  be  foretold  of  any 
other  people,  whether  English,  American  or  Hebrew. 

I  had  the  acquaintance  of  two  men  who  had  represented 
this  country  to  the  Government  of  China —  Mr.  Cushing  and 
Mr.  Burlingame.  They  alike,  and  from  experience,  enter 
tained  a  high  opinion  of  China  and  of  the  possibilities  of  its 
population. 

Some  of  us  can  remember  the  event  of  the  appearance  of 
Mr.  Burlingame  at  the  head  of  the  most  distinguished  embassy 
that  ever  crossed  the  oceans.  It  was  the  misfortune  of  China 
that  he  did  not  live  to  return.  He  had  already  accepted  the 
idea  that  China  must  enter  upon  a  military  career,  or  that 
it  must  submit  itself  to  the  domination  of  England  or 
Russia.  His  apprehensions  and  his  military  plans  he  had 
laid  before  the  authorities.  They  were  reluctant  to  enter 


II I 

upon  a  war  policy.  They  said  that  war  was  of  their  experi 
ence,  that  they  had  abandoned  it  as  a  public  policy,  although 
they  had  been  compelled  to  accept  it  in  the  provinces,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  great  rebellion,  in  which  Captain  Ward  of 
Salem  was  a  conspicuous  actor,  and  which,  as  Mr.  Burlingame 
informed  me,  was  supposed  to  have  cost  twelve  million  lives. 
If  Mr.  Burlingame  had  returned  to  China,  and  the  authori 
ties  had  accepted  his  advice  and  had  adopted  his  policy,  the 
fortunes  of  the  empire  in  the  contest  with  Japan  would  have 
been  reversed,  or,  as  is  probable,  rather,  the  thought  of  war 
would  not  have  been  entertained  by  Japan. 


The  fortunes  of  Russia  and  China  are  now  identified,  and 
henceforth  their  immense  resources  are  to  be  wielded  as  one 
power.  It  is  already  the  most  formidable  organization,  either 
for  peace  or  war,  which  the  world  has  ever  seen.  I  say 
already,  for  the  presence  of  Russia  at  Pekin  and  Port  Arthur, 
whether  with  the  friendly  concurrence  of  the  Chinese  author 
ities  or  by  the  exercise  of  hostile  dominating  power  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  warrants  the  conclusion  that  China  and 
Russia  are  combined,  and  that  there  can  be  no  division  of 
the  Chinese  empire  adverse  to  the  wishes  and  policy  of 
Russia. 

Port  Arthur  is  at  the  toe  of  the  peninsula  called  the 
Regent's  Sword,  which  commands  the  waters  of  the  Yellow 
sea  and  the  upper  Pacific  ocean,  as  Florida  commands  the 
waters  and  islands  of  the  Caribbean  sea.  The  two  countries 
contain  a  population  of  500,000,000,  and  for  the  defense 
of  the  frontiers  of  China,  or  for  the  conquest  of  the  islands 
of  the  northern  Pacific,  including  Japan  even,  they  may  defy 
the  western  world. 

It  is  in  the  nature  of  events  that  Russia  and  China  should 
become  allies.  They  are  alike  continental,  they  are  contigu 
ous,  and  combined  they  are  invincible.  So  much  has  been 
said  in  recent  years  in  disparagement  of  China  and  the 
Chinese  that  we  are  disposed  to  look  upon  the  nation  with  an 
unreasoning  measure  of  contempt. 


112 

Upon  recognized  historical  authority  China  was  an  empire 
when  King  David  was  on  the  throne  of  Israel,  and  centuries 
before  the  foundations  of  the  city  of  Rome  were  laid. 
Chinese  authorities  claim  six  thousand  years  of  unbroken 
national  existence.  In  the  three  thousand  years  of  accepted 
history,  empires  have  risen  and  fallen,  nations  have  appeared 
and  disappeared,  and  of  many  their  chronicles  are  forgotten. 


What  are  the  Chinese  today?  I  do  not  speak  of  the  gov 
ernment;  I  speak  of  the  people.  What  are  they?  In 
business  pursuits  and  in  the  competitive  industries  they  have 
become  the  terror  of  the  world.  English  and  American 
merchants  have  been  driven  from  business  on  the  coasts  of 
China,  where  a  half- century  ago  vast  fortunes  were  accumu 
lated  in  a  decade.  Chinese  merchants  have  taken  possession 
of  Madagascar,  and  they  are  invading  every  business  center 
in  the  East,  and  this  country  has  protected  its  business  and  its 
industries  by  restrictive  legislation. 

In  the  year  1853  Yung  Wing,  who  was  educated  at  Groton 
and  New  Haven,  and  who  was  afterwards  in  the  diplomatic 
service  of  China,  made  this  statement  in  a  letter  to  me : 

"  There  are  thousands  of  Chinese  in  India,  resident  mer 
chants  in  the  principal  cities  of  that  country.  In  the  East 
Indian  archipelago  the  inhabitants  are  nearly  half  Chinese." 

The  facts  of  1853  are  emphasized  in  1898.  The  govern 
ing  dynasty  of  China  may  be  weak  and  corrupt,  but  there  is 
capacity  in  the  people  for  great  undertakings  in  war  as  well 
as  in  peace.  Under  the  lead  of  Russia,  if  not  upon  its  own 
motion,  China  is  to  be  transformed  into  a  war-making  power. 
China  may  repeat  the  message  to  the  western  world  that  it 
sent  out  in  the  year  1253.  In  that  year,  a  half-century 
before  the  visit  of  Marco  Polo,  a  French  priest,  William  de 
Rubruquish,  visited  China,  and  upon  his  return  he  brought  a 
letter  from  the  emperor  to  Louis  IX.,  in  which  are  these 
words:  "  If  you  will  obey  us  send  your  ambassadors  unto  us, 
so  shall  we  be  certified  whether  you  will  have  peace  with  us 
or  war." 


In  the  same  letter  the  emperor  pleaded  for  peace,  and  he 
set  forth  the  public  policy  of  the  empire  in  these  words : 
"  When,  by  the  power  of  the  eternal  God,  the  whole  world 
shall  be  in  unity,  joy,  and  peace,  from  the  rising  of  the  sun 
unto  the  going  down  of  the  same,  then  shall  it  appear  what 
we  will  do." 

These  extracts  and  references  are  valueless  unless  they 
teach  this  —  that  the  inefficiency  of  China  in  war  is  not  due 
to  incapacity,  but  to  an  ancient,  long-continued,  and  well- 
settled  opinion  that  wars  are  evils,  and  that  the  world  ought 
to  be  at  peace. 


No  event  of  the  near  future  can  be  predicted  with  more 
•certainty  than  this — that  China  is  to  be  transformed  into  a 
warlike  power,  and  that  its  great  resources  are  to  be  at  the 
service  and  under  the  directing  hand  of  Russia.  When  we 
occupy  the  Philippine  Islands  we  sit  down  under  the  shadow 
of  this  mighty  power,  knowing  full  well  that  our  jurisdiction 
is  a  subordinate  and  tolerated  jurisdiction,  and  that  Russia  is 
supreme.  And  herein  we  find  the  source  of  the  flattery 
which  England  lavishes  on  us.  She  hopes  for  our  aid  in  the 
•contest  with  Russia  for  dominion  in  the  East.  Our  position 
will  be  this :  Humiliating  subserviency  to  Russia  on  the  one 
hand  or  an  alliance  with  England  and  a  fruitless  war  on  the 
other.  For  us,  independence  in  policy,  peace,  and  self- 
assertion  will  be  impossible,  if  we  enter  into  the  islands  of 
the  East. 

The  real  England  may  be  read  in  an  extract  from  the 
London  Saturday  Review : 

Let  us  be  frank  and  say  outright  that  we  expect  mutual  gain  in 
material  interest  from  this  rapprochment.  The  American  commis 
sioners  at  Paris  are  making  their  bargain,  whether  they  realize  it  or  not, 
under  the  protecting  naval  strength  of  England,  and  we  shall  expect  a 
material  quid  pro  quo  for  this  assistance. 

We  expect  the  United  States  to  deal  generously  with  Canada  in  the 
matter  of  tariffs,  and  we  expect  to  be  remembered  when  the  United 
States  comes  into  possession  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and,  above  all, 
we  expect  her  assistance  on  the  day,  which  is  quickly  approaching, 


when  the  future  of  China  comes  up  for  settlement,  for  the  young  im 
perialist  has  entered  upon  a  path  where  it  will  require  a  strong  friend, 
and  a  lasting  friendship  between  the  two  nations  can  be  secured,  not  by 
frothy  sentimentality  or  public  platforms,  but  by  reciprocal  advantages 
in  solid,  material  interests. 


Americans  may  take  note  of  four  or  more  observations 
that  are  of  supreme  importance : 

1.  We  are  indebted   to  the  protecting  naval   strength  of 
England  for  our  successes  in  the  war  with  Spain. 

2.  We  are  to  deal  generously  with  Canada. 

3.  Whatever  trade  benefits  may   arise  from  the  conquest 
of  the  Philippines,  England  is  to  enjoy  with  us. 

4.  There  must  be  mutual  help  in  the  coming  contest  with 
Russia. 

Thus  are  we  to  be  inveigled  into  chronic  wars,  in  which 
our  resources  of  men  and  money  will  be  wasted,  and,  it  may 
be,  exhausted,  and  for  which  no  return  —  I  do  not  say  no 
adequate  return  —  I  say  for  which  no  appreciable  return  can 
be  made. 

We  may  now  retire  from  the  Philippine  Islands  without  dis 
honor.  If  we  accept  jurisdiction  we  shall  be  driven  away  in 
disgrace,  or  we  may  remain  in  subordination  to  Russia. 

If  the  President,  or  our  commanders  in  the  Pacific,  have 
given  pledges,  they  have  not  avowed  them.  They  have  not 
had  authority  to  make  pledges.  The  country  is  free  to  act. 
In  this  aspect  of  the  condition  of  affairs  I  ask  attention  to 
the  perils  incident  to  the  un-American  policy  of  the  admin 
istration.  The  President  proposes  to  take  jurisdiction  of  the 
Philippines,  and  then  to  consider  how  they  are  to  be  gov 
erned.  I  use  his  language : 

I  do  not  discuss,  at  this  time,  government  or  the  future  of  the  new 
possessions  which  will  come  to  us  as  the  result  of  the  war  with  Spain. 
Such  decision  will  be  appropriate  after  the  treaty  of  peace  shall  be 
ratified.  In  the  meantime,  and  until  the  Congress  has  legislated  other 
wise,  it  will  be  my  duty  to  continue  the  military  governments  which  have 
existed  since  our  occupation,  and  give  to  the  people  security  in  life  and 
property,  and  encouragement  under  a  just  and  beneficent  rule. 


Thus  he  announces  the  essential  doctrines  of  an  unlimited 
tyranny.  First,  we  are  to  take  the  islands,  and  then  we  are 
to  decide  how  they  are  to  be  governed.  The  President  as 
sumes  that  the  inhabitants  have  no  rights,  that  all  right  was 
in  Spain,  and  that  as  we  succeed  to  her  jurisdiction  we  may 
also  impose  upon  the  inhabitants  whatever  form  of  govern 
ment  may  be  agreeable  to  us.  We  are  to  pursue  the  policy 
which  we  have  condemned  in  Spain,  and  which  has  ended  in 
unmitigated  disaster. 

I  do  not  now  discuss  the  constitutionality  of  the  projected 
colonial  system,  but  it  is  manifest  that  its  introduction  leads 
to  a  departure,  a  wide  departure,  from  the  doctrine  that  all 
just  governments  derive  their  powers  from  the  free  consent  of 
the  governed.  By  this  one  step  which  the  President  invites 
us  to  take,  and  which  the  President  proposes  to  take,  we  pass 

rfrom  a  republic   to   an  empire.     We  abandon  the  doctrine 
that  personal  freedom  and  political  equality  in  public  affairs, 
\      and  self-government  in  communities,  are  a  common  heritage, 
]     and  we  ally  ourselves  with  the  long  line  of  despots  who  have 
[      seized  power  and  jurisdiction,  and  then  governed  and  misgov- 
X   erned  their  fellow-men  according  to  their  own  sovereign  will. 
(    Nor   ought  the   country  to  be  pacified  and  misled  by  assur- 
)   ances  that  our  governments   are  to  be   temporary,  and  that 
1    they  will  be  liberal  governments. 

I         Enforced  governments,  though  temporary,  are  unjust  gov- 

J    ernments,  and  leniency  in  despotic  governments  is   far  away 

(     from   justice.     These    considerations,  even    if  well  founded, 

1   are  no  defense  for  the  wrong  act  of  seizing  ten  million  people, 

I    and  holding  them  for  a  day,  even. 

V*  Of  two  conjectures  it  is  certain  that  the  truth  is  to  be  found 
in  one  of  them :  Either  the  President  has  no  plan  for  the 
government  of  the  Philippines  or  he  is  not  willing  to  lay  it 
before  the  country.  Will  Congress  accept  the  jurisdiction  of 
ten  million  of  alien  and  incapable  people  without  having  first 
formulated  a  plan  of  government,  or,  at  least,  without  having 
advanced  to  the  consideration  and  decision  of  the  question 


whether  they  are  to  be  treated  as  a  vassal  class  or  to  be 
accepted  as  fellow-citizens  and  political  equals?  Upon  the 
President's  plan  the  Philippines  are  to  be  under  a  military 
government  until  —  until  when?  Assuredly  until  a  civil  gov 
ernment  can  be  set  up.  Can  any  dreamer  suggest  a  time 
when  a  free,  republican,  self-sustaining  and  self-supporting 
civil  government  can  be  set  up  in  the  Philippines?  Can  the 
President  name  such  a  time?  Although  no  such  time  has 
been  named,  and  although  no  such  time  can  be  named,  yet, 
as  a  measure  of  public  policy,  the  United  States  is  urged  to 
sanction  in  perpetuity  a  presidential  government  over  ten 
million  conquered  people  who  occupy  one  thousand  islands 
in  pestilential  climes,  in  unfrequented  seas,  ten  thousand  miles 
away. 

If  we  leave  the  islands  the  inhabitants  will  set  up  a  govern 
ment.  It  may  not  be  a  good  government  as  we  prize  gov 
ernments,  but  it  will  be  their  government.  Any  form  of  free 
government  is  better  than  any  form  of  tyranny. 

For  the  moment  I  pass  by  the  unrepublican  features  of  the 
President's  policy,  and,  having  in  mind  the  disastrous  expedi 
tions  of  Napoleon  to  Egypt  and  Russia,  I  ask  whether  the 
history  of  Europe  gives  an  account  of  any  undertaking  that 
in  its  beginnings  seemed  to  be  fraught  with  evils  and  perils  of 
equal  magnitude? 

I  end  my  observations  with  a  suggestive  comparison.  A 
review  of  our  administrations,  beginning  with  the  administra 
tion  of  General  Washington  in  1789,  invites  us  to  the  con 
clusion  that  the  opening  of  the  administration  of  President 
McKinley  was  the  most  auspicious  of  them  all.  The  victory 
of  1896  had  been  a  partisan  victory,  but  it  was  full  of  the 
promise  of  benign  results,  in  which  all  could  participate. 
The  demand  for  the  free  coinage  of  silver  had  been  arrested, 
if  not  silenced  forever.  The  apprehension  of  war  with  Eng 
land  had  disappeared.  Confidence  in  our  financial  ability 
had  been  re-established.  The  country  had  declared  for  the 
policy  of  protection,  and  it  was  certain  that  the  incoming 


Congress  would  enact  a  measure  of  revenue  which  would 
promote  our  industries  and  check  the  growth  of  the  public 
debt. 

We  were  at  peace  with  the  world,  and  there  were  no  dis 
turbing  divisions  among  our  people.  Yet  it  happened  that 
while  we  were  thus  situated,  and  at  the  end  of  fourteen  months 
only  from  the  day  of  inauguration,  the  country  was  involved 
in  war  with  Spain,  and  without  the  ability  on  our  part  to  allege 
truthfully  any  act  of  wrongdoing  on  the  part  of  Spain  that 
had  been  injurious  to  us.  The  treaties  between  the  two 
countries  had  not  been  violated  by  Spain,  our  territory  had 
not  been  invaded,  the  rights  of  American  citizens  had  been 
respected,  and,  as  to  the  destruction  of  the  battleship,  Spain 
had  tendered  a  reference  to  arbitrators,  with  a  promise  of  full 
•compensation  in  case  of  an  adverse  decision. 

The  war  on  our  part  was  a  volunteer  war.  The  question 
whether  the  war  was  a  justifiable  war  is  not  now  under  con 
sideration. 

Thus  we  passed  from  a  condition  of  peace  to  a  condition 
•of  war.  We  have  exchanged  the  greatest  of  blessings  for 
the  direst  of  calamities.  We  have  sacrificed  many  lives  and 
•expended  hundreds  of  millions  of  money  in  behalf  of  a  people 
that,  upon  closer  acquaintance,  seem  to  be  worthy  only  of  our 
pity  and  contempt. 

We  have  loaded  ourselves  with  possessions  which  we  do 
not  need ;  we  have  assumed  jurisdiction  over  millions  of 
human  beings  who  do  not  recognize  the  rightfulness  of  our 
authority,  and  who  manifestly,  in  the  opinion  of  all,  are  inca 
pable  of  self-government,  and  who  cannot  be  governed  by  us 
unless  we  abandon  our  political  principles  and  accept  doc 
trines  that  we  have  been  taught  to  despise. 

We  have  extended  our  system  of  taxation  until  we  have 
levied  upon  more  than  a  majority  of  the  available  subjects  of 
taxation,  and  we  have  increased  the  public  debt  in  the  sum 
of  hundreds  of  millions.  Our  current  expenses  are  in  excess 
of  the  revenues  at  the  rate  of  $150,000,000  a  year.  Our 


n8 

pension  rolls  have  been  lengthened  to  the  end  of  the  first  half 
of  the  next  century,  and  we  are  threatened  with  a  permanent 
increase  of  the  army  and  the  navy  at  a  cost  of  $150,000,000 
a  year. 

It  is  a  matter  of  minor  importance  that  the  supremacy  of 
the  Republican  party  has  been  put  in  peril,  but  to  some  of 
us  such  an  event  is  no  slight  catastrophe. 

What  are  our  compensations? 

The  miseries  of  Cuba  that  were  the  occasion  of  the  war 
have  not  been  relieved,  and  the  sum  of  them  has  been  multi 
plied  many  times  over  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States. 

While  we  are  not  to  undervalue  the  achievements  of  the 
navy  and  the  army  at  Manila,  at  Santiago,  and  at  San  Juan, 
they  are  but  slight  compensation  for  the  sacrifices  and  suffer 
ings  incident  to  the  war. 

It  is  a  boast  that  the  war  has  cemented  the  Union,  and 
that  the  South  has  shown  its  capacity  in  war.  The  Union 
was  compacted  and  firm  when  the  war  opened,  and  faith  in 
our  form  of  government  has  been  lessened  rather  than 
strengthened  by  the  events  of  the  war,  as  is  indicated  in  the 
opinion  of  Europe  that  our  system  is  about  to  undergo  an 
organic  change. 

We  did  not  need  a  war  to  demonstrate  the  courage  and 
skill  of  the  South.  When  an  English  sympathizer  with  the 
South  said  to  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  then  our  minister 
at  London,  "The  Confederates  fight  well," — "  Yes,"  said 
Mr.  Adams,  "  they  are  brave  men  ;  they  are  my  countrymen."" 
The  opinion  of  Mr.  Adams  was  indorsed  universally.  The 
South  has  added  nothing,  it  can  add  nothing,  to  its  standing 
in  the  quality  of  courage  in  war. 

Finally,  all  the  events  of  this  war  culminate  in  this :  The 
foundations  have  been  laid  on  which  may  be  set  up  —  I 
borrow  the  language  of  Mr.  Choate,  of  Mr.  Rufus  Choate  — 
on  which  may  be  set  up  "the  frowning  arch  of  a  ranged 
empire." 


IMPERIALISTS  OR  REPUBLICANS? 


IMPERIALISTS  OR  REPUBLICANS  ? 


I  SHALL  devote  the  larger  part  of  the  time  assigned  to  me  to 
the  discussion  of  two  topics  that  sustain  an  important  relation 
to  the  movement  by  which  this  government  is  to  be  so 
changed  and  transformed  that  its  republican  character  will  be 
subordinated  to  an  aggressive  foreign  policy,  to  be  followed 
by  burdensome  taxation  at  home  and  the  sacrifice  in  war  of 
successive  generations  of  the  youth  of  the  country. 

First  of  all  I  am  to  seek  for  the  line  of  delimitation  between 
a  republic  and  an  empire,  and  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of 
success  that  may  be  attained  will  be  our  means  of  deciding 
whether  we  are  Imperialists  or  Republicans. 

In  the  second  place,  even  though  I  compel  myself  to  stand 
at  the  confessional,  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  pass  in  review  the 
steps  and  processes  by  which  this  republic  is  being  trans 
formed  into  an  empire. 

Words  are  of  no  considerable  value,  but  Senator  Lodge 
objects  to  the  word  "  Imperialist  "  as  applied  to  him  and  to 
those  who  support  the  policy  that  he  approves.  It  is  alleged 
also  that  a  senator  who  stands  high  in  the  opinion  of  the 
President  and  in  the  councils  of  the  Republican  party  has 
said  that  he  is  ignorant  of  the  meaning  of  the  words  "  imperi 
alist"  and  "  imperialism,"  and  he  declares  that  he  will  not 
become  a  lexicographer  and  give  his  time  to  the  inquiry 
involved  in  so  laborious  an  undertaking.  His  abstention  is  a 
mark  of  wisdom.  The  inquiry  might  convince  himself,  even, 
that  he  is  an  Imperialist,  and  that  he  is  lending  himself  to  the 
work  of  transforming  this  republic  into  an  empire.  I  am  not 
concerned  about  words,  nor  am  I  anxious  to  find  words  and 
phrases  that  may  be  applicable  to  individuals  or  to  classes 
of  men.  Let  us  seek  for  facts  on  which  conclusions  may  be 
based. 


NOTE.  —  Address  before  the  Essex  Institute,  Salem,  Mass.,  Jan.  9,  1899.  121 


122 

It  may  not  be  an  impossible  undertaking  to  mark  the  dis 
tinction  between  a  republic  and  an  empire,  and  thus  from 
our  opinions  and  policy  we  may  decide  whether  we  are  Re 
publicans  or  Imperialists.  That  is  the  object  of  this  my  first 
inquiry. 

Mr.  Lincoln  expressed  in  choice  language  and  in  phrase 
immortal  the  democratic-republicanism  of  the  American 
republic  when  he  said  at  Gettysburg,  in  honor  of  the  dead 
who  had  fallen  there  :  "  We  here  highly  resolve  that  the  dead 
shall  not  have  died  in  vain,  that  the  nation  shall,  under  God, 
have  a  new  birth  of  freedom,  and  that  the  government  of  the 
people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish 
from  the  earth." 

The  new  birth  of  freedom  came  with  the  proclamation  of 
emancipation  and  the  thirteenth  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion.  Is  its  life  to  be  ended  with  the  first  third  of  the  first 
century  of  its  existence?  That  is  a  very  important  question, 
and  the  answer  must  soon  be  made  by  the  American  people. 

When  I  spoke  before  the  Twentieth  Century  Club,  the 
eighth  day  of  October  last,  I  considered  an  alternative  propo 
sition  as  to  the  government  of  the  islands  that  we  are  acquir 
ing.  The  alternative  was  this  :  Are  the  territories  and  peoples 
that  we  have  acquired  and  are  acquiring  to  be  treated  as  pro 
spective  states  or  as  perpetual  colonies? 

That  alternative  has  disappeared  and  a  new  aspect  of  the 
case  is  presented.  It  is  not  only  understood,  it  has  been 
announced  in  substance  by  the  President  at  Atlanta,  that, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Hawaii,  the  islands  claimed 
and  demanded  are  not  destined  to  statehood  in  the  American 
Union. 

PORTO  RICO. 

Porto  Rico,  which  contains  a  population  of  a  million, 
whose  homes  are  on  a  territory  about  equal  in  area  to  the 
five  western  counties  of  Massachusetts,  is  to  be  held  in  some 
subordinate  condition,  without  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  islands  having  been  first  obtained,  and  without  any 


123 

pledges  on  our  part  as  to  the  nature  and  duration  of  the  gov 
ernment  we  are  to  establish  over  them. 

As  to  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  we  are  to  set  up  and 
maintain  such  military  governments  as  please  us,  and  the 
;governments  so  set  up  are  to  remain  until  the  governing 
party  is  of  opinion  that  the  parties  governed  are  capable  of 
governing  themselves. 

Do  we  not  find  in  this  policy  the  essential  quality  of  every 
despotism  that  has  ever  existed?  And  was  there  ever  a 
despot  who  did  not  plead  in  excuse  and  justification  of  his 
usurpation  the  incompetency  and  incapacity  of  those  over 
whom  he  exercised  power?  "He  serves  them  for  their 
good."  That  is  his  plea,  and  that  is  to  be  our  plea.  It  is 
the  plea  of  the  President  in  his  proclamation  to  the  Philippines 
in  these  opening  days  of  the  new  year.  It  is  a  plea  which 
will  justify  the  acquisition  of  territory  and  the  subjugation  of 
peoples  half  the  globe  over. 

But  a  further  answer  is  tendered :  These  governments,  say 
the  advocates  of  the  new  policy,  are  to  be  temporary  govern 
ments.  All  things  are  temporary  that  are  measured  by  time, 
but  why  temporary  if  good,  and  if  good  why  not  to  be  per 
manent?  To  whatever  length  of  time  temporary  govern 
ments  may  be  maintained,  the  ability  of  the  people  resident 
to  establish  a  government  for  themselves  can  never  be  made 
certain  until  the  experiment  has  been  tried.  Why  not 
submit  to  the  experiment  at  once?  The  war  was  undertaken 
for  the  freedom  of  Cuba  and  upon  the  allegation  that  the 
Cubans  could  govern  themselves.  Spain  has  been  driven 
from  Cuba.  If  the  reason  for  the  war  was  adequate  the 
reason  remains ;  and  by  force  of  that  reason  we  are  required 
to  allow  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  to  set  up  a  government  for 
themselves,  and  that  without  delay.  This  duty  the  President 
should  realize. 

The  nature  of  a  government  is  to  be  found  in  its  origin  and 
not  in  the  character  or  quality  of  its  administration.  There 
may  be  mildness,  there  may  be  leniency  in  the  administration 
of  a  despotic  government,  but  the  existence  of  despotic  gov- 


124 

ernments  cannot  therefore  and  thereon  be  justified.  We  must 
look  to  the  foundation,  and  no  one  can  complain  that  we  now 
apply  Mr.  Lincoln's  test  of  republican  government  to  the 
case  in  hand. 

By  our  authority,  and  without  asking  the  inhabitants  of 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines,  we  are  to  set  up  governments 
over  them,  make  laws  for  which  we  demand  uncomplaining 
submission,  and  we  are  to  appoint  officers  who  are  to  follow 
our  guidance,  and  that  without  regard  to  the  opinions  of  the 
people  over  whom  those  officers  may  bear  rule.  Can  this 
conduct  endure  the  test  of  the  great  political  aphorism  laid 
down  by  Mr.  Lincoln  on  the  battlefield  of  Gettsyburg? 

Or,  if  I  am  not  too  old-fashioned  for  the  present  age,  I 
venture  to  ask  the  advocates  of  the  modern  system  of  expan 
sion  of  territory  and  the  government  of  foreign  peoples  with 
out  their  consent,  if  they  can  cite  an  act  in  Washington's 
career,  or  quote  a  passage  in  his  writings,  which  gives  sup 
port  to  the  present  policy? 

If  republicanism  in  government  is  to  be  deduced  from  our 
history  as  a  republic  the  result,  the  conclusion,  must  be  this, 
as  to  the  acquisition  of  occupied  territory : 

1.  The    people    acquired    must    have    consented    freely 
thereto,  or  the  lawful  authorities  who  were  over  such  people 
must  have  consented  freely  to  the  transfer. 

2.  The  acceptance  of  the  transfer  of  territory  and  popu 
lation  must  be  upon  the  understanding  and  pledge  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  that  the  territories  and  inhabitants 
so  acquired  are  to  become  members  of  the  American  Union 
upon  the  basis  of  equality  of  citizenship  in  the  several  states 
and  of  the  equality  of  states  in  the  Union. 

These  facts  and  conditions  do  not  exist  in  the  proceedings 
touching  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines.  One  conclusion, 
therefore,  is  unavoidable,  namely,  the  proceedings  in  regard 
to  those  islands  are  not  in  harmony  with  American-republi 
can  ideas  and  institutions. 

A  further  inquiry  may  be  this :  Do  the  proceedings 
correspond  to  the  policy  and  history  of  Great  Britain?  And 


125 

next,  Is  England  an  empire,  or  is  the  title  "  Empress  of 
India,"  that  was  bestowed  upon  Queen  Victoria  by  Lord 
Beaconsfield,  a  fabrication?  And  how  has  the  empire  of 
Britain  been  created?  Assuredly  by  conquest,  as  in  the 
Canadas  and  India,  and  by  the  seizure  and  appropriation  of 
defenseless  territories,  as  in  parts  of  Africa. 

One  law  or  rule  of  creation  may  be  found  in  all  the  empires 
that  have  existed,  from  Phoenicia  and  Carthage  to  Rome  and 
England.  In  every  empire  there  may  be  found  a  nucleus 
where  power  has  resided,  and  around  that  central  force 
dependent  and  subordinate  territories  and  provinces  have 
been  gathered.  It  is  in  this  relation  that  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippines  are  to  stand  with  reference  to  the  United  States, 
if  the  policy  of  the  administration  shall  be  consummated  and 
made  the  policy  of  the  country. 

The  city  of  Rome  was  the  nucleus  of  the  Roman  empire,  as 
England  is  the  nucleus  of  the  empire  of  Britain,  and  as  the 
United  States  is  to  be  the  nucleus  of  the  empire  of  America. 

If  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain  can  bear  with  composure  the 
statement  that  he  is  an  Imperialist  our  fellow-citizens  who  are 
introducing  the  colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain  as  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  ought  not  to  be  disturbed  when  they  are 
assigned  to  equal  rank  with  Great  Britain's  secretary  for 
colonial  affairs. 

In  this  connection  I  put  two  questions  to  the  upholders  of 
the  expansion  policy  of  the  administration,  and  in  set-off  I 
will  submit  an  answer  in  my  own  behalf  to  a  question  that 
the  President  has  put  to  the  Anti-Imperialists  of  the  country. 
My  questions  are  these :  Will  you  present  a  statement  of 
your  policy,  as  you  understand  it,  and  justify  it  as  an  Ameri 
can  policy?  And,  secondly,  Will  you  show  wherein  it  differs 
from  the  colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain? 

The  question  that  I  am  to  answer  is  this :  What  measure 
can  the  Anti-Imperialists  offer  as  a  substitute  for  the  seizure, 
possession  and  occupation  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  as  that 
work  is  now  going  on  under  the  lead  of  the  President?  My 
answer  may  be  found  in  a  single  sentence. 


126 

Recognize  the  pledges  that  were  made  in  April  last  by 
Congress  and  by  the  President,  and  retire  from  Porto  Rico 
and  the  Philippines  in  obedience  to  those  pledges.  From  the 
President's  question,  but  more  distinctly  from  his  general 
policy,  we  are  to  infer  that  what  has  been  done  is  to  be 
accepted  and  justified,  and  that  the  abandonment  of  the  Phil 
ippines  is  not  to  be  considered.  By  the  roughest  proceeding 
known  to  diplomacy  in  modern  times  we  have  secured  the 
cession  of  the  Philippines  to  ourselves,  and  all  in  disregard  of 
the  millions  whose  homes  are  in  the  islands.  If  the  country 
is  prepared  to  sanction  this  proceeding,  it  is  already  prepared 
to  carry  on  a  war  for  the  suppression  of  any  attempt  at  self- 
government  that  may  be  made  by  the  native  inhabitants. 

It  is  claimed  that  events  have  obliterated  the  pledges  of 
April  and  that  they  are  no  longer  of  binding  force.  What 
are  those  events?  We  have  seized  a  harbor  and  a  city  in  the 
Philippines,  and  it  is  alleged  that  Spain  has  kept  open  the 
question  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  islands.  When  the  fleet 
of  Cervera  had  been  destroyed,  when  the  city  of  Santiago 
had  capitulated,  when  Spain  had  abandoned  the  sovereignty 
of  Cuba,  everything  relating  to  jurisdiction  for  which  the  war 
was  undertaken  had  been  accomplished. 

The  arrangement  of  Aug.  12,  1898,  should  have  been  an 
actual  peace  —  it  should  have  been  a  comprehensive  peace. 
Having  secured  the  independence  of  Cuba,  our  duty  as  a 
nation,  according  to  our  own  theory  of  duty,  had  been  per 
formed  fully.  Spain  had  neither  the  disposition  nor  the 
capacity  for  further  hostilities. 

If  when  the  protocol  was  signed  the  question  of  the  dis 
posal  of  the  Philippines  had  been  eliminated,  then  war,  and 
all  the  apprehensions  of  war,  would  have  disappeared  at  once. 
The  war  expenses  would  have  been  reduced  rapidly,  and,  above 
all,  the  hundred  thousand  young  men  who  are  now  engaged 
in  guard  and  police  duties  in  regions  where  death  is  the  fre 
quent  visitor  of  every  regiment,  would  have  been  restored  to 
their  homes,  and  the  dire  apprehensions,  that  are  only  less 
disturbing  than  death  itself,  which  now  assail  the  happiness  of 


I2/ 

thousands  of  families  would  not  have  been  the  nation's  return 
for  patriotic  services  and  patriotic  sacrifices.  If  the  President 
had  been  disposed  in  August  last  to  receive  what  we  had 
demanded,  and  what  in  April  we  had  agreed  to  receive,  our 
authorities  would  have  signed  a  treaty  instead  of  a  protocol, 
and  in  the  place  of  an  armistice  we  should  have  had  an 
accomplished  and  established  peace. 

Whatever  of  suffering  and  loss  of  life  there  may  have  been 
at  Manila  since  the  protocol  of  Aug.  12  was  made  known 
to  Admiral  Dewey,  whatever  expenditures  may  have  been 
incurred  for  the  support  of  the  army  in  the  East,  all,  all  are 
the  consequences  of  a  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  President  to 
gain  control  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  A  war  that  was  begun 
for  humanity,  as  we  alleged,  has  been  continued  for  conquest. 
The  responsibility  for  the  war  since  the  I2th  of  August  is 
upon  the  administration  and  not  upon  Admiral  Dewey.  An 
order  from  the  President  would  have  ended  the  siege  of 
Manila.  That  the  order  was  not  issued  places  the  responsi 
bility  upon  the  President. 

The  resolution  of  Congress  of  April  19  was  a  limitation  of 
the  powers  of  the  President.  The  war  was  declared  for  a 
specific  purpose  —  the  freedom  of  Cuba  from  the  rule  of 
Spain.  When  the  protocol  was  signed  that  object  had  been 
accomplished ;  and  at  that  moment  all  military  operations 
not  required  for  the  protection  of  Cuba  should  have  come  to 
an  end.  The  President's  question  is  answered  when  I  say : 
Redeem  the  promises  you  made  in  April  last.  Allow  the 
inhabitants  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines  to  enter 
at  once  upon  the  work  of  self-government. 

The  question  is  put :  Are  we  to  be  deprived  of  the  results 
of  our  victories?  My  answer  is  this:  We  have  not  con 
quered  the  Philippines.  Less  than  three  per  cent  of  the 
inhabitants  are  under  our  jurisdiction  even  nominally.  Spain 
has  surrendered  its  sovereignty,  but  we  are  in  the  presence 
of  an  army  of  occupation  that  we  are  to  conciliate  or  to 
subdue.  For  one  I  say :  Bring  these  sacrifices  to  an  end. 
Spurn  the  congratulations  of  Great  Britain,  and  redeem  the 


128 

pledges  given  in  April  last.     Thus   and   only  thus  can   we 
command  peace  and  maintain  our  honor. 

I  pass  on  to  an  examination  of  the  protocol  of  Aug.  12. 
That  protocol  contains  this  provision :  "  The  United  States 
will  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pen 
ding  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  deter 
mine  the  control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philip 
pines."  Under  this  stipulation  the  pretension  of  Spain  that 
the  taking  of  the  city  of  Manila  on  Saturday,  Aug.  13,  was 
a  violation  of  the  protocol  is  a  groundless  pretension.  Spain 
surrendered  its  jurisdiction  over  the  city  pending  the  forma 
tion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  the  time  and  manner  of  enter 
ing  into  possession  became  the  right  of  the  United  States. 

On  another  point  our  claim  cannot  be  maintained  either 
upon  moral  grounds  or  upon  a  fair  construction  of  the  lan 
guage  of  the  protocol. 

If  in  August  last  the  President  intended  to  demand  the 
surrender  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Philippines,  the  language 
of  the  protocol  in  regard  to  those  islands  should  have  corres 
ponded  to  the  language  used  in  reference  to  Cuba,  or  it  should 
have  contained  a  specific  declaration  of  purpose.  As  to  Cuba, 
the  stipulation  is  in  these  words :  "  Spain  will  relinquish  all 
claims  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba."  The  United 
States  has  not  only  demanded  the  relinquishment  of  "  all 
claims  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  the  Philippines,"  but 
the  cession  of  the  islands  has  been  demanded  also.  That 
demand  has  been  acceded  to  by  Spain.  Under  this  claim 
Cuba  and  the  Philippines  are  placed  upon  the  same  basis  as 
far  as  the  rights  of  Spain  are  concerned.  Why  was  not  the 
demand  made  in  August  last  for  the  relinquishment  of  the 
sovereignty  over  and  title  to  the  Philippines  if  at  that  time 
such  was  the  purpose  of  the  President?  And  if  such  was 
then  his  purpose  why  did  not  the  protocol  in  regard  to  the 
Philippines  follow  the  protocol  in  regard  to  Cuba?  Further, 
upon  what  moral  grounds  can  the  indefinite  and  multifaced 
paragraph  in  regard  to  the  Philippines  be  now  so  construed 
as  to  become  the  equivalent  of  the  explicit  provision  in  regard 


129 

to  Cuba?  Or  has  there  been  a  change  of  opinion  in  the 
President  since  August  last  and,  consequently,  a  change  of 
policy?  And  if  such  changes  have  taken  place  can  they  be 
defended  upon  moral  grounds,  or  upon  those  plain  principles 
of  justice  which  ought  to  characterize  the  proceedings  of 
governments  as  well  as  the  conduct  of  individual  men?  The 
protocol  does  not  furnish  any  ground  for  a  demand  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Philippines  for  any  purpose  or  for  any 
period  of  time,  and  its  language  is  an  admission  that  we  did 
not  then  claim  title  by  conquest.  It  is  further  clear,  and 
should  be  admitted  by  us,  that  we  gained  nothing  by  the 
events  of  the  I3th  of  August. 

We  entered  the  city  of  Manila  under  the  protocol  which 
gave  us  that  right,  and  as  an  armistice  existed  on  the  thir 
teenth  we  could  take  nothing  by  a  warlike  movement,  even 
though  the  military  authorities  at  Manila  were  ignorant  of 
the  arrangements  by  which  hostilities  were  suspended. 

If,  as  matter  of  fact,  and  in  the  opinion  of  the  President, 
the  Philippines  had  been  conquered  on  the  I2th  of  August, 
why  was  not  a  demand  then  made  for  the  surrender  of  juris 
diction?  The  armistice  was  operative  on  the  1 3th  of  August, 
and  the  military  movements  of  that  day  wrought  no  change 
in  our  relations  to  Spain.  The  provisions  in  the  treaty  of 
peace  by  which  Spain  surrenders  the  sovereignty  of  the  Phil 
ippines  found  its  place  there  in  obedience  to  a  new  rule  of 
international  law — "  that  a  treaty  of  peace  can  contain  noth 
ing  except  what  the  victors  choose  to  put  in,"  and  conversely, 
that  a  treaty  of  peace  must  contain  whatever  the  victors 
choose  to  put  in. 

On  the  basis  of  this  public  policy  we  might  have  demanded 
and  secured  the  cession  of  the  Balearic  isles  in  the  Mediter 
ranean  sea,  or  even  the  cession  of  the  peninsula  of  Spain. 

We  may  yet  be  led  to  say  with  a  retired  governor-general 
of  India,  and  without  the  aid  of  a  profane  expletive,  that  we 
"  stand  astonished  at  our  own  moderation." 

I  come  now  to  the  consideration  of  my  second  topic,  the 
steps  and  processes  by  which  this  republic  is  being  trans- 


130 

formed  into  an  empire.  In  this  inquiry  I  shall  deal  with 
events  to  which  I  have  referred  already. 

As  long  ago  as  during  the  administration  of  President 
Fillmore  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Sandwich  islands  was  tendered 
to  the  United  States.  The  offer  was  declined.  The  weak 
ness  of  the  monarchy  and  the  grasping  policy  of  England 
gave  rise  to  rumors  and  to  apprehensions  that  that  govern 
ment  might  take  or  accept  a  jurisdiction  which  we  had  refused. 
The  events  of  the  Civil  War  had  renewed  and  intensified  the 
ancient  hostility  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  toward 
Great  Britain.  Our  recent  conversion  to  the  policy  of  the 
mother  country  was  not  anticipated  in  the  administrations  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  and  General  Grant.  Out  of  the  events  and  con 
ditions  concerning  Hawaii  there  came  into  view,  and  with  some 
apparent  strength,  a  tendency  to  favor  a  policy  of  annexation 
to  the  United  States. 

The  administration  of  General  Grant  entered  upon  a  policy 
to  which  I  gave  my  support  both  in  the  Cabinet  and  in  the 
Senate,  and  which  promised  two  important  political  results, 
namely,  the  extinguishment  of  any  purpose  that  England 
might  have  in  regard  to  the  future  of  the  islands,  and  the 
suppression  of  any  purpose  that  might  exist  to  secure  their 
annexation  to  the  United  States. 

The  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  of  1875  with  Hawaii  con 
tains  a  stipulation  that  as  long  as  the  treaty  shall  remain  in 
force  the  authorities  of  the  islands  will  not  "  dispose  of  or 
create  any  liens  upon  any  port,  harbor,  or  other  territory  — 
or  grant  any  special  privileges  or  right  of  use  therein,  to  any 
other  power,  state  or  government,  nor  make  any  treaty  by 
which  any  other  nation  shall  obtain  the  same  privileges 
relative  to  the  admission  of  any  articles  free  of  duty." 

By  the  treaty  of  1887,  and  under  the  lead  of  Senator 
Edmunds,  we  acquired  Pearl  river  harbor,  the  most  valuable 
harbor  in  the  islands. 

It  was  thus,  and  for  the  twofold  purpose  of  guarding  the 
islands  against  England  and  checking  the  tendency  to  annex 
ation  in  the  United  States,  that  we  made  our  first  lodgment 
in  the  tropical  parts  of  the  Pacific  ocean. 


In  the  year  1890  we  entered  into  a  tripartite  agreement 
with  England  and  Germany  for  the  management  rather  than 
for  the  government  of  the  Samoan  islands. 

We  have  incurred  expenditures  in  the  undertaking,  we 
have  sustained  losses,  and  we  have  failed  to  satisfy  the  con 
tending  rival  chieftains.  Of  gains  and  advantages  there  has 
been  no  exhibit.  When  General  Gresham  was  at  the  head 
of  the  Department  of  State  he  had  a  purpose  to  annul  the 
arrangement,  but  he  hesitated  to  try  the  experiment  of 
changing  the  policy  of  his  predecessors.  When  an  adminis 
tration  has  taken  territory  or  acquired  power  a  successor  will 
never  surrender  territory  nor  relinquish  power  except  under 
the  force  of  a  public  opinion  so  expressed  that  it  must  be 
accepted  as  a  command.  So  it  will  happen  that  any  juris 
diction  which  we  may  take  over  the  Philippine  Islands,  how 
ever  we  may  qualify  it,  will  be  continued  —  continued 
probably  until  it  is  wrested  from  us  by  force. 

Then  came  the  usurpation  in  Hawaii,  carried  on  by 
persons  of  foreign  birth  or  the  immediate  descendants  of 
foreigners,  aided  by  the  presence  of  an  American  war-vessel. 
The  haste  with  which  President  Harrison  recognized  the  new 
government,  and  the  brief  time  that  he  allowed  himself  before 
he  entered  upon  the  policy  of  annexation,  justify  the  conjec 
ture  that  he  was  preadvised  of  the  proceedings. 

The  annexation  of  the  islands  seems  to  have  been  a  pre 
liminary  step  to  the  seizure  of  the  Philippines. 

It  is  a  fact  of  common  observation,  and  a  fact  which  those 
who  are  of  the  profession  of  the  law  have  occasion  to  observe 
frequently,  that  when  a  man  has  done  a  wrong  act,  or 
violated  a  law,  he  is  ready  without  delay  to  perpetrate 
another  wrong,  or  to  commit  another  crime,  either  for  a 
defense  or  for  an  explanation  of  what  he  has  already  done. 

Our  experience  in  Hawaii,  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  is  in 
accord  with  this  general  law  of  human  conduct. 

We  have  erred  and  we  are  erring  in  taking  into  our  juris 
diction  bodies  of  men  who  have  no  knowledge  of  our 
institutions,  or  of  the  principles  and  ideas  on  which  our 
institutions  are  supposed  to  rest. 


132 

Consider  the  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand  inhabitants  in 
Hawaii.  Is  there  an  advocate  of  annexation,  from  the  Presi 
dent  along  the  entire  line, —  is  there  one  man  who  will 
advocate  what  we  call  universal  suffrage  for  the  semibarba- 
rians  whom  we  have  taken  into  fellowship?  What  follows? 
The  answer  is  in  the  report  of  the  Commission. 

First  of  all,  the  commissioners  recommend  the  exclusion 
from  citizenship  of  more  than  four-tenths  of  the  resident 
inhabitants  on  account  of  race,  thus  setting  aside  the  four 
teenth  and  fifteen  amendments  to  the  Constitution.  It  will 
appear  that  these  excluded  persons  are  already  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  they  will  so  remain  in  defiance  of  the 
commissioners  and  of  Congress.  Mr.  Wheaton  cites  as  cases 
of  "  collective  naturalization  "  the  inhabitants  of  the  territo 
ries  acquired  of  France,  Spain  and  Mexico,  and  also  the 
inhabitants  of  Texas,  who  were  made  citizens  of  the  United 
States  by  the  joint  resolution  of  Congress  of  March  3,  1845. 
His  opinion  was  followed  by  the  international  tribunal  organ 
ized  under  the  treaty  of  1880  with  France.  [See  the  case 
of  Egle  Aubrey.] 

Citizens  may  be  made  by  act  of  Congress,  but  citizenship 
cannot  be  destroyed  by  act  of  Congress,  either  for  self-pro 
tection  or  as  a  penalty  upon  a  race. 

By  the  report  of  the  Commission  the  right  to  vote  is  not 
only  limited  to  citizenship,  but  within  the  limits  of  citizenship 
the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  a  seat  in  the  House  and  the 
Senate  are  made  dependent  upon  the  possession  of  a  sum  of 
money. 

Since  Dr.  Franklin's  illustrative  example  by  which  he 
shows  that  under  a  property  qualification  the  right  of  voting 
might  be  in  a  mule  rather  than  in  the  man  who  owned  the 
mule,  that  offensive  relic  of  a  former  age  has  been  scourged 
out  of  the  states,  where  it  had  made  a  lodgment  under  the 
influence  of  England's  political  system,  towards  which  the 
Imperialistic  party  of  America  is  now  tending  with  an  appre 
ciable  movement  that  is  accelerated  constantly. 

Mark  the  steps  by  which  we  have  gained  our  first  position 
as  an  empire. 


133 

In  the  administration  of  President  Harrison  we  contributed 
to  the  overthrow  of  a  government  which  we  had  recognized 
as  a  legitimate  government,  and  whose  friendship  for  us  had 
never  been  clouded  by  any  act  of  injustice. 

We  first  encouraged  and  then  recognized  as  a  lawful  organ 
ization  a  body  of  men,  hardly  more  than  a  twentieth  of  the 
population,  who  had  seized  the  islands  and  subjected  the 
great  majority  to  their  domination. 

With  hot  haste  the  President  presented  a  treaty  of  annex 
ation  to  the  Senate.  The  undertaking  failed.  President  Mc- 
Kinley  renewed  the  treaty.  Again  the  undertaking  failed. 
Finally  the  administration  secured  the  annexation  of  the 
islands  by  a  joint  resolution,  a  mode  of  action  that  was  con 
demned  in  the  case  of  Texas  by  a  large  body  of  citizens  who 
afterwards  became  the  Republican  party. 

Next,  the  Commission  has  misnamed  the  proposed  govern 
ment.  It  is  called  a  territorial  government,  but  whatever 
may  be  the  name  under  which  it  may  be  organized  it  has  all 
the  ear-marks  and  qualities  of  a  disciplined  oligarchy. 

The  plan  of  the  Commission  has  no  precedent  in  our  his 
tory;  it  has  no  example  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  It 
stands  alone,  and  it  is  conspicuous  as  a  wide  departure  from 
American  principles  and  practice.  Forty-eight  thousand  of 
the  resident  inhabitants  are  excluded  on  account  of  race,  and 
without  any  inquiry  as  to  character  or  attainments.  Of  the 
sixty  thousand  remaining,  others  may  be  excluded  for  illit 
eracy  ;  and  finally,  no  one  can  vote  for  a  member  of  the  Sen 
ate,  nor  can  anyone  sit  in  the  House  or  Senate,  who  does  not 
enjoy  an  annual  income,  or  possess  a  very  considerable 
property.  Thus,  as  an  example  of  American  policy,  politics 
and  justice,  we  are  to  set  up  a  little  oligarchy  founded  on 
money.  Neither  Franklin  nor  Lincoln,  in  their  early  days  of 
struggling  poverty,  could  have  met  the  requirements  now 
demanded  for  full  citizenship  in  Hawaii. 

Washington's  example  and  teachings  have  vanished, —  van 
ished  for  a  time  only ;  they  will  reappear, —  and  the  example 
and  teachings  of  Mr.  Lincoln  are  disregarded  utterly. 


134 

I  may  disturb  the  serenity  of  Imperialists,  but  I  am  to 
indulge  myself  in  reading  again  Mr.  Lincoln's  formula  of 
American  liberty,  that  Imperialists  and  Anti-Imperialists 
may  have,  in  one  view,  the  means  of  testing  the  proceedings 
in  Hawaii,  which  are  to  be  reproduced  on  a  larger  scale  in 
Porto  Rico,  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  if  the  attempt  to 
acquire  the  Philippines  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

Said  Mr.  Lincoln:  "We  here  highly  resolve  that  the 
dead  shall  not  have  died  in  vain,  that  the  nation  shall,  under 
God,  have  a  new  birth  of  freedom,  and  that  the  government 
of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people,  shall  not 
perish  from  the  earth." 

The  task  to  which  I  invite  the  Imperialists  is  this :  Recon 
cile  your  scheme  for  the  government  of  Hawaii  with  the- 
principles  enunciated  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  or,  if  to  you  the  task 
should  seem  to  be  an  easier  task,  then  demonstrate  the 
unsoundness  of  the  principles  laid  down  by  him. 

I  return  to  the  proposition  that  the  doer  of  a  wrong  act 
will  continue  in  wrongdoing  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  or 
defending  what  he  has  already  done.  Such,  indeed,  is  the 
necessity  of  his  situation. 

We  erred  in  the  aid  we  gave  to  the  small  body  of  revolu 
tionists  in  Hawaii,  who,  by  our  aid,  were  enabled  to 
overthrow  a  friendly  and  long-existing  government.  They 
set  up  an  oligarchy;  we  recognized  it;  we  took  from  its 
hands  the  sovereignty  they  had  acquired ;  we  became  their 
allies ;  and  the  proposed  government  is  calculated  to  continue 
that  oligarchy  in  power.  We  engaged  originally  in  an 
unjust  enterprise,  and  every  step  in  the  subsequent  proceed 
ings  has  been  marked  by  injustice,  all  to  be  consummated 
by  the  establishment  of  a  government  which  some  will 
tolerate,  but  which  no  one  can  defend  on  principle  or  exten 
uate  on  the  ground  of  necessity. 

Thus  and  by  such  means  we  laid  the  beginnings  of  our 
empire  in  the  tropical  waters  of  the  Pacific  ocean. 


SELF-GOVERNMENT  OR  TYRANNY? 


SELF-GOVERNMENT   OR    TYRANNY. 


I  HAVE  set  before  myself  two  main  objects  in  the  address 
that  I  have  prepared  for  this  occasion.  Incidentally  I  shall 
deal  with  some  of  the  reasons  that  are  tendered  in  justifica 
tion  of  the  war  in  Cuba  and  the  war  in  the  Philippine  Islands. 

I  have  gathered  somewhat  of  evidence,  and  thereto  I  add 
something  in  the  nature  of  argument  in  support  of  the  claim 
that  the  people  of  this  country  have  never  abandoned  the 
doctrine  of  self-government  as  the  cardinal  doctrine  of  our 
public  life,  whether  in  the  municipality,  the  state  or  the 
nation. 

Next  I  have  marshaled  a  portion  of  the  evidence  that  is 
at  my  command  which  proves,  or  tends  to  prove,  that  the 
President  has  entered  systematically  upon  a  colonial  policy 
in  imitation  of  the  colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain.  You 
will  observe  as  I  go  on  that  I  give  no  attention  to  the 
speeches  that  the  President  has  made.  I  follow  him  by  his 
doings.  I  give  the  President  credit  for  ability,  for  signal 
ability,  in  the  work  of  transforming  this  government,  and, 
therefore,  unless  I  err  in  that  particular,  his  policy  must  be 
logical.  When  the  actions  of  men  and  the  language  of  men 
appear  not  to  harmonize,  I  look  for  the  truth  in  the  actions 
of  men. 

A  knowledge  of  a  single  act,  especially  in  the  case  of  a 
public  officer,  may  not  warrant  a  conclusion  as  to  the  motives 
and  purposes  of  the  actor,  but  when  there  is  an  array  of  sev 
eral  consecutive  acts,  and  all  relating  to  the  same  subject 
matter,  and  all  tending  in  the  same  direction,  a  conclusion 
may  be  deduced  with  unerring  certainty. 

Four  great  events,  for  which  the  President  is  responsible 
in  his  office,  are  reconcilable  with  each  other  upon  one  theory 
only,  and  they  all  tend  to  one  conclusion, —  an  American 

NOTE. —  Address  delivered  at  the  Anti-Imperialist  meeting,  Tremont  Temple,  Boston, 
Apirl  4,  1899.  137 


138 

colonial  system.  First,  I  mention  the  protocol  of  Aug.  12, 
1898;  second,  the  treaty  of  Paris  of  Dec.  10,  1898;  then 
the  proclamation  to  the  Philippines  of  Jan.  5,  1899;  and, 
finally,  the  Philippinean  war  of  subjugation,  which  the  Presi 
dent  is  now  carrying  on  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  upon  his 
sole  responsibility  and  without  special  authority  of  law. 

That  war  is  transforming,  and  transforming  rapidly,  the 
eight  or  ten  million  Filipinos  who  were  our  friends,  and  who, 
except  for  this  war,  would  have  continued  to  be  our  friends, 
into  enemies  of  the  United  States.  When  this  shall  have 
been  accomplished  we  shall  be  met  by  the  formidable  prop 
osition  that  we  cannot  consent  to  the  erection  of  an  inde 
pendent  state  in  hostility  to  the  government  by  whose  agency 
the  state  is  to  be  created.  Thus  the  colonial  system  will 
become  the  alternative  —  the  inevitable  alternative. 

I  pause  to  ask  the  devotees  of  commerce  and  the  friends 
of  missionary  work  whether  the  prospect  for  their  undertak 
ings  is  now  more  inviting  than  it  would  have  been  if  the 
President  had  aided  the  Filipinos  to  set  up  a  government 
without  delay,  and  thus  to  have  bound  them  to  this  country 
by  ties  of  gratitude  which  would  have  lasted  through  the 
centuries? 

The  President  is  not  drifting,  nor  is  he  anxious  for  the 
advice  of  Congress.  He  appears  rather  to  shun  its  inter 
ference.  He  has  a  policy  of  his  own  —  a  colonial  system 
ior  America  which  shall  correspond  to  the  colonial  system 
of  Great  Britain.  This  is  to  be  the  distinguishing  feature  of 
his  administration.  On  that  policy  we  join  issue. 

Passing  from  this  topic  for  the  moment  and  speaking  for 
myself,  I  concede  one  point  to  the  advocates  of  imperialism. 

If  some  of  the  opponents  of  the  present  policy  of  terri 
torial,  insular  expansion  have  questioned  the  power  of  this 
government  to  acquire  territory  either  by  purchase  or  by 
conquest,  they  may  have  erred  as  to  the  extent  of  the  sov 
ereignty  existing  in  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
and  it  is  certain  that  they  have  erred  in  raising  a  question 
which  is  not  essential  and  which  is  calculated  to  embarrass 


139 

the  opponents  of  the  present  policy.  The  power  to  acquire 
territory  is  a  necessary  incident  of  sovereignty  in  any  form  of 
government,  and  its  existence  must  always  be  assumed  unless 
a  contrary  and  controlling  declaration  shall  have  been  made 
in  the  fundamental  law  of  a  particular  state.  As  no  such 
restriction  has  been  made  in  our  Constitution,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  power  of  the  United  States  to  acquire  ter 
ritory  is  an  unlimited  power.  It  is  in  vain  that  we  seek  to 
make  a  constitutional  distinction  between  the  acquisition  of 
contiguous  continental  territories  and  the  acquisition  of 
islands  in  distant  and  unfrequented  seas.  For  one,  therefore, 
I  have  not  opposed  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  upon 
the  ground  that  there  is  not  power  in  our  government  to 
acquire  the  islands  either  by  conquest  or  by  purchase,  but  I 
have  opposed  the  scheme  as  bad  public  policy,  and  for  the 
further  and  controlling  reason  that  under  our  form  of  govern 
ment  the  inhabitants  will  be  entitled  to  citizenship  and  to 
membership  as  states  in  the  American  Union. 

Our  form  of  government  in  each  and  every  of  its  attributes 
proceeds  upon  the  idea  that  the  people,  acting  in  communi 
ties,  are  to  govern  themselves.  It  may  be  said  with  entire 
•confidence  that,  until  the  opening  of  the  Spanish  war,  there 
Jiad  not  appeared  in  the  United  States  one  man  whose  voice 
could  reach  the  public  ear  who  had  ventured  to  intimate  that 
the  United  States  could  seize,  or  take,  or  accept,  territories 
and  peoples,  and  then  proceed  in  the  business  of  government 
upon  any  other  theory  than  the  theory  of  self-government. 

No  change  in  the  public  policy  has  been  wrought  by  the 
fact  that  in  many  cases  there  has  been  a  period  of  minority, 
nor  can  the  fact  be  quoted  as  evidence  of  a  departure  from  the 
general  policy  of  the  country.  With  equal  honesty  it  might 
be  alleged  that  the  full  rights  of  citizenship  are  denied  to 
young  men,  who  do  not  possess  the  elective  franchise  until 
they  arrive  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  years. 

With  a  marvelous  inaptitude  in  the  use  of  the  faculty 
called  reason  the  advocates  of  enforced  jurisdiction  over  the 
Philippines  cite  the  case  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  where 


140 

the  right  to  vote  does  not  exist.  The  District  of  Columbia 
was  a  little  territory  originally,  that  measured  ten  miles  on 
each  of  its  four  sides,  or  one  hundred  square  miles  in  all.  It 
is  now  reduced  to  one-half  of  its  original  size.  With  suffi 
cient  reasons,  with  reasons  imperative,  in  fine,  reasons  which 
were  sufficient  to  distinguish  a  government  subordinate  from 
a  government  supreme  ;  reasons  arising  from  the  experiences 
of  a  fugitive  Congress,  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  made  a 
wide  departure  from  the  theory  of  a  republican  government, 
and  in  a  manly,  open  way  they  recognized  the  fact.  They 
made  no  resort  to  subterfuges ;  they  made  no  attempt  to 
qualify,  to  misinterpret,  or  to  conceal  the  fundamental  truths 
of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  They  said :  A  great 
exigency  is  upon  us.  We  are  engaged  in  a  mighty  struggle. 
We  are  striving  to  create  a  nation.  In  a  nation  there  must 
be  sovereignty,  and  that  there  may  be  sovereignty  there 
must  be  a  capital,  free,  always  free,  from  the  untimely  or 
impertinent  or  dangerous  interference  of  a  state  or  of  a  mob. 
They  did  not  assume  that  some  Congress  might  seize  a  terri 
tory,  exercise  jurisdiction,  and  authorize  or  permit  a  Presi 
dent,  as  commander-in-chief,  to  keep  the  peace.  They  said  : 
We  will  invoke  the  highest  human  authority;  we  will  not 
attempt  to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  and  its 
occupants,  however  insignificant  the  territory  or  feeble  in 
numbers  the  dwellers  thereon  may  be,  unless  the  people 
and  states  of  the  Union  shall  authorize  the  thing  to  be 
done. 

This  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  over  which 
a  limited  jurisdiction  was  to  be  thrown  by  the  new  Constitu 
tion. 

Let  the  advocates  of  imperial  jurisdiction  over  the  Phil 
ippines  follow  the  example  of  the  founders  of  the  republic. 
Let  them  ask  the  people  and  the  states  of  the  Union  for 
constitutional  authority  to  set  aside  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence  and  the  preamble  to  the  Constitution,  wherein  the 
establishment  of  justice  is  named  as  only  second  in  importance 
of  the  objects  for  which  the  Constitution  was  formed. 


Let  them  state  the  exact  facts  to  the  country,  and  say 
that,  with  the  aid  of  the  natives,  we  have  expelled  Spain 
from  the  islands  where  she  has  claimed  jurisdiction  since 
1521,  although  her  actual  jurisdiction  has  never  been  exer 
cised  over  more  than  one-half  of  the  territory ;  that  we  have 
succeeded  to  the  title  of  Spain,  but  without  the  concurrence 
of  the  natives ;  that  the  territory  is  equal  in  extent  to  the 
territory  of  the  states  of  New  England  and  New  York  com 
bined  ;  that  the  population  is  equal  to  the  population  of  the 
seven  states  named ;  and  that  we  propose  to  govern  these 
people  and  to  tax  these  people  without  their  consent,  until 
in  our  opinion  they  are  capable  of  governing  themselves. 

Finally,  we  ask  for  authority  to  compel  them  into  submis 
sion  in  case  of  resistance,  and  we  are  able  to  assure  the 
country  that  the  millions  on  the  islands  are  bound  to  the  soil, 
and  that  they  cannot  find  homes  or  abiding-place  or  shelter 
anywhere  else  within  the  limits  of  the  habitable  globe.  We 
know  that  we  are  departing  from  the  principles  of  our  gov 
ernment  when  we  attempt  to  rule  and  to  tax  a  people  without 
their  consent.  We  know  that  our  proposition  is  inconsistent 
with  the  preamble  to  the  Constitution,  and  that  it  is  espe 
cially  inconsistent  with  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
wherein  these  words  are  used : 

We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created 
equal,  that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable 
rights,  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
That  to  secure  these  rights  governments  are  instituted  among  men,  deriv 
ing  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed.  That  whenever 
any  form  of  government  becomes  destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the  right 
of  the  people  to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  new  government, 
laying  its  foundations  on  such  principles  and  organizing  its  powers  in 
such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to  effect  their  safety  and 
happiness. 

,  Let  them  say  to  the  country:  We  stand  in  the  presence  of 
these  great  political  truths,  we  recognize  their  binding  force, 
we  shrink  from  the  violation  of  them  in  setting  up  govern 
ments  and  enforcing  systems  of  taxation  over  and  among  a 
people  whose  wishes  have  not  been  consulted,  and  whose 


142 

voice  has  not  been  heard.  We  realize  that  these  truths  are 
for  the  islanders  as  well  as  for  us,  and  that  thereby  they  are 
prejustified  in  resisting  any  attempt  that  we  may  make  to  set 
up  our  government  over  them.  Moreover,  one  of  our  trusted 
leaders  has  said  of  himself  and  of  his  associates :  "  There  is 
not  one  among  us  who  would  not  cut  off  his  hand  sooner  than 
be  false  to  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
and  to  the  great  traditions  and  ideals  of  American  history." 
Hence  it  is  that  we  ask  the  people  and  states  of  the  American 
Union  to  assume  the  responsibility. 

By  this  course  the  advocates  of  free  conquest  and  imperial 
schemes  of  government  may  bring  themselves  within  the  prec 
edent  of  the  founders  of  the  Republic,  who  created  a  voice 
less  municipality  that  a  nation  might  possess  sovereignty. 

In  support  of  the  request  three  reasons  might  be  offered  : 

1.  A  possibility  of  an  increase  in  the  Philippines  in  the 
demand  for  low-priced  cotton  cloths,  and  thus  the  manufac 
turing  industries  of  Fall  River  and  Lowell  and  kindred  cities 
might  be  improved. 

2.  The  field  for  missionary  work  might  be  enlarged. 
One  observation  on  this  point.     The  war  through  which  we 

are  now  passing  has  been  tolerated  by  some  and  defended  by 
others  as  a  war  in  behalf  of  humanity,  or  as  a  war  which  will 
enlarge  the  field  for  the  spread  of  Christianity.  Wars  will 
not  cease  until  mankind  abandon  the  opinion  that  the  senti 
ment  of  humanity,  in  any  of  its  many  forms  of  expression,  or 
the  spread  of  any  system  of  religion,  can  justify  the  sacrifice 
of  human  life  in  war.  Wars  for  humanity,  for  civilization, 
for  religion,  have  no  fixed  points  at  which,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  they  are  to  terminate.  Our  Cuban  war,  for  humanity, 
has  spread  already  to  the  Philippines,  and  for  a  like  reason 
it  may  pass  over  to  China. 

3.  The  forcible  seizure  and  occupation  of  the  Philippines 
by  us  may  prevent  the  forcible  seizure  and  occupation  of  the 
islands   by  some  other  nation  possessing  less   wisdom   and 
humanity  in  government  than  we  claim  for  ourselves. 

Can  anyone,  can  the  President  or  Senator  Lodge,  have  a 


143 

doubt  about  the  verdict  of  the  country  upon  these  proposi 
tions? 

Are  wars  to  be  justified  upon  the  ground  that  markets  may 
be  extended?  On  the  contrary,  I  hazard  the  statement  that 
•every  war  limits  the  ability  of  the  people  to  make  purchases, 
and  for  the  reason  that  the  earnings  of  the  laborers  are  con 
sumed  in  war  taxes.  Wars  tend  to  enhance  the  price  of  the 
products  of  labor,  and  to  diminish  the  means  of  the  toilers  in 
every  line  of  industry.  Wars  increase  the  demand  for  the 
enginery  of  war,  but  they  limit  the  demand  for  everything 
else.  The  markets  of  the  world  are  not  opened  by  wars 
abroad,  but  by  schools,  by  institutes  of  design  and  technology, 
by  inventions,  and  by  applied  science  at  home.  Whoever 
can  excel  in  cheapness  and  quality  of  production  will  open 
all  the  markets  of  the  world  to  his  products.  All  markets 
are  closed  against  the  inferior  and  the  more  expensive  arti 
cles.  While  England  is  struggling  for  new  markets  she  is 
losing  the  monopoly  of  the  markets  that  she  has  conquered, 
and  one  by  one  and  step  by  step  they  are  passing  into  the 
hands  of  France,  Germany  and  the  United  States.  Wars 
are  closing  the  markets  of  the  world  against  those  who  carry 
on  the  wars.  The  war  with  Spain  has  added  largely  to  the 
cost  of  production  in  the  United  States  by  the  new  taxes 
laid  upon  capitalists  and  upon  laborers. 

The  prosecution  of  the  war  against  the  Filipinos  is  an 
offense  to  every  producer,  and  every  laborer,  and  every  tax 
payer  in  America.  Our  demand  must  be  this :  Withdraw 
the  troops  from  the  Philippines,  and  that  without  regard  to 
any  arrangements  that  may  have  been  made.  Leave  the 
islands  to  the  inhabitants.  Let  them  set  up  a  government  for 
themselves.  Let  it  be  recognized  as  an  independent  state, 
and  without  any  inquiry  by  us  as  to  its  character.  Nothing 
can  be  more  presumptuous  in  human  affairs  than  the  claim 
that  the  President  and  Congress  are  entitled  to  an  opinion 
even  upon  the  matter  of  the  government  of  the  Philippines. 
The  only  preparation  for  such  a  work  is  the  preparation  which 
ignorance  may  furnish.  We  are  ignorant  of  their  languages, 


144 

of  their  traditions,  of  their  habits  of  life,  of  the  exactions  which 
climate  may  make  upon  the  dwellers  in  the  tropics,  and  yet 
we  think  ourselves  capable  of  governing  a  distant  and  foreign 
people  with  whom  ordinary  intercourse  is  impossible. 

What  is  the  next  step  in  the  career  of  public  crime  on 
which  the  country  has  entered?  Only  this  :  The  creation  of 
a  mercenary  army,  to  be  composed  of  men  with  whom,  for 
the  most  part,  we  are  unable  to  have  personal  intercourse, 
who  have  no  knowledge  of  our  institutions,  and  who  will  be 
bound  to  us  by  no  tie,  except  that  which  may  be  established 
between  the  oppressed  and  the  oppressor.  The  demand  has 
already  come  from  Cuba,  and  for  the  reason  that  our  troops 
cannot  remain  in  the  island  after  April  I.  If  natives  can 
be  obtained  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  what  is  to  be  done  for 
or  with  the  forty  thousand  citizen  soldiers  who  are  in  the 
Philippines?  Mercenary  armies  have  been  the  curse  of 
every  country  in  which  they  have  found  employment. 
At  the  best,  they  are  bound  to  the  country  that  they  serve 
by  no  other  tie  than  the  tie  which  binds  the  employed  to 
the  employer.  In  the  Philippines  the  relation  will  be  that 
of  the  oppressed  to  the  oppressor.  We  are  to  establish  a 
system  of  slavery  in  the  Philippines,  and  then  trust  to  an  army 
composed  of  men  who  are  conscious  of  the  chains  that  they 
are  wearing. 

The  battle  of  the  5th  of  February  has  given  us  control  of 
the  suburbs  of  Manila,  but  the  subjugation  of  the  island  of 
Luzon  is  the  work  on  which  the  army  is  entering.  That  may 
be  a  work  of  days,  or  the  contest  may  go  on  for  years. 

I  pass  now  to  the  question  of  responsibility,  and  I  assume, 
first  of  all,  that  the  responsibility  for  the  existing  state  of 
affairs  is  upon  the  President.  To  that  point  I  shall  offer  some 
evidence.  How  far  Aguinaldo  represents  the  inhabitants  of 
the  islands  is  not  known  to  anyone.  Three  facts,  however, 
are  established :  He  represents  somebody ;  he  has  a  military 
force  at  his  command  that  rises  to  the  proportions  of  an  army  ; 
and  he  is  the  only  person  in  the  island  of  Luzon  who  makes 
a  claim  to  authority. 


145 

A  vital  charge  against  the  President  and  the  administration 
is  this:  Since  the  I2th  of  August,  when  the  protocol  was 
signed,  Aguinaldo  has  been  treated  as  a  rebel,  or  as  an  enemy. 

As  early  as  December,  1898,  we  sent  a  menacing  fleet  and 
army  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  or  destroying  the  city  of 
Iloilo.  That  movement  was  delayed  for  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty.  The  treaty  ratified  was  preannounced  as  security  for 
peace,  and  immediately  we  attacked  the  city  of  Iloilo.  It  is 
now  evident  that  every  habitation  and  hamlet  that  is  within 
range  of  the  shot  and  shell  of  our  navy  will  suffer  a  like  fate. 
How  otherwise  is  the  rebellion  to  be  suppressed? 

The  President's  proclamation  of  Jan.  5  was  a  declaration 
of  war  against  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  The 
declaration  of  war  by  us  justified  the  Filipinos  in  making 
actual  war,  and  it  is  in  vain  that  we  attempt  to  transfer  the 
responsibility  from  ourselves  to  them.  Nor  as  yet  is  it  an 
established  fact  that  the  war  of  arms  was  commenced  by 
Aguinaldo.  What  are  the  allegations  and  demands  of  the 
proclamation?  I  quote  from  its  language: 

1.  It  is  alleged  in  the  proclamation  that  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Manila 
"  practically  effected  the  conquest  of  the  Philippine  islands." 

2.  "  As  the  result  of  the  victories  of  American  arms  the 
future  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippine 
islands  are  ceded  to  the  United  States." 

3.  "  The  military  government  heretofore  maintained  by 
the  United  States  in  the  city,  harbor  and  bay  of  Manila  is  to 
be  extended  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  the  whole  of  the 
ceded  territory." 

4.  "  The    taxes    and    duties    heretofore   payable  by  the 
inhabitants  to  the  late  government  become  payable  to  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States,  unless  it  be  seen  fit  to  sub 
stitute  for  them  other  reasonable  rates  or  modes  of  contribu 
tion  to  the  expenses  of  government." 

5.  "In  the  fulfillment  of  this  high    mission,  supporting 
the  temperate  administration  of  affairs  for  the  greatest  good 
of  the  governed,  there  must  be  sedulously  maintained  the 


146 

strong  arm  of  authority,  to  repress  disturbances  and  to 
overcome  all  obstacles  to  the  bestowal  of  the  blessings  of 
good  and  stable  government  upon  the  people  of  the  Philip 
pine  islands  under  the  free  flag  of  the  United  States." 

The  President  occupies  the  position  in  reference  to  the 
Philippines  that  Russia  occupies  in  regard  to  Poland,  and  a 
position  kindred  to  the  position  that  Austria  occupied  to 
Hungary  in  1848,  when  Kossuth  was  carrying  on  a  contest 
in  behalf  of  self-government  in  which  all  America  sympa 
thized. 

The  President  abandons  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
and  sets  aside  the  immortal  words,  "  Governments  are  insti 
tuted  among  men,  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  con 
sent  of  the  governed."  He  is  now  using  an  army  of 
American  citizens  to  overcome  an  obstacle  —  the  opinion  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  that  they  have  a 
natural  and  inalienable  right  to  govern  themselves.  In  the 
presence  of  the  proclamation  of  Jan.  5,  the  conjecture  even 
is  impossible  that  the  President  contemplates  a  time  when  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  will  be  permitted  to  govern 
themselves. 

He  is  now  engaged  in  carrying  on  a  war  for  the  purpose, 
as  he  alleges,  of  "  bestowing  the  blessings  of  good  and  stable 
government  upon  the  people  of  the  Philippine  islands,  under 
the  free  flag  of  the  United  States."  Thus  does  the  President 
avow  a  purpose  through  war  to  undertake  the  "  bestowal  of 
the  blessings  of  good  and  stable  government,  under  the  free 
flag  of  the  United  States,"  upon  unwilling  peoples.  What  is 
the  meaning  of  this  declaration,  when  it  is  stripped  of  its 
rhetoric?  Only  this  —  we  are  to  enter  upon  wars  of  con 
quest,  and  to  govern  the  conquered  by  force.  The  flag 
which  to  us  is  a  free  flag  would  be  to  them  only  an  emblem 
of  tyranny. 

What  sort  of  a  government  is  the  President  setting  up  in 
the  Philippine  Islands?  The  answer  must  be  this  :  A  military 
government  set  up  over  a  people  who  have  been  subdued  or 
who  are  to  be  subdued  by  military  power. 


H7 

Can  such  a  government  be  a  good  government  in  the 
opinion  of  those  who  are  the  subjects  of  it? 

And  of  what  value  is  the  opinion  of  the  governing  party 
to  those  who  are  the  subjects  of  the  government? 

The  President  avows  the  purpose  to  enforce  submission 
against  all  resistance,  and  to  govern  and  to  tax  without  refer 
ence  to  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants. 

He  asserts  a  purpose  to  use  all  the  powers  ever  claimed 
by  any  despot.  In  fine,  there  is  no  middle  ground  in  prin 
ciple  between  the  republicanism  of  the  Declaration  of  Amer 
ican  Independence  and  the  broadest  claims  that  were  ever 
put  forth  by  a  czar  of  Russia.  That  some  despotisms  are 
mild  in  administration  cannot  justify  the  existence  of  despotic 
governments.  The  promises  of  the  President  as  to  the  gen 
tleness  of  his  rule  in  the  Philippine  Islands  cannot  qualify 
the  badness  of  his  policy  as  he  has  set  it  forth  in  the  procla 
mation  of  Jan.  5. 

Promises  !  Of  what  value  are  promises  as  security  against 
the  evils  of  military  rule  over  a  people  seven  thousand  or  ten 
thousand  miles  away?  It  was  as  recently  as  the  first  third 
of  the  month  of  February  that  the  Secretary  of  War  admitted 
the  necessity  of  conceding  to  General  Otis  absolute  power  to 
deal  with  the  Filipinos  upon  his  own  judgment,  and  in  the 
second  week  of  March  a  like  authority  was  given  General 
Brooke  in  Cuba.  And  now  the  administration  offers  in  its 
defense  the  statement  that  it  is  ignorant  of  an  order  by  which 
a  military  chieftain  forbade  the  free  transmission  from  one 
American  citizen  to  another  of  a  speech  spoken  in  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  by  a  senator  from  a  sovereign  state. 
To  make  "  the  gruel  thick  and  slab"  we  have  the  startling 
rumor  that  the  capture  of  prisoners  has  been  forbidden. 
Thus  for  the  time  being  there  is  a  full  surrender  of  executive 
supervision  over  the  military  authorities  in  the  Philippine 
Islands  and  in  Cuba.  Thus  does  the  civil  authority  disap 
pear,  and  thus  does  military  rule  take  its  place.  Thus  is 
despotism  the  constant  companion  of  military  rule.  Under 
such  circumstances,  of  what  value  are  executive  promises  of 


148 

good  government,  even  if  the  official  life  of  the  promiser 
could  be  extended  from  two  years  to  two  centuries? 

Has  not  this  country  had  its  fill  of  experience  of  military 
governments  while  the  states  of  the  South  were  passing  from 
the  rebellion  to  renewed  statehood  in  the  Union  ?  And  was 
there  one  man  who  did  not  rejoice  as  the  days  of  deliverance 
came  when  military  rule  disappeared  and  the  rule  of  the 
people  was  re-established? 

Our  military  districts  of  those  days  were  within  call  of  the 
telegraph  every  minute  of  the  twenty-four  hours ;  we  had 
actual  personal  supervision  of  what  was  going  on ;  we  had 
free  communication  through  private  and  public  channels; 
there  was  no  censorship  of  the  press  and  the  telegraph ;  and 
yet  evils  of  the  gravest  character  were  the  incidents  of  that 
transition  period.  With  this  experience  we  are  invited  to 
stand  aside  and  be  silent  while  the  President  forces  a  "  good 
and  stable  government  "  upon  an  unwilling  people,  through 
military  rule. 

This  is  the  advice  of  our  fellow-citizen,  Governor  Long, 
advice  which  some  of  us  can  neither  accept  nor  heed. 

Although  I  place  myself  under  the  disagreeable  necessity 
of  repeating  what  I  have  said  on  former  occasions,  I  shall 
trace  the  steps  by  which  the  President  has  developed  his 
aggressive,  warlike,  and  un-American  policy.  I  shall  not 
now  deal  with  his  motives  and  ultimate  purposes.  I  pause, 
however,  to  say  that  it  is  great  good  fortune  for  the  country 
that  the  brevity  of  our  presidential  term  gives  to  the  peo 
ple  an  opportunity  to  interrupt  or  to  change  a  bad  public 
policy. 

Dewey  entered  the  harbor  of  Manila  Sunday,  the  first  day 
of  May,  1898.  By  whose  agency,  by  whose  aid,  by  whose 
co-operation  was  he  enabled  to  achieve  the  most  illustrious 
success  in  modern  naval  warfare,  and  in  an  hour  to  advance 
himself  to  an  equality  in  rank  with  Farragut  and  Nelson? 

His  coadjutor  and  ally  was  Aguinaldo,  and  his  aids  were 
the  military  forces  under  the  command  of  Aguinaldo,  who 
were  then  engaged  in  the  work  —  the  successful  work — of 


149 

expelling  Spain  from  the  Philippines.  He  was  then  thought 
to  be  worthy  of  our  friendship  and  alliance.  We  were 
engaged  in  a  common  cause — the  overthrow  of  Spanish 
rule.  Aguinaldo  was  not  then  denounced  as  an  enemy  or  as 
a  rebel,  nor  was  a  hint  whispered  by  anyone  in  authority 
that  he  was  an  adventurer,  and  a  person  without  support  in 
the  islands.  That  he  is  an  adventurer  and  a  person  without 
influence  among  the  Filipinos  is  a  discovery  of  more  recent 
times  —  a  discovery  made  in  the  presence  of  the  fact  that  he 
is  in  command  of  an  army  confronting  us  at  every  point. 
Following  the  occupation  of  the  harbor  of  Manila  and  the 
capture  of  Cavite,  there  was  no  military  movement  until  after 
the  1 2th  of  August,  when  the  protocol  was  signed. 

If  our  title  to  the  Philippines  is  a  title  by  conquest  that 
title  was  gained  by  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Manila  and 
the  capture  of  Cavite.  At  that  time,  however,  there  was  no 
claim  to  jurisdiction  by  conquest,  and  there  was  no  sugges 
tion  that  Aguinaldo  was  either  an  adventurer,  a  rebel,  or  an 
enemy.  He  was  our  associate  and  co-worker  for  the  over 
throw  of  the  authority  of  Spain,  and  to  the  uninitiated 
he  appeared  to  be  an  ally. 

It  may  be  a  misfortune  for  the  administration  that  its  sub 
ordinates  have  left  footprints  in  the  sands  which  indicate  the 
position  of  the  administration  in  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1898. 

The  correspondence  of  Mr.  Williams,  consul-general  at 
Manila,  and  of  Consul  Pratt,  in  the  months  of  March  and 
April,  is  conclusive  to  the  point  that  Aguinaldo  was  treated 
as  an  ally  in  case  of  war,  and  conclusive  as  to  the  fact  that  as 
early  as  the  closing  days  of  March  the  authorities  of  Spain 
were  at  the  mercy  of  the  insurgents. 

Mr.  Williams  writes  under  date  of  March  19:  "  Rebellion 
never  more  threatening  to  Spain.  Rebels  outnumbered  the 
Spaniards,  resident  and  soldiery,  probably  a  hundred  to 
one." 

Consul  Pratt  sends  this  certificate  to  Secretry  Day  of  a  date 
not  earlier  than  April  28  —  nine  days  after  the  declaration  of 
war: 


ISO 

General  Aguinaldo  impressed  me  as  a  man  of  intellectual  ability, 
courage,  and  worthy  of  the  confidence  that  had  been  placed  in  him. 

No  close  observer  of  what  has  transpired  in  the  Philippines  during 
the  past  four  years  could  have  failed  to  recognize  that  General  Aguin 
aldo  enjoyed,  above  all  others,  the  confidence  of  the  Philippine  insur 
gents  and  the  respect  alike  of  the  Spaniards  and  foreigners  in  the 
islands,  all  of  which  vouched  for  his  justice  and  high  sense  of  honor. 

As  late  as  July  18,  Consul-General  Williams  gave  the  in 
surgent  leaders  full  indorsement  in  a  letter  to  our  Department 
of  State :  "  General  Aguinaldo,  Agoncillo  and  Sandico  are 
all  men  who  would  all  be  leaders  in  their  separate  depart 
ments  in  any  country."  These  quotations  may  not  rise  to 
the  dignity  of  proofs,  but  they  suggest  inferences,  reasonable 
inferences,  in  support  of  two  propositions:  (i)  That  the 
power  of  Spain  was  so  much  impaired  that  it  could  not  have 
withstood  the  insurgents  after  the  declaration  of  war  of  April 
19,  even  if  Dewey  had  not  appeared  in  the  bay  of  Manila. 
(2)  That  it  was  not  until  the  twelfth  day  of  August — a  day 
fraught  with  evils  to  the  country  second  only  to  the  evils  and 
sacrifices  that  followed  the  proceedings  at  Montgomery,  Ala., 
Feb.  22,  1 86 1 — that  it  was  not  until  the  twelfth  day  of  August 
that  the  leadership  of  Aguinaldo  was  repudiated,  his  char 
acter  assailed,  and  his  proffers  of  friendship  and  harmony  of 
action  contemptuously  spurned. 

An  address  by  Aguinaldo  to  the  Filipinos  was  dated  at 
Cavite,  within  Admiral  Dewey's  quarters,  the  eighteenth  day 
of  June.  A  paragraph  in  that  address  deserves  special  atten 
tion.  It  reads  thus :  "  I  proclaim  in  the  face  of  the  whole 
world  that  the  aspirations  of  my  whole  life,  and  the  final 
object  of  all  my  desires  and  efforts,  is  no  other  thing  than 
your  independence,  because  I  have  the  innate  conviction  that 
that  constitutes  your  unalterable  desire,  as  independence 
means  for  us  the  redemption  from  slavery  and  tyranny,  the 
reconquest  of  our  lost  liberties,  and  our  entry  into  the  concert 
of  the  civilized  nations." 

Herein  we  find  a  distinct  declaration  of  the  purpose  of 
Aguinaldo  —  the  independence  of  the  Philippines. 

It  was  made  in  the  quarters  of  Admiral  Dewey,  and  six  and 


forty  days  after  we  had  conquered  the  Philippine  islands,  if 
our  conquest  dates  from  the  advent  of  Dewey  into  the  bay  of 
Manila. 

In  my  address  at  the  Essex  Institute  I  spoke  of  the  events 
of  Aug.  13. 

It  is  sufficient  for  me  to  say  at  this  moment  that  the  entry 
into  the  city  of  Manila  was  authorized  by  the  protocol,  and 
that  the  proceeding  was  without  value  as  a  military  move 
ment. 

As  the  protocol  decreed  an  armistice,  all  military  move 
ments,  whether  by  one  party  or  the  other,  were  of  no  value. 
The  protocol  fixed  the  standing  of  the  parties  irrevocably. 
The  harbor  and  city  of  Manila  were  placed  temporarily  under 
the  control  of  the  United  States.  This  stipulation  was, 
in  fact,  an  admission  that  we  did  not  then  claim  the  islands 
by  conquest. 

The  President  now  claims  title  by  conquest,  which  by  a 
recent  authority  has  been  characterized  as  a  crime,  and  he 
claims  title  also  through  the  treaty  by  which  Spain's  title 
passes  to  us. 

I  do  not  press  you  to  an  opinion  upon  these  proceedings. 

I  have  one  suggestion  only  to  make :  Is  it  a  matter  for 
adverse  comment  or  surprise  that  Aguinaldo  entertains  the 
notion  that  he  has  been  misled,  deceived,  and  in  the  end 
betrayed  by  the  authorities  of  the  United  States  ? 

In  the  presence  of  these  facts  of  history  I  invite  you  to  one 
conclusion, —  an  inevitable  conclusion, —  namely,  that  what 
ever  there  may  have  been  of  expense,  of  loss  of  life,  of 
physical  suffering,  and  of  permanent  impairment  of  health  in 
the  men  comprising  our  army  in  the  Philippines  is  due  to  the 
aggressive  war  policy  of  the  United  States.  And  can  there 
be  a  doubt,  the  shadow  of  a  doubt,  as  to  the  truthfulness  of 
this  further  proposition —  that  the  war  would  have  come  to 
an  end  at  any  moment  if  the  President  had  said  to  Aguinaldo  : 
"  Set  up  your  government  and  we  will  retire  "  ?  Why  has  not 
this  been  said?  The  answer  is  on  the  surface.  It  is  the 
purpose  of  the  President  to  seize  and  to  hold  the  Philippines 


152 

by  the  strong  hand  of  conquest,  to  subjugate  or  to  extermi 
nate  the  natives,  and  there  are  indications  that  the  two  events 
may  coincide  in  respect  to  time.  And  I  ask  those  of  my 
countrymen  who  condemned,  and  condemned  justly,  the 
brutality  of  the  war  that  Weyler  carried  on  in  Cuba  whether 
the  war  that  General  Otis  is  now  carrying  on  in  the  Philip 
pines  is  not  equally  brutal  and  upon  the  same  lines  of  policy 
—  the  destruction  of  the  homes  of  non-combatants  and  the 
concentration  of  the  women  and  children  in  the  forests  and 
open  fields,  where  they  can  obtain  neither  food  nor  shelter? 
Is  the  country  to  be  beguiled  and  misled  by  the  statement, 
now  often  made,  that  the  great  majority  of  the  Filipinos  are 
ready  to  accept  our  rule,  and  that  Aguinaldo  is  the  only 
obstacle  to  submission  and  peace?  He  is  an  obstacle  to 
submission  and  peace;  but  how,  and  why?  He  commands 
an  army  that  checks,  if  it  does  not  arrest,  our  advance  as  we 
attempt  to  cover  the  country  in  the  rear  of  Manila. 

The  inhabitants  have  set  up  a  government  based  on  a 
declaration  of  independence  that  was  issued  the  first  day  of 
August,  1898,  and  which  was  signed  by  the  elected  chiefs  of 
one  hundred  and  ninety-one  cities,  towns  and  provinces. 

I  select  two  sentences  from  the  declaration,  prefaced  by  the 
remark  on  my  part  that  their  quality  will  justify  a  reading  in 
any  assembly  of  American  citizens.  They  say : 

The  Filipinos  are  fully  convinced  that,  if  individual  perfection, 
material,  moral,  and  intellectual,  is  necessary  to  contribute  to  the  well- 
being  of  their  fellow-beings,  the  people  must  have  the  fulness  of  life  — 
requiring  liberty  and  independence  —  to  contribute  to  the  infinite  pro 
gress  of  humanity. 

They  say  of  their  constituency : 

They  fight,  and  will  fight,  with  decision  and  constancy,  without  fear, 
and  never  receding  before  any  obstacles  that  oppose  their  aim  and 
desire,  and  with  everlasting  faith  which  realizes  the  power  of  justice  and 
the  fulfilment  of  the  providential  laws. 

It  is  against  a  people  who  have  thus  given  expression  to 
sentiments  worthy  of  the  age  of  Jefferson,  worthy  of  the  lips 
of  Lincoln,  that  we  are  making  war,  aggressive,  unjustifiable, 


153 

cruel  war.  What  is  the  issue?  The  President  demands 
unconditional  submission,  including  taxation  by  military 
decrees. 

The  Filipinos  plead  for  the  opportunity  to  exercise  the 
right  of  self-  government —  self-government,  nothing  more.  If 
the  President  would  accept  the  teachings  of  our  Declaration 
of  Independence  we  should  be  at  peace. 

The  President  and  his  supporters  ask  us  to  accept  the  situ 
ation.  We  decline  to  accept  the  situation. 

We  say  in  reply:  You  have  involved  the  country  in  an 
unnecessary  and  unjust  war.  We  say  further:  You  can 
command  peace  with  honor  to  the  country,  and,  moreover, 
you  can  create  a  free  and  grateful  commonwealth  where  now 
you  are  sacrificing  human  lives  in  an  effort  to  extend  the  area 
of  human  bondage,  which,  euphemistically,  you  term  "  a 
process  of  benevolent  assimilation." 

At  the  end  and  for  this  occasion  I  arraign  the  Imperialistic 
party  upon  two  grounds.  First,  they  have  abandoned  the 
fundamental  truths  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence. 
Their  policy  requires  the  abandonment  of  the  truth  that 
"  governments  are  instituted  among  men,  deriving  their  just 
powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed." 

In  harmony  with  that  policy  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence  was  qualified  and  limited  in  the  Senate  and  upon  the 
poor  pretext  that  the  truth  of  the  declaration  had  not  always 
and  everywhere  been  followed  by  the  people  and  government 
of  the  United  States.  What  great  truth  was  ever  yet 
observed  in  its  fulness?  Not  even  the  truths  of  the  Sermon 
on  the  Mount.  And  are  failures  to  be  made  the  occasion  for 
neglecting  and  rejecting  the  truth  altogether?  Instead  of 
burial  in  the  earth,  the  truths  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence  should  be  read  in  all  languages. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  inquire  whether  the  British  ministry 
and  our  authorities  have  come  to  an  understanding  upon  the 
questions  which  primarily  concern  England  and  Russia. 
The  seizure  of  the  Philippine  Islands  by  us  is  English  policy 
—  a  policy  more  important  to  England  than  the  possession  of 
the  islands  in  her  own  hands. 


154 

We  are  thus,  and  by  England,  to  be  forced  into  the  con 
flict  with  Russia.  In  accepting  England's  policy  in  the  East 
we  accept  her  sovereignty. 

One  of  the  calamitous  incidents  of  this  war  has  not  been 
noticed  publicly  by  anyone  except  as  an  event  for  congratula 
tion.  I  speak  of  the  claim  made  by  England  that  her  refusal  to 
co-operate  with  the  states  of  Europe  saved  us  from  a  conflict 
with  those  states  combined.  The  misery  of  the  incident  is 
in  the  fact  that  England  has  laid  upon  us  an  obligation  which 
we  can  neither  satisfy  nor  repudiate. 

In  the  month  of  November  last  the  Anti-Imperialists  were 
asked  for  a  plan,  and  in  a  way  that  implied  a  lack  of  faith  in 
our  ability  to  furnish  a  plan.  Time  having  been  taken  we 
are  now  able  to  submit  our  plan.  With  it  we  appeal  to  the 
country  in  the  belief  that  the  two  main  propositions  involved 
in  our  plan  will  be  acceptable  to  the  people !  ( i )  We 
demand  the  re-enthronement  of  the  truths  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence  to  their  former  place  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people  and  in  the  public  policy  of  the  United  States.  For 
that  we  shall  strive.  (2)  We  demand  a  distinct  disavowal  of 
any  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  accept  the 
colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain. 

Hence  we  have  set  forth  our  purpose  in  regard  to  the 
Philippine  Islands  in  these  words : 

1.  The  Anti- Imperialist  League  demands  the  suspension  of  hostil 
ities  in  the  Philippines. 

2.  The  League  insists  that  it  is  the  duty  of  Congress  to  tender  an 
official  assurance  to  the  country  and  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines 
that  the  United  States  will  encourage  the  organization  of  such  a  govern 
ment  as  may  be  agreeable  to  the  people  of  the  islands,  and  that  upon 
its  organization  the  United  States  will,  in  accordance  with  its  traditional 
and  prescriptive  policy  in  such  cases,  recognize  it  as  an  independent 
and  equal  state  among  nations. 

This  is  our  platform,  and  whether  it  is  heeded  or  derided 
it  has  in  it  the  quality  of  immortality.  Until  an  end  shall 
have  been  reached  the  contest  must  be  over  these  two  propo 
sitions —  and  the  end  cannot  be  reached  until  these  two 
propositions  shall  have  been  accepted  by  the  country. 


IMPERIALISM  AND 

ANTI-IMPERIALISM. 


IMPERIALISM  AND  ANTI-IMPERIALISM. 


So  much  has  been  said,  sometimes  by  insinuation  in  the 
columns  of  imperialistic  newspapers,  and  sometimes  by  direct 
statement,  charging  Anti-Imperialists,  and  especially  the 
Anti-Imperialist  League,  with  improper  dealings  with  the 
army  in  the  Philippines,  that  some  notice  may  be  taken  of 
the  charges  by  one  who,  within  certain  limits,  is  authorized 
to  speak  for  the  league. 

Keeping  within  those  limits,  I  proceed  to  say  that  the 
Anti-Imperialist  League  has  never  authorized  the  transmis 
sion  of  any  communication  nor  made  any  communication,  of 
any  sort  whatever,  to  any  officer  or  soldier  of  the  army  of 
the  United  States,  now  or  heretofore  employed  in  the  Philip 
pine  Islands.  I  may  say  of  the  league  that  its  limited  means 
can  be  used  more  wisely  within  the  United  States,  where 
the  demand  for  anti-imperialistic  literature  appears  to  be 
inexhaustible. 

Moreover,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  soldiers  of  the 
Philippine  army  will  return  to  America  with  fixed  opinions  in 
regard  to  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  the  Philippinean  war, 
derived  from  an  experience  of  more  value  to  them  than  any 
observations  that  we  might  make,  or  any  recommendations 
that  may  be  found  in  the  literature  that  we  are  sending  forth. 
If  their  opinions  are  hostile  to  our  policy,  nothing  of  effort 
on  our  part  would  work  a  change ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  soldiers  are  of  opinion  that  the  war  is  unnecessary,  unjust, 
cruel,  criminal  in  a  public  sense,  then  are  they  already  with 
us,  and  without  any  effort  by  the  league.  The  administration 
and  its  supporters  may  dismiss  their  fears  as  to  any  attempt 
on  our  part  to  influence  the  army. 

It  is,  however,  our  purpose,  and  in  this  purpose  we  cannot 
be  frustrated  nor  delayed,  to  bring  the  army  out  of  the 

NOTE.— Address  at  a  Conference  of  Anti-Imperialists,  Boston,  May  16,  1899.  157 


I58 

Philippines  by  the  quiet  influence  of  the  American  people  at 
home,  acting  through  the  ordinary  channels  of  intercourse 
and  communication  ;  but,  failing  in  that  effort,  as  fail  we  may, 
then  we  propose  to  so  act  as  to  summon  the  army  from  the 
Philippines  by  the  authority  of  the  votes  of  the  American 
people,  and  without  thought  of  the  consequences  to  men,  to 
administrations,  to  political  parties,  or  to  questions  of  domes 
tic  concern. 

Having  said  thus  much  as  president  of  the  Anti-Impe 
rialist  League,  I  pass  on  to  some  observations  on  my  own 
account. 

It  may  be  a  fortunate  circumstance  at  a  time  when  influ 
ential  parties  in  America  are  accepting  the  ideas  of  despotic 
governments, —  and  all  governments  are  despotic  that  exer 
cise  powers  not  derived  from  the  free  consent  of  the  people 
over  whom  the  powers  are  exercised,  —  when  parties  are 
sanctioning  or  tolerating  warlike  and  tyrannical  proceedings 
over  unwilling  peoples  for  the  enforcement  of  those  ideas, 
that  the  Constitution  contains  a  guarantee  in  these  words: 
"  Congress  shall  make  no  law  .  .  .  abridging  the  freedom  of 
speech  or  of  the  press." 

That  guarantee  is  for  the  soldier  as  well  as  for  the  citizen, 
and  the  consequences  of  full  freedom  in  the  exercise  of  the 
rights  so  guaranteed  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  inhibitive 
or  punitive  legislation.  The  domain  of  legislative  jurisdic 
tion  is  the  same  for  the  soldier  as  for  the  citizen,  and  the 
same  for  the  citizen  as  for  the  soldier.  No  one  may  advise  a 
citizen  to  commit  a  crime,  to  violate  a  law,  or  to  neglect  a 
duty  which  the  law  imposes  upon  him.  So,  no  one  can 
advise  a  soldier  to  avoid  or  neglect  his  duties,  or  in  any  way 
to  fail  in  obedience  to  the  orders  and  commands  of  his 
superiors.  Within  these  limits  the  soldier  and  the  citizen  are 
entitled  to  the  enjoyment  of  full  and  equal  means  for  forming 
a  judgment  of  the  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  the  policy  of  an 
administration  and  of  the  country. 

In  a  time  of  war,  and   on  the  theater  of  war  flagrant,  the 


159 

commander  may  exercise  powers  for  which  he  may  not  be 
amenable  to  the  civil  tribunals.  I  do  not  consider  the 
nature  and  scope  of  these  powers,  nor  the  manner  of  their 
exercise,  in  this  connection  ;  but  having  in  mind  the  declara 
tions  that  have  been  made,  and  having  observed  the  tendency 
to  enlarge  the  army  and  to  magnify  its  importance  to  the 
country,  I  add  the  remark  that  the  advice  which  one  citizen 
may  give  to  another,  as  to  voluntary  service  in  the  army,  is  a 
matter  with  which  neither  the  government  nor  the  law  can 
take  notice. 

Kindred  to  these  charges  against  the  Anti-Imperialist 
League  is  the  allegation  that  we  are  giving  aid  and  comfort 
to  the  Filipinos,  and  thus  that  we  are  prolonging  the  war. 

We  are  engaged  in  a  contest  for  free  government  —  free 
government  in  America  and  free  government  in  Asia,  if  the 
people  of  Asia  prefer  free  governments.  If  our  efforts  con 
tribute  to  the  advancement  of  corresponding  ideas,  whether 
in  Asia  or  America,  WP_  V>avp  nn  apojoprjes  to  offer,  no  de 
fenses  to  make.  Our  contest,  primarily,  is  not  in  aid  of  the 
Filipinos,  but  for  the  honor  of  the  United  States,  and  the 
preservation  of  free  government  in  America  as  a  model  and 
example  to  the  world. 

We  lament  the  loss  of  American  citizens  in  war, —  in  an 
unjust  and  unnecessary  war, —  but  we  cannot  condemn  a 
liberty-loving  people,  who  are  imitators  of  the  men  who 
fought  for  the  independence  of  the  United  States.  Writh  our 
means  of  information  we  cannot  say  whether  the  Filipinos 
are  influenced  by  what  is  said  and  done  by  the  anti-imperi 
alists  in  America.  We  are  engaged  in  a  contest  for  liberty 
and  justice  in  the  United  States,  but  we  welcome  converts  to 
our  ideas  in  any  part  of  the  world,  and  we  have  no  words  of 
censure  for  those  who  are  striving  to  maintain  the  equality  of 
men,  whether  by  the  ballot  or  by  the  sword. 

If  the  opinion  of  one  person  upon  the  question  whether 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  or  Aguinaldo  is  in  the 
right,  is  of  any  value  to  the  advocates  of  imperialism,  I  am 


i6o 

prepared  to  make  answer.  Aguinaldo  is  contending  for  that 
which  is  his  own  —  the  right  to  self-government,  in  common 
with  those  with  whom  he  is  associated  and  whom  he  repre 
sents.  The  President  asserts  a  right  to  govern  others  without 
their  consent,  a  right  which  has  never  been  possessed  by  any 
one,  and  which  has  never  been  exercised  except  through  fear, 
fraud,  force  and  war.  As  between  Aguinaldo  and  the  President, 
Aguinaldo  is  in  the  right  and  the  President  is  in  the  wrong. 

^Aguinaldo  can  only  bring  the  war  to  an  end  by  the  sur 
render  of  all  right  to  self-government  in  himself  and  in  his 
people,  and  by  the  recognition  of  a  right  in  the  President  to 
govern  and  to  tax  eight  million  Filipinos  in  whatever  manner 
shall  to  him  seem  expedient;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
President  can  bring  peace  to  the  islands  by  the  abandonment 
of  a  claim  to  which  he  has  no  just  title,  and  which  can  only 
be  prosecuted  for  a  purpose  that  is  inconsistent  with  Ameri 
can  institutions  and  with  American  ideas  of  freedom,  equality 
and  justice. 

The  President  demands  of  the  Filipinos  a  surrender  of  all 
the  rights  that  they  possess,  and  for  the  enforcement  of  this 
demand  he  is  making  war;  and  he  offers  in  return  a  promise 
that  he  will,  from  time  to  time,  concede  to  them  all  the  rights 
and  privileges  that,  in  his  opinion,  they  are  fitted  to  use  and 
to  enjoy.  The  President  can  command  peace.  By  his 
unjust  demands  he  provoked  war.  By  his  unjust  demands 
the  war  goes  on.  The  responsibility  is  on  him.  I  borrow 
the  language  of  the  poet,  and  I  say  to  the  President : 

Stay  thy  clutching  hands 

From  pleading  throats  in  distant  lands, 
Wherefrom  there  comes,  though  faint  the  cry, 

A  stifled  wail  for  liberty. 

Oh,  stretch  thy  helping  arm  to  free 

The  prostrate  forms  that  kneel  to  thee, 
And  give  to  men,  unjustly  blamed, 

The  sacred  rights  thy  land  proclaimed  ! 

It  is  not  in  our  line  of  duty,  of  policy,  or  of  purpose  to 
exalt  Aguinaldo.  Upon  the  evidence  at  our  command,  he 


seems  to  be  worthy  of  confidence  and  respect.  Much  of  the 
evidence  has  been  furnished  by  Admiral  Devvey,  by  officers 
of  the  army  and  by  other  officials  who  have  been  employed 
in  the  East. 

The  information  that  has  been  gathered  in  the  twelve 
months  that  have  passed  since  Dewey  entered  the  bay  of 
Manila  warrants  the  opinion  that  the  inhabitants  of  Luzon, 
under  the  lead  of  Aguinaldo  and  his  assistants,  are  capable 
of  self-government.  However,  the  question  is  unimportant 
to  us  when  we  are  considering  the  duty  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  not  for  us  to  render  judgment  upon  the  question  of  the 
capacity  of  other  people  to  govern  themselves,  and  especially 
it  is  not  for  us  to  seize  and  enforce  jurisdiction  over  all  those 
who,  in  our  opinion,  are  incapable  of  self-government. 

Following  these  limitations  of  responsibility  for  Aguinaldo, 
I  shall  use  a  sentence  of  illustrative  comparison  that  may  not 
be  agreeable  to  those  who  think  that  any  form  of  commenda 
tion  of  the  Filipinos  or  any  criticism  of  the  war,  has  in  it 
the  taint  of  treason.  May  not  an  enthusiastic  imitator  of 
George  Washington,  who  carried  on  a  seven  years'  war  for 
the  right  of  three  million  people  to  tax  themselves  and  to 
govern  themselves,  be  as  worthy  of  a  place  in  our  confidence 
and  as  worthy  of  honorable  mention  on  the  page  of  history 
as  an  imitator,  even  though  a  successful  imitator,  of  Lord 
North  and  George  III.? 

In  the  case  of  the  American  colonies  the  king  had  a  claim 
to  sovereignty,  to  which  our  title  to  sovereignty  in  the 
Philippines  bears  only  a  slight  resemblance.  They  had 
accepted  their  charters  from  the  hands  of  his  predecessors,  a 
grant  of  money  had  been  made  to  one  of  the  colonies  from 
the  treasury  of  the  realm,  and  all  of  them  had  been  defended 
by  sea  and  by  land,  through  a  period  of  more  than  a  century 
and  a  half, —  not  always  in  kindness  and  under  a  sense  of 
justice,  but  there  was  never  a  day  when  the  hand  of  the 
realm  was  not  security  against  France  and  Spain,  the  constant 
enemies  of  England  and  of  her  possessions. 

As  to  the  Philippines,  we  have  contributed  nothing  beyond 


162 

the  aid  which  was  given  by  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Spain.  At  that  moment  the  authority  of  Spain  in  the  Phil 
ippine  Islands  had  departed  forever. 


Since  the  second  day  of  May,  1898,  our  presence  at 
Manila  has  cost  us  tens  of  millions  of  treasure  and  some 
thousands  of  lives,  more  precious  than  money  and  more 
exhaustive  of  the  resources  of  the  country  than  any  system 
of  taxation  can  ever  be,  and  all  without  any  advantage  that 
can  be  stated  by  anyone,  while  in  Luzon  a  district  of  terri 
tory  as  large  as  the  state  of  Rhode  Island  has  been  traversed 
by  our  armies,  the  inhabitants  have  been  driven  from  their 
homes,  the  houses  of  the  rich  have  been  sacrificed  to  greed, 
the  huts  of  the  poor  have  been  given  to  the  flames,  and,  if  by 
their  owners,  as  is  alleged,  then  more  worthy  of  condemna 
tion  is  a  policy  by  which  human  beings  in  mass  have  been 
driven  to  suicidal  desperation. 

These  are  the  fruits  of  the  attempt,  running  through  one 
short  year,  to  create  an  imperial  republic.  On  whose 
shoulders  rests  the  awful  responsibility? 


I  pass  abruptly  to  another  topic.  The  appearance  of 
Governor  Long  as  the  exponent  and  defender  of  the  Philip- 
pinean  policy  of  the  administration  is  an  event  for  which  the 
body  of  anti-imperialists  have  occasion  to  be  thankful. 
What  he  has  said  is  to  be  accepted  as  a  truthful  presentation 
of  the  views  and  purposes  of  the  administration,  unless  the 
President  shall  indicate  his  dissent  from  the  statement  that 
Governor  Long  has  submitted  to  the  country.  What  he 
omitted  to  say  may  prove  in  the  end,  and  that  at  a  day  not 
far  off,  of  more  importance  to  him,  as,  beyond  question,  what 
he  omitted  to  say  is  of  more  importance  to  the  state  and  to 
the  country  than  all  that  he  did  say.  It  must  be  assumed 
that  Governor  Long  has  become  the  indorser  of  the  Presi 
dent's  policy  and  doings,  except  so  far  as  he  may  have 
expressed  dissent  in  his  speech  to  the  Essex  Club. 

I  proceed  to  state  again  the  policy  of  the  President  as  he 


163 

has  set  it  forth  in  his  proclamation  of  Jan.  5,  and  as  he  has 
reproduced  in  it  more  persuasive  phraseology  in  his  proc 
lamation  of  April,  1899.  These  are  the  claims  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  in  his  own  language : 

1.  "  The  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  capture 
of  the  city  of  Manila  practically  effected  the  conquest  of  the 
Philippine  islands." 

2.  "  As  the  result  of  the  victories  of  American  arms,  the 
future  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippine 
islands  are  ceded  to  the  United  States." 

3.  "The  military  government  heretofore  maintained  by 
the  United  States  in  the  city,  harbor,  and  bay  of  Manila  is  to 
be  extended  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  the  whole  of  the 
ceded  territory." 

4.  "  The  taxes  and    duties    heretofore    payable    by    the 
inhabitants  to  the  late  government  become  payable  to  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States,  unless  it  be  seen  fit  to  sub 
stitute  for  them  other  reasonable  rates  or  modes  of  contribu 
tion  to  the  expenses  of  government." 

5.  "  In  the  fulfilment  of  this  high  mission,  supporting  the 
temperate  administration  of  affairs  for  the  greatest  good  of 
the    governed,   there    must    be    sedulously    maintained    the 
strong    arm    of    authority,  to    repress    disturbances,   and  to 
overcome  all  obstacles  to  the  bestowal  of   the  blessings  of 
good  and  stable  government  upon  the  people  of  the   Philip 
pine  islands,  under  the  free  flag  of  the  United  States." 

Governor  Long  has  given  a  general  indorsement  to  this 
policy  of  the  President  by  his  services  and  co-operation  as  a 
member  of  the  Cabinet,  and  now,  more  specifically,  by  his 
Essex  speech,  in  his  neglect  to  express  his  dissent  of  the 
President's  position.  Thus  he  partakes  of  the  responsibility 
resting  upon  the  President,  first,  for  the  policy  of  the  war, 
and  then  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  Philippine 
Islands. 

What  is  the  policy  of  the  war?  The  answer  is  to  be  found 
in  the  proclamations  and  in  the  replies  of  General  Otis  to  the 
appeals  of  the  Filipinos  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities  looking 


1 64 

to  negotiations  for  an  adjustment  upon  a  basis  of  a  perma 
nent  peace.  The  war  is  to  be  prosecuted  until  the  eight  mil 
lion  inhabitants  of  unnumbered  islands  are  brought  into 
subjection  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States.  Until  they 
consent  that  we  may  rule  them  and  may  tax  them,  or  until 
we  acquire  the  power  to  rule  them  and  to  tax  them  against 
their  consent,  this  war  of  subjugation,  a  brutal  war  of  sub 
jugation,  is  to  go  on. 

I  hazard  the  statement,  and  without  considering  whether 
my  voice  will  reach  the  Philippine  Islands  or  not,  that  neither 
of  these  results  is  a  possible  result.  If  not  by  the  circum 
stances  of  time  and  of  distance  from  the  theater  of  war,  yet 
by  the  authoritative  judgment  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  these  short-sighted  conjectures  of  a  misguided 
administration  will  be  forced,  finally,  into  the  class  of  impos 
sibilities.  But  the  war,  hopeless  as  it  is,  may  go  on  for  a 
period,  if  not  indefinitely,  with  its  sacrifices  and  horrors  of 
which,  as  yet,  the  country  knows  but  little. 

On  the  5th  of  May  the  official  statement  was  made  that  on 
the  day  preceding,  one  hundred  wounded  soldiers  and  invalids 
were  brought  from  the  front  to  the  hospitals  at  Manila.  The 
statement  was  added  that  "  the  heat  was  unbearable." 

In  the  last  days  of  April  we  had  a  statement,  as  coming 
from  General  Otis,  that  his  effective  force,  not  including  the 
troops  at  Iloilo,  was  reduced  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  and  in 
this  month  of  May  we  have  official  knowledge  that  a  regiment 
consisting  originally  of  not  less  than  one  thousand  men,  and 
presumably  of  one  thousand  three  hundred  and  eight  men,  is 
reduced  to  four  hundred  and  sixty  on  the  roster,  and  that  of 
these  one-third  are  on  the  sick  list. 

Of  the  territory  that  we  conquered  in  the  months  of  March 
and  April,  and  then  announced  in  a  voice  of  exultation  as 
victories  of  signal  importance,  more  than  one-half  has  been 
abandoned,  and  in  the  first  week  of  the  month  of  May  an 
army  of  Filipinos  was  encamped  so  near  the  city  of  Manila 
as  to  require  the  presence  of  troops  for  its  protection. 


i65 

In  diplomacy,  and  in  all  artful  practices  that  may  seem 
essential  to  the  success  of  diplomacy,  the  orientals  are  adepts. 
Hence  it  may  appear  in  the  end  to  have  been  true  that  their 
request  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  their  suggestions 
for  arrangements  for  peace  without  independence,  were  only 
schemes  for  delay,  they  knowing  from  long  experience  that 
time  and  the  diseases  of  the  tropics  are  their  friends. 

If  correctly  reported,  a  word  of  truth  dropped  from  the 
agent  of  General  Luna  when  he  said  to  General  Otis  that  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  army  would  not  bring  peace. 


Peace  is  never  secured  by  wrong,  by  injustice,  by  wars  for 


-1 


sovereignty,  and  despotic    rule.      Peace    is  the  outcome    of 
justice,  and  only  of  justice. 

Governor  Long,  in  substance,  repeats  the  statement  made 
by  the  President  in  his  Home  Market  speech,  in  which  he 
disavows  imperialism  and  all  sympathy  with  imperialists.  I 
ask  Governor  Long  this  question :  Be  pleased  to  state 
wherein  you  would  differ  in  your  policy  and  conduct  concern 
ing  the  Philippine  Islands,  if  you  were  an  imperialist  in  fact, 
and  acting  according  to  your  ideas  of  imperialism? 

Will  some  member  of  the  administration,  or  some  friend  of 
the  administration,  name  a  country,  either  historical  or  now 
existing,  against  which  the  charge  of  imperialism  can  be 
made  with  justice,  or  is  it  to  be  affirmed  that  there  neither  is 
nor  was  ever  any  such  government? 

Rome  seized  provinces  and  ruled  and  taxed  peoples  with 
out  their  consent  through  the  agency  of  pretors  and  govern 
ors-general.  We  have  seized  Porto  Rico,  Cuba,  and  the 
margins  of  two  islands  in  the  Philippines,  and  we  are  ruling 
and  taxing  the  inhabitants  without  their  consent  through  the 
agency  of  military  chieftains,  who,  for  the  time  being,  are 
endowed  with  full  powers.  Was  the  empire  of  Rome  imperi 
alistic,  and  wherein  does  our  rule  in  the  islands  differ  from 
the  rule  of  Rome  in  Judea  or  in  Gaul  and  Britain?  And  if 
different,  then  in  what  respect? 

Is  England  an  empire,  with  two  hundred  million  natives  in 


1 66 

India,  whom  she  rules  and  taxes  upon  her  own  judgment  and 
in  constant  denial  of  the  right  of  those  whom  she  claims  as 
her  subjects  to  tax  and  govern  themselves?  Are  we  not 
pursuing,  or  attempting  to  pursue,  the  same  policy  in  Porto 
Rico,  Cuba  and  the  Philippines?  Is  it  to  be  said  that  our 
title  to  the  islands  is  superior  to  the  title  of  Britain  on  the 
continent  of  Asia?  Both  titles  were  acquired  by  force,  and 
in  that  respect  they  are  of  equal  value.  The  title  of  England 
in  India  was  wrested  from  peoples  who  had  enjoyed  it  from 
antehistorical  ages. 

England  succeeded  to  titles  that  no  one  can  question. 
We  have  succeeded  to  titles  from  Spain  that  we  had  ourselves 
discredited,  upon  moral  and  political  grounds,  through  a 
period  of  more  than  one  hundred  years.  If  we  cannot  sus 
tain  our  claim  to  a  nonimperialistic  policy  by  a  reference  to 
the  history  of  England,  then  what  of  Spain?  Spain  carried 
on  a  war  for  three  hundred  years  in  a  vain  attempt  to  rule 
and  to  tax  a  people,  and  to  secure  peace  through  force,  and 
the  end  was  a  disastrous  failure.  Her  title,  whatever  it  was, 
was  a  title  obtained  through  force,  and  it  never  extended  to 
more  than  one-half  of  the  territory  that  we  now  claim.  We 
are  assured  of  ultimate  success,  however,  by  the  fact  that  our 
soldiers  are  quite  superior  to  the  conscripts  of  Spain.  Thus 
we  are  invited  to  rely  upon  the  superiority  of  our  armies,  and 
to  dismiss  all  thought  of  the  justice  of  our  cause.  And  thus, 
by  the  abandonment  of  the  principle  of  justice  in  the  affairs 
of  government,  do  we  lay  a  foundation  for  an  indiscriminate 
warfare  upon  mankind  whenever  we  are  of  the  opinion  that 
our  armies  are  of  a  superior  quality. 

In  passing  from  this  branch  of  my  discourse,  I  ask  the 
friends  of  the  administration  to  say  wherein  their  policy 
differs  from  the  policy  of  Rome,  of  England,  or  of  Spain,  or, 
denying  the  imperialistic  character  of  those  countries,  then 
to  name  an  imperialistic  government,  and  show  wherein  the 
policy  of  President  McKinley  in  the  island  of  Luzon  is  favor 
ably  distinguished  from  the  standard  so  set  up. 

According  to  the  policy  of  the  administration,  the  war  in 


the  Philippines  is  to  come  to  an  end  whenever  there  shall  be 
an  unconditional  surrender  of  the  Philippine  armed  forces. 

Second :  The  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  are  to 
be  permitted  to  enjoy  self-government  whenever  the  author 
ities  of  the  United  States  shall  be  of  the  opinion  that  the 
millions  in  the  islands  are  capable  of  governing  themselves. 
Into  this  practical  form  of  government  President  McKinley 
and  his  assistants  and  supporters  have  perverted  these 
immortal  truths  :  "  That  all  men  are  created  equal ;  that  they 
are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  rights  ; 
that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi 
ness.  That  to  secure  these  rights  governments  are  instituted 
among  men,  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed."  Will  the  country  indorse  this  perversion  of 
the  principles  on  which  the  government  was  founded?  And 
will  the  country  consent  to  the  inevitable  expenditure  of 
money  and  the  sacrifice  of  life  while  the  war  goes  on? 

On  the  first  day  of  May,  when  the  average  length  of  serv 
ice  of  thirty  thousand  men  had  not  exceeded  six  months,  and 
the  term  of  service  in  the  field  had  been  less  than  three 
months,  the  deaths  from  diseases  and  wounds  exceeded  two 
thousand,  showing  an  annual  death-rate  of  about  fifteen 
per  cent. 

For  what  length  of  time  will  the  country  tolerate  such 
sacrifices  of  its  youth  in  a  war  begun  for  humanity,  as  was 
claimed,  but  now  prosecuted  for  conquest  and  the  enslave 
ment  of  eight  million  people,  over  whom  our  title,  if  title  we 
have,  is  a  title  resting  in  a  purchase  commercial  in  its  char 
acter,  like  a  title  to  oxen  or  to  mining  lands? 

There  is  no  misrepresentation  of  the  policy  of  President 
McKinley  in  the  statement  that  I  now  make.  He  claims  the 
right,  as  President  of  the  United  States,  to  exercise  every 
power  of  government  over  eight  million  people  in  the 
Philippine  Islands,  and  he  offers  in  atonement,  or  as  a  just 
measure  of  compensation,  his  promise  of  good  government. 
This  policy  and  this  promise  are  indorsed  by  Governor 
Long. 


1 68 

There  may  be  found  in  some  ancient  library  or  in  some 
antique  bookstore  an  essay,  now  a  long  time  ago  forgotten, 
and  the  first  sentence  thereof  is  this :  "  Truth  and  integrity 
have  all  the  advantages  of  appearance  and  many  more." 


As  long  ago  as  the  fifth  day  of  February  last  the  Presi 
dent  made  the  offer  of  good  government  to  the  Filipinos, 
exacting  only  the  single  condition  that  they  should,  as  a  con 
dition  precedent,  surrender  all  right  of  government  to  him. 
Now  at  the  end  of  more  than  one  hundred  days  this  proposi 
tion  for  peace  has  not  been  accepted  by  Aguinaldo  and  his 
associates,  and  no  adequate  reason  has  been  assigned  for  the 
delay.  Thus  are  we  left  to  conjecture  a  reason. 

The  Filipinos  may  entertain  the  barbaric  notion  that  a 
man  may  derive  more  satisfaction  from  an  inferior  govern 
ment  in  which  he  has  a  part,  than  will  come  to  him  under 
any  government  of  foreign  origin,  whose  movements  are  to 
be  guided  by  alien  and,  it  may  be,  by  hostile  hands.  Or 
they  may  have  obtained  some  knowledge  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  term  of  President  McKinley 
in  his  office  ;  and  they  may  have  heard,  also,  that  his  re-election 
is  in  peril  through  the  machinations  of  a  body  of  men  called 
anti-imperialists.  Hence  they  may  hesitate  to  enter  into  an 
arrangement  of  which  time  is  the  essence  and  over  which  the 
blind  god  called  destiny,  who  has  either  forced  or  inveigled 
us  into  the  Philippinean  war,  may  have  supreme  control. 

Or  they  may  have  heard  the  rumor  that  in  the  summer 
months  of  1898  the  authorities  of  the  United  States  gave  a 
promise  to  Aguinaldo  that,  upon  the  expulsion  of  Spain 
from  the  islands,  the  inhabitants  would  be  allowed  to  set  up 
a  government  for  themselves.  As  five  months  have  now 
gone  since  Spain  surrendered  all  authority  over  the  islands, 
and  as  the  privilege  of  self-government  has  not  been  ceded,  — 
as,  on  the  contrary,  /the  right  of  self-government  has  been 
specifically  and  repeatedly  denied,  —  a  delay  in  the  accept 
ance  of  a  new  promise  may  be  understood,  if  it  cannot  be 
pardoned. 


1 69 

Finally,  it  is  not  an  unreasonable  suggestion  to  say  that 
the  Filipinos  may  have  had  doubts  of  our  ability  to  meet 
the  obligations  arising  from  the  promises  contained  in  the 
proclamation  of  the  commissioners  of  April,  1899. 


What  is  to  be  said  of  paragraph  five  if  read  by  one  who 
has  some  knowledge  of  the  civil  service  of  the  United 
States  —  "  There  shall  be  guaranteed  to  the  Philippine  people 
an  honest  and  effective  civil  service,"  and  as  security  for  the 
pledge,  it  is  said,  "  in  which,  to  the  fullest  extent  that  it  is 
practical,  natives  shall  be  employed  "? 

Can  this  promise  be  performed?  Can  the  equivalent  con 
dition  of  the  civil  service  be  found  within  the  limits  of  the 
United  States? 

Consider  the  proclamation  as  a  state  paper.  It  is  an 
address  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  It  is 
upon  a  plane  of  intelligence  and  of  knowledge  of  public 
affairs  and  of  administration  quite  abreast  of  the  intelligence 
of  the  average  American  citizen.  If  the  President  and  the 
commissioners  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  Filipinos  were 
equal  to  the  task  of  examining  and  weighing  the  statements 
and  promises  contained  in  the  proclamation,  then  that 
opinion  is  an  important  piece  of  evidence  in  support  of  the 
claim  that  they  are  capable  of  self-government.  If  in  the 
opinion  of  the  President  and  the  commissioners  the  Fili 
pinos  are  not  so  capable,  then  why  was  the  proclamation 
sent  forth?  Or  was  it  designed  for  use  in  the  United 
States  ? 

Governor  Long  may  have  occasion  to  qualify  a  promise 
that  he  has  given  to  the  public  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  Philippine  Islands  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Bachelor  of  the 
Christian  Register. 

Speaking  of  the  President,  and  in  his  name,  Governor 
Long  says : 

All  his  military  efforts  are  directed  solely  to  the  preservation  of  the 
law  and  order  there  ;  and  if  the  natives  would  co-operate  in  this  respect 
he  and  the  peace  commission  which  he  has  sent  to  them  would  enter  at 


once  upon  the  work  of  their  political  regeneration  with  a  view  to  giving 
them  all  the  privileges  which  the  territories  of  the  United  States 
between  the  Pacific  and  the  Atlantic  now  enjoy. 

A  partial  enumeration  of  the  privileges  which  the  terri 
tories  of  the  United  States  now  enjoy  may  be  set  forth : 

1.  Representation  by  delegates  in  the   House  of  Repre 
sentatives  as  a  pledge  of  ultimate  statehood. 

2.  The  right  to  travel,  to  labor,  to  own  land  in  any  part 
of  the  United  States. 

3.  The  right  to  acquire  citizenship  in  any  part  of    the 
Union,   with    the    consequent    freedom    from    discriminating 
adverse  legislation  on  account  of  race  or  color. 

4.  The  freedom  of  the  markets  of  the  United  States  for 
the  products  of  their  industry. 

5.  The  right  to  export  the  products  of  their  industry  to 
all  parts  of  the  world  without  the  payment  of  an  export  duty. 

6.  The    right    to  protection  against  foreign    aggression, 
whether  from  Japan,  France,  Germany,  England  or  Russia. 

7.  The  right  to  import  goods  from  all  parts  of  the  world 
upon  the  payment  of  the  rates  of  duties  imposed  upon  citi 
zens  of  states. 

These  advantages  and  privileges,  so  attractively  set  forth, 
may  be  sufficient  to  induce  the  Filipinos  to  surrender  their 
claim  to  self-government,  but  how  will  the  scheme  be  received 
by  classes  of  American  citizens? 


What  will  be  the  reply  of  American  laborers  to  the  propo 
sition  to  endow  eight  million  Malays,  and  their  posterity 
through  all  time,  with  a  right  of  competition  which  has  been 
denied  to  the  Chinese? 

What  will  be  the  answer  of  sugar  producers  from  Louisi 
ana  to  Minnesota,  whose  industry  is  to  be  destroyed,  not 
alone  by  the  competition  of  the  Philippines,  but,  upon  the 
doctrine  of  equality,  by  the  competition  of  Porto  Rico,  and  it 
may  be  of  Cuba  also,  should  the  project  for  annexation  be 
accepted  by  the  country? 


What  will  be  said  by  the  mass  of  tax-payers  who  are  to 
supply  the  deficiency  of  revenues  caused  by  the  free  admis 
sion  of  sugar  and  coffee  and  the  other  products  of  tropical 
climes?  With  the  annexations  contemplated,  the  duties  on 
tropical  products,  whether  of  the  land,  of  the  hand,  or  of  the 
loom,  will  disappear. 

Finally,  there  is  no  aspect  of  this  war  and  its  probable  con 
sequences  that  can  be  made  attractive  to  the  laboring  and 
producing  classes  of  America. 

They  are  to  furnish  the  main  body  of  recruits  for  the 
army;  they  are  to  meet  the  sacrifices  of  campaigns  in  the 
tropics ;  and  at  the  end,  and  as  an  inevitable  consequence, 
the  laboring  men  and  the  pursuits  of  laboring  men  are  to  be 
degraded  by  competition  with  inferior  races. 

These  would  be  the  results  of  Governor  Long's  promise  to 
the  Filipinos.  The  promise,  however,  will  not  be  sanctioned 
nor  observed  by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  nor  will  it 
be  received  by  Aguinaldo  and  his  associates  as  a  promise 
made  in  good  faith. 

The  iniquity  of  imperialism  is  bearing  a  harvest  of  evil  in 
many  quarters. 

In  Samoa,  in  co-operation  with  two  monarchies,  we  are 
engaged  in  the  work  of  setting  up  and  maintaining  an 
insignificant  monarchy  over  an  uncivilized,  half-clad,  and 
incompetent  race,  in  violation  of  our  principles  of  govern 
ment,  and  for  no  good  purpose  that  can  be  stated  by  any 
one. 

In  Hawaii,  our  commission,  under  the  lead  of  Senator 
Cullom,  has  sanctioned  the  exclusion  of  two-fifths  of  the 
population  from  citizenship,  and  within  the  limits  of  citizen 
ship  the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  hold  office  are  made 
dependent  upon  the  possession  of  property.  All  this  be 
cause  President  Dole  and  Senator  Cullom  and  his  associates 
think  that  Mongolians  are  not  qualified  for  citizenship  and 
the  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage. 

In  presence  of  this  policy,  what  criticism  can  be  made  of 


1/2 

the  white  people  in  Mississippi  and  South  Carolina  who 
think  that  persons  of  the  negro  race  ought  not  to  possess  the 
rights  of  citizenship  and  suffrage?  And  sad  it  is  that  these 
departures  from  the  doctrines  of  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence  were  inaugurated  by  members  and  leaders  of  the 
Republican  party,  and  are  now  defended  by  the  successors 
of  the  men  who  reaffirmed  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
in  the  thirteenth,  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  ! 

Having  thus  contributed  to  the  creation  and  support  of  a 
monarchy  in  Samoa,  having  trampled  down  the  principles  of 
human  equality  in  Hawaii,  it  is  only  a  natural  consequence 
that  we  should  demand  of  eight  million  Malays  in  the  Phil 
ippine  Islands  a  full  surrender  of  all  their  rights  as  an  act 
preliminary  to  the  enjoyment  of  such  privileges  of  existence 
in  the  land  of  their  birth  and  in  the  home  of  their  ancestors 
as  we  may  be  pleased  to  concede  to  them. 

Where  else  in  the  world  has  tyranny  made  such  rapid 
advances,  and  where  else  in  the  world  have  tyrants  assumed 
to  assert  and  to  exercise  more  absolute  control  over  their 
subjects? 

In  the  presence  and  under  the  influence  of  these  teachings, 
the  statement  is  not  a  surprise  that  our  Postmaster-General 
has  seized  the  contents  of  the  mail,  and  made  the  public 
announcement  that  a  person  named  is  not  worthy  to  enjoy  its 
privileges  in  common  with  his  fellow-citizens. 

If,  in  1764,  when  the  contest  between  the  American 
colonies  and  the  mother  country  was  opening,  George  III. 
and  the  British  ministry  had  said  to  the  colonists:  "  If  you 
wish  to  enter  upon  the  experiment  of  self-government  we 
will  not  only  not  oppose  the  undertaking,  but  we  will 
co-operate  with  you,"  how  changed,  how  beneficially  changed, 
would  have  been  the  relations  of  the  two  great  branches  of 
the  English-speaking  race  through  the  long  century  now 
closing ! 

Instead  of   war,  instead  of   threats  and  menaces  of   war, 


173 

instead  of  a  century  of  suspicion,  of  jealous  rivalries,  of  syco 
phantic  hypocrisy  at  intervals,  we  might  have  enjoyed  a  long 
period  of  friendship  and  co-operation,  resting,  in  America, 
upon  a  basis  of  gratitude  as  permanent  as  the  existence  of  the 
English  race  on  this  continent. 

Our  relations  with  France,  tempered  always  with  a  feeling 
of  gratitude  for  the  aid  given  to  us  in  the  days  of  weakness, 
poverty  and  peril,  may  be  accepted  as  a  trustworthy  indi 
cation  of  the  relations  that  would  have  subsisted  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  if  our  beginnings  had 
been  in  peace  and  justice  instead  of  controversy  and  war. 

A  like  opportunity  was  presented  to  President  McKinley 
when  the  protocol  of  Aug.  12  had  been  signed.  If  he  had 
then  proceeded  upon  the  theory  of  aiding  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands  in  the  establishment  of  sep 
arate  and  independent  governments,  the  inhabitants  of  those 
islands  for  all  time  future  would  have  been  allied  to  the 
United  States,  and  ever  ready  to  co-operate  with  us  in  every 
aspect  of  public  affairs. 

His  neglect  thus  to  avail  himself  of  the  opportunity,  and 
his  inauguration  of  war  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  have  alien 
ated  the  inhabitants  of  those  islands  from  the  United  States 
for  a  long  time  future.  Thus  was  a  great  opportunity  to 
establish  friendly  relations  lost,  and  forever  lost,  to  the 
United  States,  should  the  present  policy  be  continued. 

The  only  possibility  for  peace  and  friendship  remaining  is 
n  the  opportunity  now  presented  of  abandoning  our  claim  to 
jurisdiction  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  in  the  tender  of  our 
aid,  without  any  positive  obligation  on  our  part,  in  the  estab 
lishment  of  an  independent  government. 

Freedom,  Justice  and  Peace  are  natural  allies. 

Herein  is  our  demand. 

The  administration  has  entered  upon  a  policy  of  aggres 
sion,  injustice  and  war. 

Herein  is  the  issue  on  which  the  country  is  to  pass  judg 
ment. 


UN-REPUBLICAN  POLICY  OF 
PRESIDENT  McKINLEY." 


UN-REPUBLICAN     POLICY    OF    PRESIDENT 
MCKINLEY." 


GROTON,  MASS.,  July  i,  1899. 
John  J.  Teevens,  Esq.,  South  Boston. 

MY  DEAR  SIR.  —  The  circumstance  that  the  speaking  on 
the  occasion  of  the  reunion  and  field  day  of  the  Clan-na- 
Gael  of  Massachusetts,  July  4,  will  be  in  the  evening,  seems 
to  make  it  unwise  for  me  to  accept  your  invitation  to  be 
present.  This  decision  is  very  much  against  my  inclination, 
which  is  to  join  you  and  to  give  further  public  utterance  to 
my  opposition  to  the  un-American  and  unrepublican  policy  of 
President  McKinley. 

There  has  been  no  other  such  departure  from  American 
ideas  and  principles  in  all  our  history,  not  even  by  Jefferson 
Davis,  as  is  now  in  progress  under  the  lead  of  the  President. 

Jefferson  Davis  did  not  contemplate  the  destruction  of  the 
American  republic,  he  only  contemplated  its  division ; 
President  McKinley  is  transforming  this  republic  into  an 
empire,  and  the  permanent  establishment  of  our  authority  in 
the  Philippine  Islands  is  the  consummation  of  the  under 
taking. 

We  are  engaged  in  a  war  which  no  one  defends,  which  no 
one  can  defend,  as  a  just  and  righteous  war.  Its  supporters 
are  apologists,  laying  the  responsibility  for  the  war  some 
times  on  destiny  and  sometimes  upon  divinity. 

Is  it  an  answer  or  only  a  guilty  pretext  when  we  say  that 
for  $20,000,000  we  have  purchased  from  Spain  the  title  to 
the  Philippine  Islands,  and  therewith  the  right,  through  war 
and  slaughter,  to  subjugate  ten  million  human  beings  who 
never  injured  us,  and  who  ask  only  for  the  right  to  manage 
their  own  affairs — a  right  as  sacred  as  the  right  to  exist? 

For  the   execution  of  this  unholy  purpose  a  call  is  now 


pending  for  the  enlistment  of  thirty  thousand,  soon  to  be 
sixty  thousand,  and  then  one  hundred  thousand,  of  the 
youth  of  the  country,  whose  destiny  it  will  be  to  either  fall  in 
battle,  or  to  perish  by  disease,  or  to  return  broken  in  health 
to  become  the  recipients  of  pensions  to  be  paid  from  the 
labor  of  those  who  may  remain  at  home. 

This  sacrifice  of  men  and  this  waste  of  money  and  the  con 
sequent  burden  of  taxation  through  generations  are  not  more 
to  be  regretted  than  the  humiliation  to  which  the  country  is 
now  subjected  in  the  abandonment  of  the  republic  and  the 
acceptance  of  England  as  our  guide  and  model  in  affairs  of 
government. 

This  administration  has  been  inveigled  into  a  policy  which 
involves  an  alliance  with  England  for  the  defense  of  her 
eastern  empire  against  the  frowning  supremacy  of  Russia, 
that  has  already  laid  its  iron  hand  upon  China,  and  which  is 
yet  to  dominate  over  Japan. 

We  are  now  to  choose  whether  America  shall  remain  a 
republic  and  lead  the  world  on  to  higher  ideas  and  to  purer 
practices  in  public  affairs,  or  whether  we  are  to  accept  the 
ideas  and  principles  of  despotic  governments. 

Justice  and  peace  are  possibilities  in  a  republic.  Justice 
and  peace  are  impossibilities  in  an  empire.  Imperialism  and 
republicanism  are  impossible  in  the  same  government. 

The  greatest  crime  which  the  world  can  ever  know,  the 
greatest  crime  which  mankind  can  commit,  is  the  inaugura 
tion  of  a  war  and  the  prosecution  of  a  war  for  the  conquest 
of  territory  and  the  subjugation  of  peoples,  with  the  incident 
and  inevitable  sacrifice  of  human  life. 

The  founders  of  this  government  preferred  republicanism 
and  peace  to  imperialism  and  war. 

President  McKinley  and  his  supporters  are  engaged  in  an 
effort  to  revise  their  work  and  to  reverse  their  opinion.  This 
is  the  issue. 

Let  us  unite,  one  and  all,  whatever  may  be  our  differences 
on  other  matters,  and  whatever  our  nationality,  and  demand 
the  abandonment  of  the  unjust  and  thus  far  unsuccessful  war 
in  the  Philippine  Islands. 


ADDRESS  TO  THE  PEOPLE. 


ADDRESS  TO  THE  PEOPLE. 


THE  Anti-Imperialist  League  was  formed  at  Boston  in 
the  month  of  November,  1898.  It  was  the  first  organized 
protest  against  the  imperialistic-colonial  policy  on  which 
President  McKinley  was  then  entering. 

From  the  tone  of  the  press  it  was  to  have  been  assumed 
that  the  country  was  prepared  to  tolerate  and,  finally,  that  it 
would  be  compelled  or  induced  to  accept  the  new  policy,  and 
thus  to  follow  England  and  to  co-operate  with  England  in  the 
subjugation  of  the  world  to  what  is  called  Anglo-Saxon 
civilization. 

In  the  few  months  that  have  passed  great  changes  have 
taken  place.  Anti-imperialist  leagues  have  been  formed  in 
Chicago,  Cincinnati,  Philadelphia,  San  Francisco,  Detroit,  St. 
Louis,  Portland,  Oregon,  New  York,  Washington,  and  in  other 
cities  and  towns  in  many  parts  of  the  country. 

These  organizations,  as  a  whole,  contain  an  array  of  names 
such  as  has  not  been  brought  together  in  support  of  a  com 
mon  cause  since  the  signing  of  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence.  That  cause  is  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
the  preservation  of  the  great  truths  therein  announced,  with 
their  application  to  the  affairs  of  America  and  of  the  world. 

The  issue  is  again  made  up.  The  republicanism  of  our 
fathers  is  assailed  by  the  doctrines  of  imperialism  as  they 
were  maintained  by  George  III.  The  country  is  compre 
hending  the  issue.  A  vigorous  and  powerful  portion  of  the 
press,  religious,  secular,  independent  and  industrial,  is  giving 
full  support  to  the  anti-imperialistic  policy.  It  is  not  known 
to  us  that  the  President's  policy  has  one  supporter  in  the 
press  devoted  to  the  interests  of  agriculture. 

The  war  in  the  Philippines  is  not  defended  by  anyone 
upon  the  ground  of  wisdom  or  right  or  justice.  Of  bold  and 

NOTE.  —  Issued  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Anti-Imperialist  League,  Boston,  Aug. 
IS,  1899.  181 


182 

manly  defense  on  the  basis  of  justice  we  hear  nothing.  We 
are  asked  to  accept  an  exculpatory  analogy  between  our 
conduct  in  the  Philippines  and  our  treatment  of  the  Indians 
on  the  changing  frontier  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  If 
the  analogy  must  be  accepted  it  may  be  said  that  our  treat 
ment  of  the  Indians  cannot  be  dignified  and  made  a  precedent 
or  a  defense  for  a  like  policy  in  foreign  lands. 

This  league  is  now  carrying  on  the  contest,  and  it  will  con 
tinue  to  carry  on  the  contest,  upon  the  idea  and  in  the  belief 
that  the  United  States  —  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  especially  —  is  responsible  for  the  war,  and  that 
President  McKinley,  at  any  moment,  or  the  United  States, 
acting  through  him  or  through  a  successor,  can  bring  the 
war  to  an  end.  It  is  our  purpose  to  aid  in  bringing  the  war 
to  an  end,  and,  in  advance,  we  reject  any  and  every  scheme 
of  compromise. 

We  are  gratified,  and  well  may  the  country  be  elated,  by 
the  fact  that  the  laboring  populations,  with  singular  unanimity, 
have  resolved  against  the  un-American  policy  of  the  adminis 
tration.  All  that  men  can  have  at  stake  they  now  have  at 
stake  in  the  issue  that  is  before  them.  Their  own  right  to 
self-government  is  involved  in  the  claim  to  self-government 
now  made  by  ten  million  artisans  and  land-workers  in  the 
Philippine  Islands.  The  annexation  of  those  islands  to  the 
United  States,  in  whatever  form  it  may  come,  whether  as 
states  or  as  colonies,  means  free  and  full  competition  by  the 
American  laborer,  of  every  trade  and  condition,  with  the 
underpaid  and  half-clad  workers  of  the  tropics. 

Henceforth  the  plain  people,  on  whom  Lincoln  relied, — 
American  born  many;  others  immigrants  from  Ireland,  from 
Germany,  from  the  Scandinavian  states, —  are  to  enter  upon 
the  task  of  saving  the  republic.  Of  their  disposition  we  are 
already  well  informed,  and  of  their  capacity  we  are  not  in 
doubt. 

In  presence  of  the  evidence  before  us  our  aim  is  not  so 
much  to  secure  a  verdict  against  the  administration  as  to 
obtain  a  dominating  judgment  which  shall  stand  as  a  con- 


183 

trolling  precedent  for  the  guidance  of  the  republic  in  all 
times  future. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  events  rather  than  men  have 
been  our  teachers ;  and  henceforth,  even  if  the  country  should 
disregard  principles,  events  will  become  our  masters. 

We  have  carried  on  a  campaign  of  the  winter  months,  the 
available  months  of  the  year,  and  a  disastrous  campaign  it 
has  been.  A  force  of  thirty  thousand  men  has  been  wasted 
as  an  army  for  an  aggressive  movement,  and  the  remnant  is 
now  limited  to  the  environs  of  the  six  or  ten  cities  and  towns 
that  we  are  able  to  occupy. 

The  war  goes  on,  the  public  debt  increases  rapidly,  the  tax 
gatherer  demands  daily  contributions  from  every  household 
for  the  support  of  the  war,  and  for  the  same  purpose  he  col 
lects  a  percentage  upon  every  business  transaction  and  upon 
every  industry  of  the  country. 

But,  outweighing  all  other  events  is  the  demand  for  an 
army  of  thirty  thousand  or  forty  thousand,  or,  as  some  friends 
of  the  administration  say,  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  to  be 
kept  constantly  in  the  islands  as  an  effective  force  to  meet  the 
casualties  of  the  field  and  to  countervail  the  ravages  of  disease 
in  the  camps. 

There  is  only  a  possibility  that  an  army  of  fifty  thousand 
can  be  raised  by  voluntary  enlistments  and  placed  in  Luzon 
by  November,  and  there  is  only  a  slight  probability  that  such 
an  army  would  remain  an  aggressive  force  beyond  the  month 
of  May  next. 

Is  the  country  prepared  for  a  conscript  system  that  shall 
run  through  years  and  decades  of  years?  Can  a  Congress 
be  elected  and  continued  in  power  that  will  vote  men  and 
money  for  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war?  Herein  are 
perils  of  which  the  country  and  the  public  men  of  the  country 
may  wisely  take  notice. 

Our  information  and  experience  justify  the  opinion  that 
the  body  of  anti-imperialists,  the  country  over,  will  disregard 
the  claims  of  domestic  questions,  subordinating  them  one 
and  all  to  a  single  purpose  of  comprehensive  public  policy, — 


1 84 

the  purpose  to  bring  the  army  of  the  United  States  out  of 
the  Philippine  Islands  with  the  least  possible  delay,  and 
without  delay  to  recognize  in  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philip 
pines,  of  Cuba,  and  of  Porto  Rico  the  right  of  self-govern 
ment  agreeably  to  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  and  as  a  pledge  of  the  permanent  policy  of  the 
United  States. 


LETTER  TO  A  MEETING  OF 
LABORING  MEN. 


LETTER  TO  A  MEETING  OF  LABORING  MEN. 


GROTON,  Aug.  31,  1899. 

To   George  E.  McNeill,  Esq.  : 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  It  is  with  misgivings  that  I  put  aside  the 
opportunity  to  meet  you  and  your  friends  and  associates  on 
the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the  passage  of  the  ten-hour 
law  in  Massachusetts. 

I  have  welcomed  the  steps  by  which  the  interests  of  the 
laboring  classes  have  been  advanced  in  the  last  half-century, 
and  the  limitations  of  the  hours  of  labor  have  been  among 
the  more  important  steps. 

As  a  fact  of  history  and  as  an  act  of  personal  justice,  I 
take  this  occasion  to  say  that  General  Banks  prepared  the 
bill  by  which  the  eight-hour  rule  was  introduced  into  the 
labor  service  of  the  United  States. 

To  me  and  to  you  one  topic  is  supreme  over  all  others 
when  questions  of  public  importance  are  under  consideration. 

The  nation  is  passing  through  a  crisis,  or  rather  it  is  in  a 
crisis,  which  portends  all  of  evil  to  the  laboring  population 
that  can  ever  come  to  them  —  their  downfall  from  a  condi 
tion  of  independence,  of  power  in  the  affairs  of  the  country, 
to  a  state  of  servility  through  competition  with  the  millions 
of  the  oriental  world.  The  Philippines  are  never  to  be  sur 
rendered.  So  says  the  President.  They  are  to  be  con 
quered,  and  they  are  to  be  kept  within  or  under  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  the  United  States. 

The  laboring  population  of  this  country  have  one  means  of 
averting  the  evil,  and  I  do  not  hesitate  in  advising  its  use. 

Let  them  unitedly  and  with  energy  oppose  the  re-election 
of  President  McKinley,  and  their  days  of  peril  will  be  ended 
and  the  country  will  be  saved  from  the  grasp  of  imperialism. 


NOTE. —  Letter  to  a  meeting  of  laboring  men,  held  in  Boston  Sept.  i,  1899.  187 


THE  WAR  OF  DESPOTISM  IN  THE 
PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS. 


THE  WAR  OF  DESPOTISM  IN  THE  PHILIPPINE 

ISLANDS. 


LIBERTY  is  LIBERTY  AS  GOD  is  GOD. 

—  Louis  Kossuth. 

THE  war  against  Spain  and  the  war  in  the  Philippine 
Islands  have  given  rise  to  an  opinion,  now  much  cultivated 
by  the  advocates  and  organs  of  imperialism,  that  the 
supreme  power  in  the  United  States  is  vested  in  the  Presi 
dent,  and,  consequently,  that  any  criticism  of  his  doings  is 
akin  to  the  crime  known  in  monarchies  as  lese  majeste,  mean 
ing  thereby  high  treason  or  the  purpose  to  commit  high 
treason.  The  prevalence  of  this  opinion  and  the  support 
given  to  it  by  the  imperialistic  press  of  the  country  justify  an 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  our  government,  and  especially 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  where  the  attribute  or  endow 
ment  called  supremacy  has  been  lodged. 

Indirectly  and  in  a  collateral  inquiry  that  question  has 
been  settled  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  President  and  all 
subordinates  in  the  Executive  Departments  holding  under 
him,  and  all  judges  and  all  subordinates  in  the  Judicial 
Department  holding  under  them,  are  officers  of  the  Govern 
ment,  and  consequently  all  of  them  may,  under  some  cir 
cumstances,  become  amenable  to  a  higher  power. 

An  office  is  a  place  created,  and  an  officer  is  a  person 
holding  in  a  place  created,  and  by  necessity  he  is  amenable 
to  the  author  or  creator  of  the  place  so  created.  This  theory 
is  met  in  practice  and  without  limitation  in  our  system  of 
government.  All  the  officers  of  whom  I  have  spoken, 
including  the  President,  are  amenable  to  an  authority  in 
which  the  President  has  no  part  —  an  authority  to  which  the 
President  himself  may  become  responsible.  That  authority 
is  vested  in  the  House  of  Representatives  and  in  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  acting  concurrently. 

NOTE  — Address  at  Springfield,  Mass.,  Sept.  5,  1899.  191 


The  Congress  of  the  United  States  is  a  body  which  may 
or  may  not  include  the  President  as  a  co-ordinate  branch. 
The  provision  of  the  Constitution  by  which  the  veto  power 
is  given  to  the  President  may  work,  and  often  it  has  worked, 
the  exclusion  of  the  President  from  the  law-making  branch 
of  the  government.  For  a  particular  occasion  and  for  a 
special  purpose,  he  ceases  to  be  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States.  The  two  houses,  by  a  two-thirds  vote  in  each 
house,  may  enact  laws  in  defiance  of  the  President's  opinion, 
may  declare  war  without  his  concurrence,  may  authorize  and 
require  him  to  make  a  treaty  of  peace,  and  in  case  of  his 
neglect  to  comply  with  such  requirement,  the  two  houses, 
acting  in  the  way  pointed  out  in  the  Constitution,  may 
impeach  him  and  remove  him  from  office. 

By  the  Constitution  the  United  States  guarantees  to  each 
state  a  republican  form  of  government.  That  guarantee  is 
to  be  executed  by  Congress,  with  the  co-operation  of  the 
President  as  a  part  of  the  Congress,  or  by  the  two  houses 
acting  independently,  in  case  of  the  nonconcurrence  of  the 
President.  Thus  the  phrase  "  the  United  States"  means  the 
two  houses  of  Congress  acting  concurrently,  and  either  with 
or  without  the  co-operation  of  the  Executive. 

In  the  Thirty-ninth  and  Fortieth  Congresses  the  great 
measures  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  government,  and  for 
its  preservation  upon  a  republican  basis,  became  statutes 
against  the  opinion  of  the  President.  Moreover,  the  two 
houses  provided  for  the  assembling  and  reassembling  of 
Congress  in  defiance  of  the  wishes  of  the  President.  Beyond 
what  has  been  done,  a  Congress  may  assemble  upon  the 
motion  of  a  majority  of  the  members  of  each  house,  and 
may  proceed  to  business  without  the  aid  of  a  preliminary 
proclamation  by  the  Executive.  The  Congress  always 
exists,  and  upon  its  own  motion  it  may  exist  with  a  right 
to  act.  Members  of  Congress  are  not  officers  of  the  gov 
ernment  ;  they  are  constituent  parts  of  the  government. 

For  the  purposes  of  government  and  in  the  ultimate,  the 
two  houses  of  Congress  are  the  United  States.  They  are 


193 

self-existent  bodies.  They  can  command  men  and  money 
for  such  purposes  as  they  may  think  expedient,  including 
their  own  support  and  defense,  and  on  them  every  branch 
and  agency  of  the  government  is  dependent. 

As  individuals,  the  members  of  Congress  are  responsible, 
first,  to  their  associates  in  the  respective  houses,  and  beyond 
that  they  are  responsible  only  to  the  people  whom  they 
represent. 

The  President,  as  a  public  officer,  is  open  to  criticism  on 
the  part  of  any  citizen  who  may  think  that  the  President  errs 
in  his  public  policy  or  in  his  personal  conduct.  The  law 
protects  him,  as  it  protects  other  citizens,  but  not  otherwise. 
Every  citizen  who  criticises  another  is  responsible  for  the 
manner  in  which  he  exercises  his  privilege.  Nothing  more. 
What  Shakespeare  has  said  of  kings  does  not  apply  to  Presi 
dents  —  not  as  yet : 

There's  such  divinity  doth  hedge  a  king. 

Not  upon  Presidents  only,  but  upon  Congresses  as  well,  the 
right  and  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  criticism  are  security 
for  the  freedom  of  the  citizen  and  the  preservation  of  the 
State.  Nor  is  the  exercise  of  this  right  to  be  limited  to 
times  of  peace ;  indeed,  its  fullest  enjoyment  is  most  im 
portant  in  times  of  war. 

War  implies  the  destruction  of  human  life,  and  the  sacrifice 
and  often  the  waste  of  vast  sums  of  money.  Wars  that  are 
unavoidable  and  defensible  are  great  calamities  —  wars  that 
are  unnecessary  and  unjust  are  the  greatest  of  crimes.  Is 
there  to  be  no  inquiry,  no  judgment,  no  criticism  on  the  part 
of  those  who  fill  the  ranks  or  pay  the  taxes?  No  words  of 
warning  from  those  who,  void  of  ambition,  consult  only  the 
safety  and  prosperity  of  the  State?  As  the  perils  of  the 
Republic  are  greater  in  war  than  in  peace,  so  in  war  rather 
than  in  peace  should  there  be  entire  freedom  in  inquiry,  unre 
stricted  freedom  of  judgment  of  public  affairs,  and  of  criticism 
of  those  in  authority. 

The  full  recognition  of  the  right  of  criticism,  with  the  free 


194 

exercise  of  the  right  on  the  part  of  the  people,  is  the  chief 
security,  indeed,  it  is  the  only  security,  against  maladminis 
tration  in  public  affairs.  One  of  the  regretable  incidents 
of  the  Philippinean  war  is  the  appearance  of  officers  of  the 
regular  army  and  navy  who,  not  content  with  the  free 
expression  of  their  own  opinions,  venture  to  suggest  the  sup 
pression  of  opinion  in  those  who  differ  from  them.  They 
should  realize  that  they  are  the  servants  of  the  Republic,  and 
not  its  rulers. 

The  attempt  now  making  by  the  imperialistic  press  and 
organs  to  compel  the  country  into  silence  means  the  accept 
ance  of  imperialism  in  America,  while  the  President  makes 
war  in  Asia — a  war  which  has  never  been  sanctioned  or 
recognized  by  Congress,  and  whose  conduct  and  fortunes 
are  systematically  concealed  from  the  people.  Thus  does 
imperialism  in  Asia  react  and  imperil  liberty  in  America. 
The  attempt  to  stifle  criticism  is  a  vain  attempt.  Criticism 
of  the  President  will  be  more  and  more  general  and  vigorous 
as  month  after  month  passes,  until  his  administration  shall 
have  come  to  an  end.  With  this  explanation  and  defense  of 
the  right  of  criticism  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  I  proceed  to  the  individual  exercise  of  the  right. 

First  of  all,  I  seek  for  an  answer  to  this  question :  What 
is  the  character  of  the  war  that  we  are  now  carrying  on  in  the 
Philippine  Islands?  Is  it  a  struggle  of  arms  for  the  suppres 
sion  of  a  riot  or  a  popular  outbreak  against  recognized  and 
established  authority,  such  as  occurred  at  Chicago  in  Presi 
dent  Cleveland's  administration,  or  is  it  a  war  against  an 
organization  which  has  all  the  attributes  and  qualities  of  a 
civil  government  and  which  has  come  into  existence  through 
the  exercise  of  original  sovereignty  by  eight  million  or  ten 
million  people, —  a  sovereignty  that  is  divine  in  its  origin,  if 
any  sovereignty  in  government  can  be  called  divine  —  and 
with  which  the  millions  of  Filipinos  were  and  are  quite  con 
tent?  If  it  is  a  war  against  such  an  organization  and  against 
such  a  people,  then  those  who  are  carrying  it  on  are  guilty  of 
a  crime  called  lese  hunianite — treason  to  humanity. 


195 

It  is  only  by  slow  processes  and  under  the  restraints  of  a 
military  censorship  and  despotism  that  we  have  gained  a 
partial  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  perfectness  of  the  civili 
zation  of  the  island  of  Luzon.  Whoever  has  had  the  oppor 
tunity  to  read  Clay  MacCauley's  lecture  on  "The  Very  Noble 
City  Manila,"  delivered  at  Yokohama  in  the  present  year,  has 
acquired  some  trustworthy  knowledge  of  the  civilization  of 
the  chief  city  of  the  Philippine  Islands  —  a  civilization  which 
has  a  footing  in  other  parts  of  the  island  and  in  other  islands 
of  the  Philippinean  group. 

Mr.  MacCauley  was  formerly  a  resident  clergyman  in 
Washington,  where  he  is  now  well  remembered  and  highly 
appreciated.  For  many  years  he  has  lived  in  Japan  as  the 
representative  of  the  Unitarian  denomination  of  the  United 
States.  He  is  a  trustworthy  witness,  and  that  within  my  own 
knowledge. 

Listen  to  a  description  of  a  home  in  Manila.      He  says : 

Possibly  you  would  like  to  know  of  the  kind  of  house  into  which  I 
then  was  welcomed.  It  is  a  long,  broad  bungalow,  having  a  floor  raised 
about  five  feet  from  the  ground.  Between  it  and  the  street  lies  the 
garden  of  which  I  spoke  before,  ornamented  in  the  center  by  a  fountain, 
and  bearing  in  great  abundance  foliage,  shrubbery,  and  flowers  that  serve 
as  a  shield  for  the  inmates  of  the  house  against  the  curious  eyes  of 
passers-by,  and  that  delight  the  senses  with  color  and  fragrance. 

Fronting  the  garden  and  reached  by  wide  steps  is  a  vine-surrounded 
porch  extending  the  whole  width  of  the  house,  whence  one  may  enter, 
by  large  windows  and  doors,  a  vestibule  that  is  as  wide  as  the  porch. 
This  vestibule,  large  enough  for  the  dancing  of  a  good-sized  Virginia 
reel,  is  richly  frescoed  in  dark  colors  —  walls  and  ceiling.  Its  floor  is 
made  of  hardwood  boards,  so  hard  as  to  seem  rather  like  metal  than 
wood,  laid  in  alternating  colors,  yellow  and  brown,  and  so  highly  polished 
as  to  look  more  like  costly  furniture  than  a  floor.  Here  is  social  hall, 
drawing-room,  and  family  gathering-place,  all  in  one. 

Leading  backward  from  the  vestibule  for  about  seventy-five  feet  is  a 
generous  corridor.  From  one  side  of  this  passage  doors  open  into  five 
large  chambers  for  the  use  of  separate  members  of  the  family.  In  a 
certain  sense  this  corridor  is  only  a  balcony.  It  may  be  thrown  wholly 
open,  on  the  side  opposite  the  bedrooms,  upon  the  shaded  driveway  that 
leads  thence  to  the  carriage-house  and  servants'  quarters.  At  the 
farther  end  of  the  passageway,  by  flights  of  steps  under  three  Moresque 


1 96 

arches,  one  ascends  to  a  large  enclosed  platform  that  covers  the  carriage- 
house,  and  serves  as  the  general  dining-room.  The  walls  of  the  dining- 
room  are  frescoed  so  as  to  simulate  the  trellises  of  a  grape  arbor. 

Everywhere  in  the  building  are  Pompeii-like  decorations :  floors  of 
hardwood,  laid,  as  in  the  vestibule,  in  alternating  colors ;  high-studded 
ceilings  with  open  gratings  under  them  for  the  free  circulation  of  air, 
and  large  windows,  unglazed,  but  iron  barred  and  heavily  shuttered. 
Toward  the  sea  the  view  is  fully  open.  The  house  is  especially  char 
acterized  by  spaciousness,  airiness,  shade,  and  a  free  outlook  across  the 
bay. 

On  this  description  I  ask  you  to  realize  that  such  a  home 
could  not  exist,  would  not  be  permitted  to  exist,  except  in  a 
highly  civilized  community,  and  under  the  protection  of  a 
wise  and  efficient  government. 

From  Manila  a  railway  extends  longitudinally  along  the 
island  to  the  distance  of  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  miles, 
carrying  civilization  to  the  interior  parts  of  Luzon.  One 
excuse,  one  pretext  for  the  war,  has  been  the  assertion  that 
the  Filipinos  were  uncivilized,  and,  therefore,  that  they  were 
not  entitled  to  consideration, —  a  criminal  view  of  human 
rights,  and  a  view  resting  on  a  falsehood  as  to  the  facts. 

The  country  has  indulged  in  many  delusions.  It  was  a 
delusion  that  the  insurgents  in  Cuba  were  the  worthiest  part 
of  the  population  of  the  island.  That  delusion  is  passing 
away,  but  it  was  an  incentive  to  the  war  against  Spain. 

It  is  an  error,  which  the  Administration  has  promulgated, 
and  which  it  continues  to  cherish  and  defend,  that  the  Fil 
ipinos  are  uncivilized  and  incapable  of  self-government,  even 
now  when  the  evidence  to  the  contrary  is  conclusive. 

With  cheek  unblushing  we  go  on  in  the  prosecution  of 
this  war  as  though  our  ideas  of  civilization  were  to  be 
accepted  by  every  grade  of  people  from  the  tropics  to  the 
arctics. 

In  all  the  public  policy  of  this  war,  and  especially  in  the 
proclamations  of  the  President  to  the  Filipinos,  there  may  be 
seen,  and  only  half  'Concealed,  the  arrogant  pretension  that 
whatever  we  have  is  good  and  that  whatever  has  been 
accepted  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  is  bad. 


197 

But  the  evidence  of  civilization  and  good  government  is 
not  limited  to  Manila  and  Luzon.  'Five  degrees  of  latitude 
to  the  south  of  Manila  is  the  small  island  of  Cebu,  which 
resembles  in  size  and  shape  the  island  of  Long  Island,  on 
our  own  coast.  On  the  anniversary  day  of  the  birth  of 
Washington  the  United  States  gunboat  "  Petrel "  demanded 
the  surrender  of  the  city  of  Cebu.  I  am  to  read  the  answer 
which  the  governor  of  Cebu  gave  to  the  commander  of  the 
"  Petrel "  upon  the  short  notice  of  fourteen  hours.  As 
a  specimen  of  literary  work  it  may  rival  the  writings  of  the 
mayor  of  the  city  of  Boston,  and  the  writer  exhibits  a  respect 
able  knowledge  of  diplomacy  and  the  usage  of  nations,  not 
unworthy  the  notice  of  the  accomplished  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  United  States.  Listen  to  words  of  truth  and  justice 
from  the  lips  of  an  uncivilized  ruler  of  an  uncivilized  people: 

In  the  face  of  the  verbal  intimation  to  this  government  by  the  com 
mander  of  the  United  States  gunboat  "  Petrel  "  demanding  the  surrender 
of  the  fort  and  city  of  Cebu,  in  order  to  hoist  the  flag  of  his  nation  on 
the  Cotta  within  the  limit  of  fourteen  hours,  the  great  council  convoked 
in  consequence,  and,  composed  of  representatives  of  all  the  live  forces  of 
the  country,  resolved  unanimously  to  cede  to  these  demands,  in  view  of 
the  superiority  of  the  American  arms,  but  not  without  first  protesting 
that  neither  the  government  of  this  province  nor  the  whole  of  its  inhab 
itants  combined  have  the  power  to  execute  acts  expressly  forbidden  by 
the  honorable  President  of  the  Philippine  Republic,  Emilio  Aguinaldo, 
our  legitimate  chief  of  the  state,  recognized,  thanks  to  his  indisputable 
qualities  of  just  governor  and  illustrious  general. 

Sad  and  painful  is  the  situation  of  this  defenseless  city,  compelled 
to  act  contrary  to  its  own  convictions  ;  therefore,  it  proclaims  before 
the  whole  world  that  this  occupation  is  not  based  upon  any  rights  which 
form  the  codes  of  any  civilized  nation ;  it  never  expected  to  behold 
such  a  scene  at  the  close  of  a  century  supposed  to  be  enlightened. 

The  talk  of  conquest,  of  protectorate,  of  cession  made  by  the 
Spaniards,  as  if  the  Archipelago,  and  our  persons,  above  all,  were  mer 
chandise,  subject  to  barter,  when  one  only  of  these  is  worth  more  than 
a  thousand  worlds,  even  if  composed  of  that  metal  called  vile,  which 
possibly  enchants  like  the  eyes  of  a  serpent. 

But  be  this  as  it  may,  the  only  person  whom  the  pretender  can  treat 
with  is  Sefior  Aguinaldo,  without  whose  acquiescence  the  act  demanded 
of  this  government  is  neither  licit  nor  legal,  being  too  momentous. 

(Signed)  Luis   FLORES,  Governor. 

CEBU,  Feb.  22,  1899. 


198 

Can  this  act  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  be  called  a 
worthy  commemoration  of  the  birthday  of  a  man  who  car 
ried  on  a  war  through  seven  years  in  support  of  the  right  of 
self-government,  and  thereupon  founded  a  republic  as  a  living 
protest  against  tyranny  and  imperialism  in  every  form? 

I  am  thus  able  to  lay  before  you  evidence  from  two  cities 
in  two  islands  of  the  Philippine  group,  five  hundred  miles 
distant  from  each  other,  which  gives  support  to  three  propo 
sitions,  namely :  That  the  Filipinos  are  a  civilized  people ; 
that  they  are  already  a  self-governing  people;  and  that 
Aguinaldo  is  supreme  even  in  the  extreme  parts  of  the 
archipelago. 

In  the  presence  of  the  missive  of  the  Governor  of  Cebu, 
what  is  to  be  said  of  the  tender  of  "  good  and  stable  gov 
ernment  "  by  the  President  of  the  United  States?  How  can 
the  claim  be  made  that  we  are  engaged  in  a  war  for  civiliza 
tion  and  humanity?  In  truth,  nothing  in  honesty  and  justice 
remains  for  the  President  and  his  supporters  except  the 
admission  that  the  \var  is  a  war  of  aggression  and  conquest 
—  a  criminal  war  of  aggression  and  conquest  for  which  the 
President  alone  is  responsible.  But,  whether  admitted  or 
evaded,  that  is  the  issue  before  the  country. 

Wherever  we  have  touched  the  islands  of  the  Philippinean 
group  we  have  found  civilization,  domestic  comfort,  and  a 
form  of  government  that  was  popular  in  its  nature  and 
agreeable  to  the  people.  The  records  of  the  army  move 
ments  in  Luzon  justify  this  statement,  and  at  Iloilo  and 
Cebu  there  were  well-administered  local  governments  when 
we  entered  those  towns. 

In  all  the  principal  islands  there  are  local  and  municipal 
governments  on  which  the  framework  of  a  general  gov 
ernment  can  rest  and  be  maintained  in  stability  and  vigor. 
Such  a  government,  based  on  a  declaration  of  independence, 
has  been  set  up,  with  Aguinaldo  at  its  head,  and  with  the 
authorized  concurrence  of  the  representative  men  of  one 
hundred  and  ninety-one  provinces  and  cities  and  towns. 

Its    provisions    are  known.     They    are    not    open   to  any 


199 

serious  criticism.  The  instrument,  as  a  scheme  of  work 
manship,  and  as  an  instrument  for  the  guidance  of  affairs  of 
state,  is  far  superior  to  our  Articles  of  Confederation  under 
which  our  fathers  lived  for  a  long  ten  years. 

The  answer  to  all  this  is  that  the  government  is  a  govern 
ment  of  paper  only,  and  that  Aguinaldo  is  not  recognized 
beyond  the  military  limits  of  his  command. 

Something  to  the  contrary  might  be  inferred  from  the 
events  of  the  i8th  and  I9th  of  June,  when  a  reconnoitring 
party  of  General  Wheaton's  command  was  ambuscaded 
within  twenty  miles  of  Manila  by  Filipinos  who  professed 
friendship,  and  then  subjected  our  small  force  to  a  treat 
ment  not  unlike  that  which  the  troops  of  England  received 
at  Concord  in  1775. 

In  the  autumn  of  1898  Aguinaldo  proclaimed  a  fast  to  be 
observed  on  the  thirty-first  day  of  December  in  memory  of 
Jose  Rizal,  who  had  been  executed  by  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment.  The  day  was  observed  in  Manila,  in  the  presence  of 
our  army.  Business  was  suspended,  the  streets  were  vacant, 
and  the  houses  were  draped  in  mourning.  Such  was  the 
influence  of  Aguinaldo. 

The  Filipinos  at  Manila,  and  elsewhere,  are  not  to  be 
trusted  as  to  the  position  and  power  of  Aguinaldo,  nor  as  to 
the  strength  and  location  of  his  command.  To  the  inhab 
itants  of  Luzon  we  are  usurpers  and  tyrants,  and  as  a  conse 
quence  they  practice  falsehood  and  deception  upon  us. 
These  vices  everywhere  and  always  are  the  outgrowth  of 
tyranny.  Frankness,  truthfulness,  courage,  justice,  coexist 
with  freedom  of  thought  and  freedom  of  action,  and  they 
flourish  nowhere  else. 

To  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  the  President 
is  a  usurper  and  a  tyrant,  and  yet  we  indulge  the  hope  that 
the  subjugation  of  the  Filipinos  will  be  followed  by  confidence, 
respect,  and  a  devoted  attachment  on  their  part  to  the  insti 
tutions  and  people  of  the  United  States.  Friendships  and 
the  attendant  virtues  of  friendships  —  confidence,  mutual 
respect,  free  service,  devotion  —  are  not  the  outcome  of 


200 

processes  of  subjugation.  Subjugation  is  followed  always  by 
tyranny,  and  tyranny  on  the  one  part  breeds  hypocrisy, 
deception,  and  treachery  on  the  part  of  those  who  are  the 
victims  of  tyranny. 

At  this  point  in  my  address  I  give  emphasis  to  two  propo 
sitions :  We  are  engaged  in  war  with  an  organized,  civilized 
body  of  men,  who  number  eight  million  or  ten  million,  or 
even  twelve  million  possibly  in  all,  and  who  can  command 
a  fighting  force  of  two  million,  all  our  enemies,  and  united 
in  opinion  and  compacted  in  purpose  as  were  never  the 
people  of  the  United  States  in  any  war  that  we  have  carried 
on. 

My  second  proposition  is  this :  As  between  the  policy 
of  the  President  and  the  demand  of  the  Filipinos  there  can 
be  no  compromise,  no  arrangements.  We  are  to  subjugate 
the  Filipinos,  or  they  are  to  achieve  their  independence. 
In  this  view  of  the  situation  I  ask :  What  has  been  accom 
plished,  and  what  is  now  the  outlook?  What  value  can  the 
President  now  attach  to  his  proclamations  of  Jan.  5  and  April 
last? 

Let  him  consider  the  answer  that  has  been  given  by  time 
and  events  to  the  declarations  therein  made,  and  let  him 
announce  the  time,  if  he  will,  that  will  be  required  for  their 
fulfilment.  Three  of  the  propositions  as  announced  by  the 
President  are  these : 

1.  "The  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  the  capture 
of  the  city  of  Manila  practically  effected  the  conquest  of  the 
Philippine  Islands." 

2.  "As  the  result  of  the  victories  of  American  arms,  the 
future  control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  are  ceded  to  the  United  States." 

3.  "The  military  government  heretofore  maintained  by 
the  United  States  in  the  city,  harbor,  and  bay  of  Manila  is  to 
be  extended  with  all  possible  despatch  to  the  whole  of  the 
ceded  territory." 

And  now  in  this  month  of  September,  1899,  what  remains 
of  these  pretensions  to  power  and  right?  Has  the  conquest 


201 

of  the  Philippine  Islands  been  effected?  Have  we  the 
"control,  disposition,  and  government"  of  them?  Has  the 
military  government  "  heretofore  maintained  by  the  United 
States  in  the  city,  harbor,  and  bay  of  Manila  "  been  extended 
to  "  the  whole  of  the  ceded  territory,"  or  permanently  to  any 
part  of  it?  Has  our  recognized  occupation  of  territory 
or  our  authority  in  government  been  advanced  since  the 
opening  of  the  year?  Has  any  declaration  then  made  been 
verified  by  events?  Has  any  promise  then  made  been 
kept?  Has  any  hope  that  was  then  entertained  been  real 
ized? 

What  has  come  from  the  embassy  of  peace  that  went  out 
with  a  demand  for  unconditional  submission  in  one  hand  and 
a  promise  of  supernal  government  in  the  other?  Buffeted 
and  overmatched  by  its  adversaries,  it  returns  discredited  by 
its  own  admissions. 

Further,  I  ask  what  progress  has  been  made  in  the  execu 
tion  of  these  declarations  put  forth  by  the  President  in  January 
and  April  of  the  present  year?  — 

1.  "  The    taxes    and    duties    heretofore    payable   by   the 
inhabitants  to  the   late  government  become  payable  to  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States,  unless  it  be  seen  fit  to  sub 
stitute  for  them  other  reasonable  rates  or  modes  of  contribution 
to  the  expenses  of  government." 

2.  "  In  the  fulfilment  of  this  high  mission,  supporting  the 
temperate  administration  of  affairs  for  the  greatest  good  of  the 
governed,  there  must  be  sedulously  maintained  the   strong 
arm  of  authority,  to  repress  disturbances,  and  to  overcome 
all  obstacles  to  the  bestowal  of  the  blessings  of  good  and 
stable  government  upon  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands, 
under  the  free  flag  of  the  United  States." 

Have  any  taxes  been  collected  outside  of  Manila  and  the 
environs  of  that  city  and  two  other  cities  that  we  control  by 
force  of  arms?  How  far  has  "  the  strong  arm  of  authority  " 
been  stretched  over  the  thousand  islands  of  the  Philippine 
group?  I  do  not  ask  the  imperialistic  supporters  of  the 
administration  to  name  an  island,  even  an  insignificant  one, 


202 

that  is  grateful  or  would  be  grateful  for  our  presence.  I  only 
ask  them  to  name  a  league  of  land,  however  sparsely  inhab 
ited,  that  will  accept  our  jurisdiction  with  complacency. 
Enemies  have  we  everywhere?  Yes,  enemies  everywhere; 
and  everywhere  they  have  been  created  by  the  policy  and 
doings  of  the  government  and  the  army.  In  June,  1898, 
from  Aguinaldo  to  the  humblest  worker  in  the  rice  fields,  the 
United  States  had  not  an  enemy  in  the  archipelago.  In 
June,  1899,  we  could  not  command  a  friend. 

Diplomacy  and  embassies  have  accomplished  nothing,  and 
now  I  ask  what  can  be  said  of  our  military  operations? 

Our  navy  has  had  command  of  the  coasts.  The  natives 
there  have  been  defenseless.  Our  dominion  within  range  of 
the  shell  and  shot  of  the  navy  is  supreme.  We  are  indebted 
to  the  navy  for  the  capture  and  occupation  of  Cebu  and 
Iloilo. 

At  the  end,  what  remains  as  the  fruit  of  the  operations 
of  the  army?  When  the  contest  of  arms  opened,  our  force  in 
the  Philippines  was  not  less  than  thirty  thousand  men  — 
a  force  equal  to  the  conquest  of  the  islands,  as  was  then 
claimed.  Through  many  dreary  weeks  and  months  we  were 
assured  from  day  to  day  that  General  Otis  was  "  master  of 
the  situation  " ;  that  the  Filipinos  were  discouraged ;  that 
Aguinaldo  was  anxious  to  surrender;  that  he  was  deserted 
by  his  army;  and  that  the  insurrection  would  soon  come  to 
an  end. 

What  was  our  situation  when  in  June  the  weather  for 
campaigning  was  ended,  and  the  rainy  season  had  come? 
We  occupied  three  positions  in  Luzon  —  Manila,  Fernan- 
dino,  and  Imus,  the  two  last  mentioned  of  no  value  what 
ever  in  a  strategical  point  of  view.  In  the  four  months  from 
February  to  May,  inclusive,  we  had  had  many  skirmishes, 
many  insignificant  victories,  many  exhibitions  of  courage  on 
the  part  of  our  soldiers,  but  for  the  subjugation  of  the  islands 
the  prospect  was  less  favorable  in  June  than  it  had  been  in 
January.  Our  losses  in  battle  were  inconsiderable,  but  our 
capacity  for  further  military  undertakings  had  been  reduced 


203 

not  less  than  fifty  per  cent.  The  quite  unanimous  refusal  of 
the  volunteers  to  re-enlist,  although  large  inducements  were 
offered,  was  a  protest  against  service  in  the  islands,  and  it 
may  have  been  a  protest  also  against  the  policy  of  the  war  on 
the  part  of  the  government.  Upon  the  return  of  the  volun 
teers,  we  are  receiving  trustworthy  information,  from  which  the 
country  will  derive  valuable  instruction. 

An  Englishman,  who  claims  to  have  been  at  the  theater  of 
war,  estimates  the  American  losses  from  fighting  at  an 
average  of  five  per  day  during  the  winter  campaign,  and  the 
losses  of  the  Filipinos  at  twice  that  number.  If  the  loss  on 
the  part  of  the  Filipinos  from  February  to  June  has  been  at 
the  rate  of  fifty  or  even  one  hundred  a  day,  Aguinaldo's 
fighting  force  has  not  been  diminished. 

In  November  next  Aguinaldo  will  have  all  the  fighting 
men  that  he  can  use ;  he  will  have  added  to  his  supply  of 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  in  every  respect  his  command  will 
be  better  prepared  than  ever  before.  This  view,  however, 
will  not  be  accepted  at  Washington,  and  the  statement  will 
be  offensive  to  the  imperialists  of  the  country.  Time  will 
test  its  wisdom. 

We  are  at  the  end  of  a  year  of  occupation  —  we  are  at  the 
close  of  a  winter  campaign.  We  have  gained  nothing  that  is 
of  value  to  us.  The  Filipinos  have  lost  nothing  that  impairs 
their  resources  for  the  conduct  of  another  campaign.  Our  loss 
of  life  must  be  counted  by  the  thousand,  and  the  expenditure 
of  money  by  tens  of  millions,  and  where  is  the  imperialist 
who  can  boast  of  what  has  been  accomplished?  Or  state  the 
gain  that  has  been  secured?  Or  offer  anything  but  vain 
promises  for  the  future,  such  as  the  President's  promise  of  a 
victorious  peace? 

Nor  are  we  free  from  cause  for  anxiety  for  the  fate  of  the 
army  during  the  months  of  inaction  through  which  we  are 
passing.  The  statements  made  by  Surgeon  McQueston  of 
General  Otis'  staff,  and  recently  the  head  of  the  medical  staff 
at  Manila,  furnish  food  for  serious  thought.  The  inter 
viewer's  report,  which  has  stood  unchallenged  for  many 
weeks,  is  this : 


204 

Unless  troops,  thousands  of  them,  are  sent  to  the  aid  of  our  men 
there,  they  will  be  driven  hack  into  Manila  in  the  course  of  the  next  few 
months,  during  the  rainy  season.  Our  men  simply  cannot  stand  the 
climate.  Fifty  per  cent  of  them  will  be  incapacitated  by  sickness,  and 
the  territory  overrun  will  have  to  be  abandoned.  Manila  will  be  in  a 
state  of  seige  again. 

Our  officers  and  soldiers  have  accomplished  wonders  and  have  proved 
themselves  the  best  soldiers  in  the  world.  But  nothing  decisive  has 
come  of  it,  because  our  men  were  not  in  great  enough  force.  One  of 
the  great  dangers  that  our  men  have  to  face  is  the  climate.  The  new 
comers  will  be  at  a  disadvantage,  because  the  volunteers  who  are 
returning  home  are  inured  to  the  climate.  This  will  make  more  men 
necessary  than  we  could  otherwise  have  put  in  the  field.  As  a  matter  of 
belief,  the  Filipinos  think  they  have  the  Americans  licked  already.  One 
solution  of  the  situation  might  be  to  enlist  colored  men  from  the  Gulf 
States,  and  this  might  settle  some  of  the  race  questions  of  that  section. 
These  men  would  be  better  able  to  stand  the  climate  conditions  around 
Manila,  and  it  has  been  proved  that  they  are  good  fighters. 

I  want  to  say  a  word  for  the  Western  volunteers.  They  make  the 
finest  soldiers  in  the  world,  and  their  fighting  qualities  are  wonderful. 
But  the  volunteers  all  want  to  return  home,  and  I  hardly  think  that  the 
plan  to  reenlist  these  skeleton  regiments  from  the  volunteers  now  in  the 
Philippines  will  be  a  success.  The  men  enlisted  to  fight  for  their 
country,  and  they  are  not  the  kind  of  men  who  want  to  stay  and  fight  an 
insurrection  for  money  or  the  fun  of  fighting. 

If  Surgeon  McQueston's  report  of  the  condition  of  the 
army  is  trustworthy,  the  summary  must  be  this :  At  the 
end  of  a  fruitless  campaign  the  remnant  of  the  army  is  not 
only  incapable  of  an  aggressive  movement,  but  re-enforce 
ments  are  required  for  its  protection  and  preservation. 

As  proclamations  of  power  and  embassies  of  peace  are  no 
longer  available,  the  Administration  can  offer  to  the  country 
only  war  —  exhausting  war — for  an  indefinite  future. 

The  continuance  of  the  war  means  more  men  and  more 
money.  The  increase  of  the  army  for  service  in  the  tropics 
means  a  longer  death  roll,  and  that  without  reference  to  the 
losses  in  the  field.  With  men,  and  the  frequent  renewal  of 
the  supply  of  men,  we  can  overrun  the  territory,  we  can 
destroy  property,  we  can  lay  waste  the  evidences  of  civiliza 
tion,  we  may  blast  the  prospects  of  youth  and  dim  the  hopes 


205 

of  age,  we  may  make  misery  the  general  condition  of  millions 
of  human  beings,  and  the  inheritance  of  those  yet  to  be  born, 
but  there  are  two  enemies  in  the  Philippines  we  cannot  van 
quish.  The  climatic  diseases  of  the  tropics  gloat  upon  num 
bers,  and  prosper  with  every  addition.  When  you  double  or 
treble  the  army  in  the  East,  you  lengthen  the  death  roll  and 
increase  the  sum  of  family  and  domestic  misery  in  the  United 
States  in  the  same  proportion. 

Our  other  enemy  is  the  embittered  hostility  of  the  people, 
which  war  may  aggravate  but  can  never  remove. 

Is  it  a  wild  suggestion  to  say  that  if  General  Otis  had  had 
sixty  thousand  men  in  his  command  in  January  last  his  situ 
ation  today  would  not  be  better  than  it  now  is,  while  his 
record  of  death  losses  would  be  much  worse? 

He  might  have  penetrated  the  island  to  the  distance  of  a 
hundred  miles,  but  the  spectacle  would  have  been  the  same, 
and  the  necessity  for  a  retreat  the  same  upon  the  approach  of 
the  rainy  season. 

The  invasion  of  a  territory  is  not  conquest.  Conquest 
requires  permanent  occupation  of  territory  and  continuing 
local  government,  and  finally  the  abject  submission  or  the 
general  approval  of  the  people.  These  conditions  are  impos 
sible  in  the  Philippines. 

v  American  citizens  will  never  colonize  the  islands,  and, 
therefore,  local  civil  government  friendly  to  the  United  States 
can  never  be  instituted.  The  army  cannot  subsist  in  the 
interior  through  the  seasons  and  year  after  year,  and,  there 
fore,  local  military  government  is  impracticable. 

The  Administration  may  be  congratulated  upon  its  success 
if  it  will  accept  the  teaching  of  the  lessons  furnished  by  the 
experience  of  the  past  year.  We  are  invincible  on  the  sea- 
coast  along  the  margin  that  is  within  range  of  our  gunboats 
and  ships  of  war,  but  gunboat  jurisdiction  is  temporary, 
evanescent,  and  at  any  moment  we  may  be  dispossessed  by  a 
storm. 

An  army  of  thirty  thousand  men  may  penetrate  the  island 
of  Luzon  at  its  pleasure  in  the  winter  season,  and  an  army  of 


206 

one  hundred  thousand  men  will  perish  in  the  swamps  and 
rice-fields  of  the  interior,  or  it  will  seek  refuge  in  the  moun 
tains,  or  it  will  retreat  to  the  seacoast  when  the  rainy  season 
comes  on,  as  in  this  year,  1899. 

What  Macauley  said  of  Spain  is  equally  true  of  the  Philip 
pines  :  "  The  easiest  of  all  lands  to  overrun  and  the  hardest 
to  conquer."  We  have  overrun  a  territory  in  Luzon  as  large 
as  the  state  of  Rhode  Island,  and  we  have  not  gained  peace 
ful  jurisdiction  of  an  acre  of  ground. 

Hostile  populations,  numbering  millions,  cannot  be  charmed 
by  peace  embassies  nor  cajoled  by  veneered  proclamations, 
nor  by  force  of  armies  can  they  be  converted  into  patriotic 
citizens. 

It  is  the  history  of  popular  rebellions  that  they  succeed  — 
it  is  in  the  nature  of  things  that  they  should  succeed  —  espe 
cially  when  the  rebels  have  a  just  cause  and  ample  territory 
to  which  they  may  flee  for  refuge  and  for  reorganization.  We 
have  examples,  not  in  the  United  States  only,  but  in  Hayti 
and  in  the  states  of  Central  and  South  America,  from  Mexico 
to  the  Argentine  Republic. 

No  exception  in  two  continents,  and  the  Philippines  will 
not  be  an  exception. 

The  Administration  has  been  forced  by  events  to  abandon 
its  policy  of  peace,  for  which  there  was  no  justifying  founda 
tion  or  ground  for  hope. 

We  now  enter  upon  a  policy  of  war  —  a  policy  of  war 
unmasked  and  freed  from  all  adventitious  circumstances.  A 
heavy  responsibility  rests  upon  those  who  venture  to  assume 
it.  Not  much  time  can  pass  before  the  country  will  be 
forced  to  abandon  the  policy  of  war  and  to  enter  upon  a 
policy  of  justice  to  others,  thereby  securing  peace  for  our 
selves.  Let  the  country  command  peace,  or  else  be  prepared 
to  accept  a  conscription  act  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  in 
the  Philippine  Islands. 

The  Governor  of  Cebu  has  raised  the  question  of  title  on 
our  part,  as  against  the  title  of  the  Filipinos,  who  are  the 
occupants,  and  whose  ancestors  for  centuries  have  been  the 


207 

occupants  of  the  islands.  He  claims  that  the  title  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  is  superior  to  the  title  of  Spain 
as  the  discoverer.  His  claim  has  support  in  the  treaty 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  to  which  the  United 
States  has  assented. 

The  valley  of  the  Essequibo  river  is  the  territory  in  dis 
pute.  Great  Britain  claims  a  right  to  the  entire  valley  as 
derived  from  Spain,  the  discoverer,  through  Denmark,  the 
intermediate  proprietor.  By  the  treaty,  which  is  now  under 
arbitration  at  Paris,  Great  Britain  holds  the  territory  that 
it  has  occupied  for  fifty  years,  and  Venezuela  holds  the 
territory  that  its  citizens  have  occupied  for  fifty  years,  and 
all  without  any  inquiry  as  to  the  original  title,  whether  it  was 
in  Venezuela  or  in  Great  Britain.  The  title  to  the  interme 
diate  and  unoccupied  portion  of  the  valley  is  to  be  found  by 
the  arbitrators. 

The  Venezuelan  treaty  warrants  this  conclusion,  namely : 
That  a  title  resting  in  possession  is  superior  to  a  title  derived 
from  discovery.  Under  this  doctrine  the  superior  title  to  the 
Philippine  Islands  was  in  the  inhabitants,  and  consequently 
Spain  had  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  title  to  which  the  treaty 
of  December,  1898,  could  attach.  Under  this  doctrine  the 
Filipinos  had  a  right  to  assert  their  superior  title.  This  has 
been  done  in  every  part  of  the  islands,  unless,  possibly,  the 
city  of  Manila  may  have  been  an  exception.  We  are  now 
asserting  a  title  that,  in  principle,  has  been  disavowed  by 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  in  a  treaty  that  received  our 
approval,  and  that  was  proclaimed  as  a  triumph  of  American 
policy  in  our  new  part  as  one  of  the  great  powers  of  the 
world. 

If  in  this  address  I  have  presented  a  gloomy  view  of  our 
conduct  in  the  Philippinean  war,  and  of  our  condition  at  the 
close  of  the  year,  some  relief  may  be  found  in  a  single  ray  of 
light  that  may  be  thrown  upon  the  dark  picture. 

We  declared  war  against  Spain  in  the  belief — a  belief  in 
which  I  had  no  share  —  that  the  sufferings  of  the  patriotic 
Cubans  were  such  as  to  justify  and  require  our  intervention 


208 

upon  grounds  of  humanity.  The  country  was  deceived  and 
misled,  and  we  entered  at  once  upon  a  war  of  aggression  and 
conquest,  first  in  Porto  Rico  and  Cuba,  then  and  now  in  the 
Philippine  Islands,  with  hints  that  the  interests  of  trade  and 
the  missionary  spirit  combined  may  soon  demand  our  inter 
vention  in  China. 

A  war  commenced  in  misrepresentations  and  misunder 
standings,  and  carried  on  for  the  subjugation  of  a  people  who 
owe  no  allegiance  to  us,  may  be  ended  in  an  exhibition  of 
chivalric  justice  for  which  no  example  can  be  found  in  the 
history  of  mankind. 

Is  it  a  vain  thing  to  suggest,  is  it  a  vain  thing  to  indulge 
the  hope,  that  the  United  States  may  redeem  its  honor  and 
purge  itself  from  the  foul  stain  of  carrying  on  a  war  for  con 
quest  and  power,  by  conceding,  and  conceding  freely  and 
without  delay,  independent  statehood  and  full  individual 
sovereignty  to  Porto  Rico,  to  Cuba,  and  to  the  Philippine 
Islands? 


TO  EDWIN  BURNETT  SMITH 
AND  ERVING  WINSLOW. 


TO   EDWIN   BURNETT  SMITH  AND   ERVING 
WINSLOW. 


BOSTON,  MASS.,  Oct.  11,  1899. 

GENTLEMEN: — I  am  compelled  by  Mrs.  Boutwell's  long 
continued  illness,  to  put  aside  and  at  once,  all  thought  of 
acceding  to  your  request  to  me,  to  be  present  at  the  confer 
ence  of  American  Anti-Imperialists  to  be  held  at  Chicago,  the 
seventeenth  day  of  the  present  month. 

Massachusetts  will  be  represented  in  the  conference,  but 
the  state  has  already  so  declared  its  opinions  that  its  further 
action  can  be  forecast.  The  Democratic  party  has  denounced 
the  war  in  the  Philippines,  and  the  Republican  party  has 
refused  to  sanction  the  doings  of  the  President,  and  it  has 
traversed  his  policy  by  demanding  peace  and  the  recognition 
of  the  right  of  self-government  in  those  whom  the  President 
is  seeking  to  subdue  to  his  will. 

There  are  several  points  on  which  the  conference  may 
declare  its  opinions  and  announce  its  policy  with  entire  free 
dom  and  with  much  power: 

1.  The  President  should  be  held  responsible  for  the  war  in 
the  Philippines,  and  for  the  sacrifice  of  life  and  the  expendi 
ture  of  treasure  incurred  in  its  prosecution. 

2.  The  conference,  in  the  name  of  the  Anti-Imperialists 
of  the  country,  should  announce  its  purpose  to  oppose  his 
re-election  and  its  further  purpose  to  oppose  the  election  of 
members  of  Congress  who  may  sustain  his  policy. 

3.  The  conference  may  declare  its  purpose  to  oppose  the 
re-election  of  any  members  of  Congress  who  may  sustain  an 
appropriation  of  men  or  money  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

On  these  points  there  should  be  no  compromises,  no  con 
cessions. 

Thus  far  the  President  alone  is  responsible.  Should  Con 
gress  endorse  and  sustain  his  policy  we  can  then  carry  the 

211 


212 

contest  into  the  states  and  districts,  for  the  purpose  of  unseat 
ing  the  men  who  may  have  supported  and  sanctioned  the 
doings  of  the  President. 

At  present  we  are  not  in  co-operation  with  any  political 
party.  Let  us  reserve  and  preserve  our  right  of  action  and 
our  freedom  of  action  in  the  presidential  election  of  1900, 
until  that  contest  has  been  organized,  coupled  with  the 
understanding  that  it  is  our  purpose  to  contribute  to  the 
defeat  of  any  party  that  demands  the  subjugation  of  the 
Philippine  Islands.  Our  Republic  thus  far,  and  certainly 
since  the  thirteenth  amendment  was  adopted,  has  rested  upon 
two  great  propositions :  'The  equality  of  men  in  the  states 
and  the  equality  of  states  in  the  Union.  The  President's 
policy  is  an  abandonment  of  both  of  those  propositions  and 
the  substitution  therefor  of  a  colonial  empire  on  the  model  of 
the  British  empire.  We  demand  peace  in  the  Philippine 
Islands  and  the  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
self-government  in  Cuba,  in  Porto  Rico,  and  in  the  Philippine 
Islands,  as  the  only  means  by  which  our  country  can  be 
saved  from  a  disgraceful  abandonment  of  the  principles  on 
which  the  Republic  has  rested  for  a  long  century,  and  a 
degrading  acceptance  of  wars  and  policies  which  we  have 
denounced  through  the  same  period.  Republic  or  Empire? 
That  is  the  question  before  the  country,  f 

To  EDWIN  BURNETT  SMITH, 
ERVING  WINSLOW. 


INDEX 


Adams,  J.  Q.,  as  Author  of  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  13. 

Address  to  the  people,  179,  181. 

Age,  Old,  27. 

Aguinaldo,  Ally  of  Dewey,  148;  Address  by, 
150;  In  the  Right,  159;  His  influence  in 
Manila,  199  ;  His  Means  for  a  New  Cam 
paign,  203. 

Alaska,  Boundary  of,  31  ;  Purchase  of,  40; 
Acquisition  of,  90. 

Allen,  Elisha  A.,  39. 

Alliance,   The    Holy,     15;     With    England, 
Effect  of,  73. 
illiances,      59 ;     x-ror 
Create  Enemies,  75. 

American  States,  Self-dependence  of,  19. 

America,  Colonies  of,  56  ;  True  Policy  for,  73. 

Ames,  Fisher,  77. 

Annexation,  Hawaiian,  39;  of  Sandwich 
Islands,  39 ;  No  gain  by,  43  ;  Results  of,  72; 
To  be  Forced  on  the  United  States,  83  ; 
Consequences  of,  Political-  and  Indus 
trial,  85. 

Anti-Imperialists,  Policy  of,  125;  Plan  of,  154; 
Purposes  of,  158. 

Anti-Imperialism,  155,  157. 

Arbitration,  How  far  Nations  are  Bound  to 
Arbitrate  Differences,  6;  International,  27  ; 
Benefits  of,  in  cases,  29;  Scope  of,  30,  54; 
Treaties  for  International,  Advantages  of, 
32  ;  Terms  of  the  treaty  of,  with  England, 

Arbitrators,  Character  of,  34. 

Army,  Mercenary,   Character  of,  144 ;   to  be 

Supplied  by  Conscription,  183  ;    Results  of 

Operations  of  the,  202. 
Artillery,  Flying,  61. 
Bragg,  Captain,  61. 
Britain  Great,  Controversy  with  Venezuela,  3  ; 

War  of  1^12  with,  54. 
Burlingame,  His  Opinion  of  China,  no. 
California,  Purchase  of,  40 ;  Treaty   for  the 

Acquisition  of,  90. 
Canada,  Possession  of  by  England,  a  Cause 

of  Trouble,   41  ;   Proclamation  concerning 

Revolution  in,  107. 
Cantabrigia  Club,  Address  Before,  89. 
Campaign,   What  May  be  Accomplished   by 

Another,  205. 

Catholic  Church  in  the  Philippines,  99,  100. 
Cebu,  Governor  of,  197;  Civilization  in,  197; 

Letter  of  Governor  of,  197 ;  Anniversary  of 

Birth  of  Washington  in,  198. 
Chandler,  Senator,  on  Alliance  with  England, 

59. 
China,     its    Resources,    no;   Alliance    with 

Russia,  no;   As  a   Warlike  Country,  112; 

Its  Antiquity,   112;   Its  policy  in  the   i3th 

Century,  112;  Character  of  its  People,  112. 
Chicago  Conference,  Letter  to  the,  211. 
Citizens,  Classes  of,  73. 
Churches  to  be  free,  79. 
Church  and  State,  101. 
Citizenship,  Duties  of,   53  ;    Denial   of,   70; 

Under  the  Constitution,  72. 
Civilization  in  the  Philippines,  198. 


Claims,  Adjustment  of,  with  France,  33. 

Cleveland,  President,  Opinion  of  Law  of 
Nations  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  18. 

Climate,  The  Influence  of,  81. 

Colonies,  Cost  of,  59;  Government  of,  76; 
Impose  Servitude,  82  ;  Influence  of,  96; 
The  Error  of  Creating,  115. 

Colonization,  205  ;  The  Meaning  of,  14;  Oppor 
tunities  of,  80. 

Columbia  District  of,  Government  in  the,  139. 

Commission  on  Controversy  between  Eng 
land  and  Venezuela,  n. 

Commission,  Failure  in  the  Philippines  of, 
202. 

Communications,  none  to  Philippines,  157. 

Confederation  of  France,  Italy,  Spain  and 
Portugal,  41. 

Congress,  War  Power  in,  53;  Its  Duty,  115; 
Powers  of,  191,  192,  193. 

Congregational  Club,  Address  before  the,  105. 

Conscripts,  Army  of,  183. 

Constitution,  the  isth  Amendment  to,  77. 

Corinto,  Acts  of  England  at,  n. 

Countries,  Evils  of  Small,  41. 

Country,  Right  or  Wrong,  53. 

Criticism,  The  Right  of,  193. 

Cuba,  Pledge  in  Regard  to,  58 ;  War  for,  96 ; 
Redemption  of,  98;  Regeneration  of,  99; 
Government  of,  102,  123  ;  Neutrality  not 
observed  by  United  States  in  regard  to,  106. 

Cuban  Insurgents,  Character  of,  66. 

Gushing,  his  Opinion  of  China,  no. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  his  Purposes,  177. 

Debts  of  Nations,  28. 

Dependencies,  Cost  of,  59. 

Diplomacy,  Failure  of,  168. 

Discovery,  Title  to  Territory  Through,  12. 

England,  Position  in  Regard  to  Venezuela,  7; 
Claims  of,  8;  Doings  of,  at  Corinto,  n; 
No  Attempt  by,  to  Seize  Venezuela,  20; 
Claims  Against,  28;  Monroe  Doctrine,  Its 
Nonacceptance  by,  35  ;  Disputes  with,  41 ; 
Distant  Possessions  of,  a  Cause  of  War,  42; 
Wars  of,  42;  Its  Policy  in  Colonizing,  42; 
Claim  of,  to  American  Colonies,  56;  Alli 
ance  with,  59;  Policy  of,  75  ;  Relations  to, 
in  case  of  Revolution  in  Canada,  107 ; 
Its  real  policy  as  to  the  United  States,  113; 
Its  Policy,  124;  Alliance  with,  153;  Claim 
of,  over  American  Colonies,  161. 

Empires,  Nature  of,  125  ;  How  Constituted, 
165. 

Equality,  Abandonment  of  the  doctrine  of,  172. 

Essequibo  Valley,  England's  Claim  in,  8. 

Expansion,  How  dangers  of,  may  be  avoided, 
?8. 

Filipinos  converted  into  enemies,  138 ;  War 
against  the,  The  evils  of  a,  143  ;  Their  Pur 
pose  and  Courage,  152 ;  Capable  of  Self- 
government,  161. 

Flag,  Jurisdiction  of,  85 ;  Set  up  in  Mexico 
and  Hauled  Down,  91,  92. 

France,  Treaty  with,  of  1880,  33  ;  Italy,  Spain 
and  Portugal,  if  Confederated,  41  ;  Alliance 
with,  59;  Treaty  of  1803  with,  90. 

Freedom  for   Cuba  and  the   Philippines,  83. 


213 


214 


Government,  Self-right  of,  to  exist,  46  ;  Self, 
71  ;  Self,  Claims  for,  71  ;  Self,  Limits  of,  76 ; 
Self,  Wisdom  of,  77;  Self,  Opinion  of 
Fisher  Ames  on,  77 ;  Self,  Fitness  for, 
How  acquired,  78 ;  Self,  Knowledge  of, 
How  Acquired,  79  ;  Free,  for  Cuba  and  the 
Philippines,  83;  Nature  of  where  found, 
123;  Essential  Elements  of  free,  124;  Self, 
or  Tyranny,  137;  in  the  Philippines,  146; 
Contest  for  Free,  159. 

Grant,  General,  Favored  the  Acquisition  of 
San  Domingo,  40. 

Hawaii,  Under  Control  of  United  States,  43; 
Population  of  Incongruous,  43  ;  Alliance  of, 
with  any  other  country  impossible,  44;  How 
Situated,  44;  Revolution  in  a  wrongful  act, 
46;  Population  of,  47;  Rejection  of,  58; 
Annexation  of,  39,  70;  Can  it  be  admitted  into 
the  Union?  94;  Acquisition  of,  130;  Com 
mission  on  policy  for,  132,  133. 

Homes,  Americans  will  not  make,  in  the 
tropics,  81. 

Independence  of  the  Philippines,  206. 

Inhabitancy  Essential  to  Colonization,  80. 

Inhabitants  of  Territory,  Transfer  of,  12. 

Imperialism,  87,  89,  155,  157  ;  Evils  of,  171. 

Imperialist,  Who  is  an,  121. 

Imperialists  or  Republicans,  120,  121  ;  Policy 
of,  125. 

Institutions,  How  Extended,  101. 

International  Arbitration,  27. 

Intervention,  Under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  17. 

Islands,  Policy  Concerning  the,  208. 

Isolation,  87,  89;  Policy  of,  90;  Results  of, 
94. 

Japan,  Future  of,  105. 

Jurisdiction,  Title  to,  by  Possession,  9  ;  Lim 
its  of,  70  ;  Evils  and  Responsibilities  of,  79. 

Law  of  Nations,  Monroe  Doctrine  not  a  part 
of  the,  18. 

Law,  Advantages  of  our  process  of,  32. 

Laborers,  Letter  to,  187. 

League,  Anti-Imperialist,  Policy  of  the,  182, 
183  ;  Anti-Imperialist,  its  demands,  212. 

Letters  to  Governor  Long,  67. 

Letter  to  Laboring  Men,  187. 

Lincoln,  Mr.,  Definition  of  Republicanism  by, 
122. 

Lodge,  Senator,  Definition  of  Monroe  Doc 
trine  by,  14  ;  Senator,  121. 

Long,  Governor,  Letters  to,  67 ;  Governor, 
Advice  of,  148  ;  Governor,  Position  of,  162, 
163  ;  Governor,  Promises  by,  169. 

Louisiana',  Purchase  of,  40. 

Luzon,  Civilization  in,  196. 

Maine,  Battleship,  Destruction  of,  66. 

MacCauley,  Lecture  by,  195. 

Manila,  Consequences  of  Capture  of,  83,  129  ; 
Inhabitants  of,  100;  Home  in,  195;  Taxes 
in,  20 1. 

Maximilian,  Expedition  of ,  to  Mexico,  10. 

McKinley's  Administration,  Review  of,  116. 

McKinley's  Policy,  Effects  of ,  117,  118. 

McQueston,  Surgeon,  His  Statement,  203. 

Merrimac,  Destruction  of  ship,  61. 

Mexico,  Maximilian  in,  10  ;  War  With,  91. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  3  ;  Origin  of,  and  Authority 
of,  4  ;  Scope  of,  10,  13,  35,  90  ;  For  Whose 
Benefit?  10;  History  of,  13  ;  For  the  Benefit 
of  the  United  States,  16,  17  ;  Interpretation 
of,  17. 

Nations,  Debts  of,  28;  Friendships  among, 
106. 

Navy,  Danger  from  Increase  of,  5. 

Negro,  The,  His  Fitness  for  Self-Govern 
ment,  78. 

Neutrality,  Not  Observed  by  us  in  Regard  to 
Cuba,  106;  How  Preserved  in  1841,  107. 

Oligarchy,  72. 

Pacific,    Perils  of  Possessions  in  the,  75. 


Peace,  Security  For,  60;  Or  War,  104;  How 
Secured,  165. 

Pearl  River  Harbor,  How  Acquired,  43. 

Philippines,  Admission  of,  Into  the  Union, 
94  ;  Government  of,  98,  102,  123  ;  Cause  of 
the  Insurrection  in  the,  100 ;  For  Whose 
Benefit  Acquired,  105;  Dangers  from,  108 ; 
President's  Policy  Concerning  the,  116; 
Advantages  of,  142;  Promises  of  President, 
Concerning,  147;  Title  to,  149;  No  Com 
munications  to,  by  Anti-Imperialists,  157; 
War  in  the,  Cost  of,  162,  167;  Subjugation 
of,  Impossible,  164;  Civilization  in,  198; 
Local  Governments  in,  198;  The,  Their 
Number  and  Power,  200  ;  Title  to  the,  206; 
Policy  in  Regard  to  the,  207,  208;  War  in, 
Character  of,  194. 

Platform  of  the  Anti-Imperialist  League,  154: 

Policy,  Public,  Changed  by  War,  51,  53. 

Porto  Rico,  Government  of,  102;  Subordinate 
Condition  of,  122;  Policy  in  Regard  to,  208. 

Possessions,  Insular,  Refused,  40,  58  ;  Insular, 
a  Source  of  Weakness  in  War,  42. 

Pratt,  Consul,  Statement  of,  149. 

President,  Interview  with,  69;  Position  of, 
114;  Plans  of,  Concealed,  115;  Responsible 
for  the  War,  127,  144  ;  Deception  of  the,  in 
Regard  to  the  Philippines,  128;  Policy  of, 
138  ;  Proclamation  by  the,  145;  Claims  by, 
145;  a  Despot,  146;  His  Purpose,  15 1  ;  In 
the  Wrong,  159,  160;  Proclamation  of  Jan. 
5,  1899,  163  ;  Errors  of,  173  ;  Unrepublican 
Policy  of,  176,  177;  McKinley,  A  Duty  to 
Defeat,  187;  Opinion  of  him  in  the  Philip 
pines,  199;  His  Policy  is  War,  200;  His 
Demands,  200;  Promises  of,  Failures,  201. 

Problems  Raised  by  the  War,  65. 

Proclamation  of  the  President,  145 ;  Presi 
dent's  of  Jan.  5,  1899, 163. 

Promises  of  the  President,  147. 

Protocol,  Error  Concerning,  126,  128. 

Rebellion,  Claims  against  England,  28  ;  Pres 
ent  Annual  Charge  on  account  of,  28. 

Republic,  How  Transformed,  130. 

Republicans  or  Imperialists,  120. 

Russia,  its  Position,  109;  Its  Policy  in  the 
East,  109;  and  China  in  Combination,  in. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  Views  Concerning  Venez 
uela,  55. 

Salem,  Address  at,  121. 

Samoa,  90  ;  Policy  Concerning,  130  ;  Evils  of 
the  Occupation  of,  171. 

San  Domingo,  Offer  of,  40;  Rejection  of,  58. 

Sandwich  Islands,  Tender  of,  39. 

Schomburgh's  Line,  Venezuela  Not  Bound 
by  it,  7. 

Servitude,  Colonial  Systems  Impose,  on  the 
Governing  Country,  82. 

Sheridan,  General,  Ideas  of  War,  62. 

Ships,  Changes  in  Structure  of,  60. 

Slavery,  Peaceful  Abolition  of,  30;  Its  Aboli 
tion  in  Spain  and  Brazil,  57. 

Soldiers,  Rights  of,  158. 

Sovereignty,  Our  Claim  to,  in  the  Philippines, 
161. 

Spain,  Weakness  of,  66;  Reasons  for  War 
with,  67;  Treaty  of  1819  with,  90;  Its 
Downfall,  96;  Government,  of  the  Philip 
pines  by,  100  ;  Our  Title  from,  166. 

Springfield,  Speech  at,  191. 

St.  Thomas,  Purchase  of,  40. 

State  and  Church,  101. 

Taxes,  Collection  of,  201. 

Teavens,  John  J.,  Letter  to,  177. 

Territory,  Title  of,  by  discovery,  12  ;  Trans 
fer  of,  by  Force,  12  ;  Continental,  accepted, 
40;  Wars  for  Conquest  of,  57  ;  Extension  of, 
70;  Acquisition  of,  78;  Conditions  for  the 
Increase  of,  93  ;  Power  of  our  Government 
to  Acquire,  138. 


215 


Texas,  Purchase  of,  40;  Annexation  of,  91. 

Treaty,  Terms  of  Proposed  Treaty  with  Eng 
land,  33,  34;  Arbitration,  Its  Effect  upon 
Foreign  and  Domestic  Policy,  36. 

Tremont  Temple,  Meeting  in,  136. 

Tropics,  Americans  Cannot  Make  Homes  in 
the,  81 ;  Jurisdiction  of,  fraught  with  evil,  85. 

Tyler,  John,  Proclamation  by,  in  1841,  107. 

Tyranny  or  Self-Government,  137. 

United  States,  Interest  in  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine,  10;  Commission  of,  on  Controversy 
Between  England  and  Venezuela,  n  ;  Right 
of,  to  Intervene  under  Monroe  Doctrine,  17  ; 
As  Protector  of  other  States,  19  ;  No  Inter 
est  in  the  Controversy  Between  England 
and  Venezuela,  21;  Tender  of  Sandwich 
Islands  to,  39;  Disputes  with  England,  41; 
Territory  of,  43  ;  Policy  of,  70  ;  Future  of, 
If  we  Occupy  the  Philippines,  108  ;  Power 
of,  to  Acquire  Territory,  138. 

Venezuela,  Controversy  with  Great  Britain,  3; 
Not  bound  by  the  Schomburgh  Lint,  7; 
Dispute  Concerning,  55. 

Venezuelan  Question,  3  ;  Treaty,  the  Prin 
ciple  in,  207. 


Washington,  Policy  of,  87;  Example  of,  124; 

His  Conduct  in    1776,  161 ;  Birthday  of,  in 

Cebu,  198. 
War  Spirit,  5;  The  United  States  Responsible 

for  the,  in  England  and  the  United  States, 

22. 

War,  Justifying  Reasons  for,  5  ;  Historical, 
54;  Just  Causes  of,  55;  For  Religion  and 
Humanity,  57;  Change  of  our  Public  Policy 
Through,  51,  53;  Spanish,  Changes  in  Gov 
ernment  from,  65 ;  the  Fruits  of  Alliances,  74; 
Results  of  the  Present,  95;  Sacrifices  in,  96; 
or  Peace,  104,  105  ;  Responsibility  for,  on 
the  President,  127;  Object  of  the  war  with 
Spain,  127;  Justification  for,  143;  Declared 
by  the  Presidents,  145:  Unjust,  the  Greatest 
of  Crimes,  178  ;  the  Character  of,  193  ;  Its 
Continuance  and  Cost,  204  ;  Responsibility 
for  its  Continuance,  206;  Power  in  Con 
gress,  53. 

Webster,  the  Influence  of  his  Eulogy  on 
America,  43  ;  Speech  of,  96. 

Williams,  Consul,  Statement  of,  149. 

Woodford,  Minister,  Opinion  of,  in  regard  to 
Cuba,  97. 

World,  Opinion  of,  95. 


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